Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 051735Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 051703Z NOV 25 – 051735Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Synchronization of the RF deep strike and rear-area disruption is confirmed to be in progress, demanding immediate counter-action.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad Axis (CRITICAL FOCUS): FACT: RF elements (O-Group) are actively launching ground assaults in the Myrnohrad sector (051707Z, 051719Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This confirms the RF intention to press the attack on the Pokrovsk salient concurrently with the operational disruption in the rear (Kostiantynivka, as per previous reporting). The defense of Myrnohrad remains critical to preventing the isolation of UAF forward positions.
• Operational Rear (Northern Axis - NEW INGRESS): FACT: A new group of RF UAVs (Shahed) is confirmed inbound from Belgorod Oblast, moving toward Northern Kharkiv Oblast (051733Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This confirms the initial phase of the predicted Shahed saturation attack (MLCOA 5.1). The repeated use of the Belgorod vector aims to fix AD assets in the immediate border regions before the main wave focuses on logistics and CNI deeper in the East/Central Oblasts.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• No change. Deteriorating weather (fog/low cloud) continues to favor low-flying Shahed UAVs and infiltration groups. The cancellation of the "energy saving regime" in the Russian-occupied LNR (051730Z NOV 25) suggests localized RF confidence in maintaining power supplies in occupied areas, contrasting sharply with the planned nationwide UAF power outages.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Posture: UAF is engaged in active defense on the Pokrovsk axis and maintaining high AD readiness against the confirmed new UAV ingress. FPV/drone counter-offensives are confirmed successful at the tactical level (051730Z NOV 25).
• RF Posture: RF is executing the synchronized multi-domain attack: Ground Push (Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad) + Air Saturation (Kharkiv/Deep) + SpN Disruption (Kostiantynivka). RF IO is supporting these actions by heavily featuring claims of successful strikes with large munitions (FAB-3000) (051715Z, 051730Z NOV 25).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Tactical Strike (Confirmed Heavy Munitions): RF maintains the capability to employ heavy guided aerial bombs (e.g., FAB-3000) against hardened UAF positions (Ravnopolye area confirmed struck) (051715Z, 051730Z NOV 25). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Multinational Recruitment: Presidential decrees expanding citizenship for foreigners serving in the RF military after Feb 2022 (051713Z NOV 25) demonstrates a long-term strategic effort to sustain manpower through non-traditional means.

Intentions:

1. Operational Rupture: RF intends to force a critical logistical failure in the UAF rear (Kostiantynivka-Myrnohrad GLOCs) to enable a rapid tactical advance toward Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad.
2. Strategic Deterrence: RF continues to escalate strategic messaging regarding internal unity and external threats (Putin statements: 051707Z, 051708Z, 051709Z, 051723Z NOV 25) to deter NATO engagement and undermine domestic stability within Russia.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Counter-FPV Tactics (Observation): UAF drone footage shows an RF soldier attempting a desperate physical engagement ("fist fight") with an attacking FPV drone (051730Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: While tactically irrelevant, this highlights the immense psychological pressure and desperation FPV usage is inducing in RF front-line personnel.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Logistics (Strategic Constraint): UAF reporting suggests Lukoil's foreign operations are paralyzed by sanctions (051716Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This supports the long-term assessment of systemic economic strain on the RF war machine, contrasting with short-term kinetic capacity.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 remains focused on synchronizing deep strikes with tactical assaults. The successful employment of heavy munitions (FAB-3000) requires precise BDA and targeting coordination, suggesting C2 systems are functioning adequately for these large-scale fires missions.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Asymmetric Superiority (Confirmed): UAF FPV/drone teams (Azov Brigade, STERNENKO support) continue to achieve critical tactical kills against RF personnel and logistical vehicles near Myrnohrad (051719Z, 051730Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This counter-offensive capability is essential to slowing the RF advance and compensating for the current vulnerability in the logistics rear.
• Strategic Signal: The US test launch of the Minuteman III ICBM (051729Z NOV 25) and subsequent RF commentary (051706Z NOV 25) serve as powerful strategic signaling, reassuring UAF of continued Western deterrence posture against RF escalation.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Tactical Successes:

1. Pokrovsk Counter-Fire: Confirmed FPV kills on RF logistics vehicles and personnel near Myrnohrad directly slows the current RF assault momentum.
2. Strategic Support: Continued delivery of drones (Section 3.1) and confirmation of deep strike success (Tuapse, previous reporting) maintain UAF strategic depth.

Setbacks:

1. Confirmed New Air Ingress: The new Shahed group inbound on Kharkiv reinforces the imminent threat to CNI/logistics hubs and increases strain on already stretched AD assets.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Priority Requirement: Immediate ground and air assets must be allocated to defend against the active Myrnohrad assault and the new Shahed threat simultaneously. Emphasis must be placed on deploying ground-based electronic warfare (EW) and mobile SHORAD in the Kharkiv sector to address the initial Northern ingress, preventing RF from freely fixing AD assets.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO (Tactical Focus): RF "War Correspondents" are heavily promoting the 'O-Group' advance toward Dnipropetrovsk Oblast and the "storming" of Pokrovsk (051707Z NOV 25), exaggerating the pace of advance.
• RF IO (Strategic Focus): Putin's focus on "Mezhnatsionalnoye Yedinstvo" (Inter-ethnic Unity) and establishing a government commission on the issue (051707Z, 051708Z, 051709Z, 051712Z, 051721Z, 051723Z, 051725Z, 051728Z NOV 25) is a significant domestic IO campaign. AIM: To preemptively counter internal instability and reinforce the narrative that the war is supported by all of Russia’s ethnic groups, countering Western "provocations."
• UAF IO (Counter-Mobilization Narrative): UAF/Ukrainian media continues to actively address and dismiss sensationalist RF claims regarding TCC mobilization (e.g., Angelina Jolie’s driver incident) (051710Z, 051717Z, 051730Z NOV 25). AIM: Maintain public confidence in TCC operations.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• UAF morale is sustained by confirmed tactical successes (FPV strikes) but is under increasing pressure from the confirmed nationwide power outage schedule and the immediate threat to the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad front.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4-8 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The synchronized attack is accelerating:

1. Shahed Attack Escalation: The initial wave inbound on Kharkiv will be followed by larger, coordinated waves targeting CNI, logistics, and military infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava Oblasts.
2. Kostiantynivka Disruption Raid: RF SpN groups in Kostiantynivka will execute their raid(s) against high-value targets (HVT) – likely rail infrastructure or a main C2/Logistics center – within the next 2-4 hours, concurrent with the peak of the Shahed attack chaos.
3. Myrnohrad Assault Continuation: RF ground forces will continue probing attacks, attempting to exploit any signs of logistical disruption or C2 failure caused by the rear-area attacks to force a breakthrough on the Pokrovsk axis.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Operational Collapse (Confirmed Risk): Successful SpN attacks sever a major rail link and/or destroy a forward repair depot in Kostiantynivka. Combined with major power outages (CNI degradation), this logistical failure forces a decision to preemptively withdraw key heavy equipment and personnel from the Pokrovsk salient to prevent encirclement and attrition, granting RF a major operational victory.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J2 (Counter-Infiltration): INCREASE FORCE PROTECTION FOR RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE.

   • Action: Immediately increase security, surveillance, and hardening around all major rail bridges, classification yards, and rail repair depots within a 15km radius of Kostiantynivka, assuming these are the primary targets of SpN. Deploy fixed/mobile EW platforms to jam UAV reconnaissance efforts over these critical sites.

2. J3 (Air Defense): IMMEDIATE SHORAD DEPLOYMENT TO KHARKIV-BELGOROD VECTOR.

   • Action: Deploy immediately available SHORAD (e.g., Gepard, MANPADS teams) to the ingress corridor in Northern Kharkiv to attrit the initial Shahed wave and force RF to commit higher-value, harder-to-replace cruise missiles for the follow-on strike. Constraint: Ensure this commitment does not leave Dnipropetrovsk/Poltava critical HVTs unprotected.

3. J4 (Logistics): PRE-POSITION REPAIR ASSETS.

   • Action: Given the high risk of GLOC damage from SpN activity, pre-position emergency bridge repair assets, heavy recovery vehicles, and engineering units (J7) along key bypass routes immediately southwest of Kostiantynivka to ensure rapid repair and continued throughput into the Pokrovsk salient.

//END SITREP//