Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 051800Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 051735Z NOV 25 – 051800Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (The synchronization of RF deep kinetic strikes, rear-area disruption, and frontal assaults on the Pokrovsk axis remains the primary and accelerating threat.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad Axis (CRITICAL FOCUS): FACT: UAF counter-infiltration forces (Skelya Regiment) confirmed successful defensive operations, raising the Ukrainian flag over the Pokrovsk City Council (051742Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This is a key counter-narrative and morale boost, confirming UAF retention of the city center despite heavy RF pressure and IO claims of encirclement. The tactical pressure on Myrnohrad remains severe (Previous SITREP), indicating that RF ground forces are still attempting to outflank the Pokrovsk defense.
• Operational Rear (Slovyansk Sector): FACT: RF Reactive Artillery (RVG 'Yug' Grouping) claimed a successful rocket strike against a warehouse containing ammunition (BP) and military technical equipment (VTI) of the UAF 54th Separate Mechanized Brigade (OMBR) near Slovyansk (051800Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This strike, if confirmed, directly targets the logistical depth and sustainment capabilities for UAF forces defending the Donbas axis, reinforcing the MLCOA of disrupting the rear area to facilitate a breakthrough.
• Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia: FACT: Air Raid Alert has been called off in Zaporizhzhia (051735Z NOV 25). Dnipropetrovsk Oblast has published power outage schedules for 6 November (051746Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: The scheduled blackouts confirm the systemic operational impact of previous RF strikes and establish constraints on UAF CNI, even in the absence of current active strikes.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Deteriorating weather (fog/low cloud) continues to favor RF deep strikes (Shahed) and infiltration efforts. The scheduled power outages in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (051746Z NOV 25) confirm the success of RF energy strikes and will exacerbate the operational challenges for UAF C2, repair, and sustainment activities during the critical 6 November period.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Posture: UAF maintains a strong, active defense on the Pokrovsk front, supported by effective counter-IO and morale-boosting actions (Pokrovsk flag raising). UAF is actively pursuing strategic force generation efforts (15,000 vacancies for the Unmanned Systems Force) (051749Z NOV 25), indicating a long-term commitment to asymmetric warfare superiority.
• RF Posture: RF forces are executing the synchronized kinetic plan: Deep Strikes (Slovyansk depot strike, potential Shahed wave preparation) + IO Campaign (high volume of content focusing on RF unity and UAF failures) + Frontal Assaults (Myrnohrad pressure).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Deep Strike Capability (Confirmed): RF retains the capability to execute precise RVG strikes on high-value logistical targets (e.g., 54th OMBR depot near Slovyansk) well behind the front lines. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Multinational/Inter-Ethnic Unity IO: RF C2 is prioritizing domestic political messaging, confirmed by Putin supporting the declaration of 2026 as the 'Year of the Unity of Peoples of Russia' (051753Z, 051800Z NOV 25). INTENT: Bolster domestic support and counter perceived Western 'Russophobia' targeting Russia's multi-ethnic character.

Intentions:

1. Operational Paralysis: RF intends to overload UAF C2 and logistics through simultaneous, multi-domain attacks (Shahed saturation, SpN raids, deep kinetic strikes) to force a tactical collapse on the Pokrovsk axis.
2. Psychological Attrition: RF IO efforts (e.g., claims of mass UAF amputations due to NATO med standards, 051758Z NOV 25) aim to undermine the credibility of Western support and degrade UAF soldier morale and trust in allied training/equipment.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Counter-UAV Tactics (Observed): RF Rosgvardia footage claimed the successful detection and engagement of an adversarial UAV (051753Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This highlights RF's ongoing efforts to adapt short-range AD/Counter-UAS systems, particularly in rear or sensitive security areas where Rosgvardia typically operates. This adaptation may degrade UAF tactical ISR capacity near HVTs.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• UAF Logistics (Vulnerability): The confirmed RVG strike near Slovyansk (if successful BDA is confirmed) represents a significant, localized loss of ammunition and VTI for the 54th OMBR, necessitating rapid resupply and dispersal measures to mitigate future losses.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 remains robust enough to coordinate long-range fires (RVG strike on Slovyansk) while simultaneously managing front-line operations (Myrnohrad) and strategic IO messaging (Putin's unity focus). The threat to UAF C2 in Kostiantynivka (Previous SITREP) remains the critical vulnerability RF is attempting to exploit.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Morale/IO Superiority: The confirmed re-establishment of the Ukrainian flag in Pokrovsk City Council is a major symbolic and psychological victory, reinforcing UAF operational control and denying the RF IO narrative of city seizure/encirclement.
• Force Generation: The announcement of 15,000 vacancies for the Unmanned Systems Force (051749Z NOV 25) demonstrates UAF’s strategic commitment to expanding its asymmetrical advantage, which is crucial given the current RF focus on deep logistics strikes.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Tactical Successes:

1. Pokrovsk Retention: UAF forces confirmed control of Pokrovsk City Center. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. FPV Effectiveness: Continued tactical success against RF personnel/logistics (Previous SITREP FPV kills) is confirmed by aggressive RF counter-UAV measures observed in the new footage (Rosgvardia footage, 051753Z NOV 25).

Setbacks:

1. Logistical Loss: The confirmed RF RVG strike on a 54th OMBR depot near Slovyansk, if BDA is confirmed, represents a critical loss of resources in a key operational support area.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Urgent Requirement: Rapid BDA validation of the Slovyansk strike impact. If confirmed severe, J4 must prioritize the resupply of 54th OMBR from secondary logistics nodes and immediately implement maximum dispersal/concealment measures for all remaining VTI and ammunition depots within 30km of the current front line.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO (Strategic Unity): Putin's focus on declaring 2026 the 'Year of the Unity of Peoples of Russia' (051753Z, 051800Z NOV 25) is a high-level strategic IO effort aimed at solidifying domestic support against internal and external destabilization threats.
• RF IO (Hybrid/Medical): RF media is disseminating narratives claiming mass UAF amputations due to faulty NATO tactical medicine standards (051758Z NOV 25). AIM: Degrade confidence in Western support and equipment among UAF personnel and their families. This is a classic hybrid warfare tactic.
• UAF IO (Counter-Narrative): The visible raising of the Ukrainian flag in Pokrovsk (051742Z NOV 25) serves as a potent, immediate counter-IO measure against RF claims of capture.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• UAF morale is buoyed by tactical successes (Pokrovsk retention, FPV kills) and strategic efforts (drone recruitment). However, public sentiment will be negatively impacted by the confirmed power outage schedules in Dnipropetrovsk (051746Z NOV 25), reinforcing the perceived vulnerability of CNI.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4-8 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will maximize chaos in the rear to enable frontal assault success:

1. Shahed Attack Commencement: The predicted large-scale Shahed attack is still assessed as imminent (likely commencing within the next 2-4 hours). Primary targets will remain CNI and logistics hubs in Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava Oblasts, exploiting the scheduled power outage periods and weather conditions.
2. Kostiantynivka SpN Raid: RF infiltration groups will launch their kinetic raids against the identified HVTs (rail links, C2 nodes) in Kostiantynivka, exploiting the operational distraction and potential CNI/communication degradation caused by the Shahed strikes.
3. Myrnohrad Breakthrough Attempt: RF O-Group will launch a renewed, aggressive ground assault on the Myrnohrad axis, attempting to exploit any signs of UAF logistics breakdown or C2 confusion resulting from the rear-area attacks.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• GLOC Severance and Attrition: The combination of successful SpN activity in Kostiantynivka and successful RVG strikes (like the Slovyansk depot) severely degrades UAF ability to sustain front-line units. The resulting logistical bottleneck leads to ammunition shortages and delays in troop rotation, rendering UAF positions near Pokrovsk untenable under sustained RF kinetic pressure.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J2 (Counter-Infiltration): DEFENSE OF Kostiantynivka GLOCs.

   • Action: Immediately task engineer elements to prepare secondary and tertiary GLOC bypass routes around Kostiantynivka, assuming primary rail/road links will be targeted/temporarily disabled by SpN activity in the next 4 hours. All logistics convoys must be accompanied by EW/security detachments.

2. J4 (Logistics): AMMUNITION DEPOT DISPERSAL.

   • Action: Issue a FLASH directive for all remaining VTI and ammunition depots supporting the Donbas front (particularly those within 50km of the front line) to implement immediate, maximum dispersal and enhanced concealment. Use the Slovyansk strike as a clear example of RF deep targeting accuracy.

3. J5 (Planning): CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR MYRNOHRAD WITHDRAWAL.

   • Action: Develop and brief a limited, structured withdrawal contingency plan for heavy equipment and personnel from the most forward positions near Myrnohrad, to be executed only if the combined Shahed/SpN attacks induce catastrophic C2/Logistical failure in the rear area (MDCOA). This plan must prioritize minimizing attrition.

//END SITREP//