Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 051703Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 051700Z NOV 25 – 051703Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (The imminent synchronized RF deep strike against GLOCs and the Shahed attack remains the critical and immediate threat.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad Axis (CRITICAL FOCUS): FACT: UAF assault troops (SKELYA Regiment) confirmed re-securing the Pokrovsk City Council building (051636Z, 051655Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This localized victory stabilizes the immediate front line but increases the importance of the rear supply corridor, which remains the primary RF target (Kostiantynivka/Myrnohrad). RF IO is actively portraying the fall of Myrnohrad (formerly Dimitrov) as inevitable, indicating continued RF focus on cutting off this key operational salient.
• Operational Rear (Northern Axis): FACT: UAF Air Force confirms multiple new groups of RF UAVs (Shahed) inbound from Russia toward Northern Sumy and Chernihiv Oblasts (051647Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This confirms the commencement of the anticipated large-scale Shahed saturation strike, consistent with MLCOA (Section 5.1). The initial trajectory suggests an attempt to fix AD assets in the north and degrade CNI/logistics hubs in the central/eastern regions (Dnipropetrovsk/Poltava).
• Deep Rear (Zaporizhzhia): FACT: Russians launched two strikes against the Zaporizhzhia district, resulting in one civilian injury (051656Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: Confirms RF maintenance of persistent kinetic pressure against civilian targets, likely utilizing ballistic or high-speed cruise missiles (051651Z NOV 25 alert) to further drain AD resources and degrade morale.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Impact: Deteriorating weather (fog/low cloud) continues to favor low-flying Shahed UAVs and infiltration groups in the Donbas operational rear.
• CNI Impact (Escalated): FACT: Ukrenergo confirms scheduled power outages (08:00 to 22:00) across all regions of Ukraine tomorrow, in volumes up to 2 queues (051700Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This confirms the strategic effectiveness of previous RF CNI attacks, forcing UAF to divert resources to emergency power generation and creating operational constraints for military and logistics bases reliant on the grid.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Posture: UAF is in heightened AD readiness due to multiple inbound Shahed groups and ongoing ballistic missile threats (051651Z NOV 25). Counter-infiltration forces must simultaneously be positioned to defend critical GLOCs in Kostiantynivka.
• RF Posture: RF is executing the synchronized multi-domain attack: Phase 1: Shahed Infiltration (Northern Axis); Phase 2: Ballistic Threat (Eastern Axis); Phase 3: Deep Disruption (Kostiantynivka SpN) (assessed as imminent).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Strategic Strike (Confirmed): RF maintains the ability to launch synchronized multi-axis UAV attacks designed to overwhelm AD and target CNI (Shahed inbound now). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Psychological Warfare (Nuclear Signaling): RF officials (Belousov, Medvedev, Peskov) are actively promoting nuclear posturing (preparations for full-scale nuclear tests, updated nuclear triad) (051426Z, 051638Z, 051700Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This is assessed as strategic signaling intended to deter NATO intervention and international support for Ukraine, rather than an immediate tactical threat.

Intentions:

1. Isolate Pokrovsk (Primary): The immediate RF intention is to execute the synchronized disruption in Kostiantynivka concurrent with the Shahed attack to sever supply lines and collapse the Pokrovsk salient.
2. CNI Degradation (Winter Prep): RF aims to maximize damage to the energy grid and logistics infrastructure before winter, evidenced by the confirmed national power outage schedule (051700Z NOV 25).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Counter-Robotics: RF forces (Southern Grouping) successfully destroyed a UAF robotic complex via drone strike (051645Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This indicates an improved RF capability or prioritization in targeting UAF asymmetric robotic systems, which previously held an advantage. This must be countered by improved operational security for UAF robotic platforms.
• Drone Netting: RF UAV operators (1428 MSP) showcased the use of large net structures, likely for counter-drone operations (051635Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: RF is actively seeking sophisticated C-UAS solutions, challenging UAF dominance in the FPV/small drone sphere.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Logistical Constraint (Strategic): Ukrainian intelligence reports that Russian companies are widely shifting into "survival mode" (051651Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This supports the assessment that UAF deep strikes (e.g., Tuapse) and Western sanctions are having a cumulative, long-term impact on the RF economic base supporting the war effort.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 remains highly centralized and focused on IO synchronization. The celebration of Military Intelligence Day (051635Z, 051635Z NOV 25) alongside the push for nuclear signaling emphasizes morale reinforcement and strategic deterrence messaging.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Tactical Momentum: Confirmation of the SKELYA Regiment's success in Pokrovsk (051636Z, 051655Z NOV 25) confirms high morale and readiness at the tactical level.
• Materiel Acquisition (Asymmetric): The 54th Brigade received a new batch of drones (including FPVs) on the Siversk axis (051654Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: Confirms continued reliance on private/civilian fundraising efforts (STERNENKO) to maintain the supply of critical FPV/drone technology, an ongoing operational requirement.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Tactical Successes:

1. Pokrovsk City Center: The successful clearance operation stabilizes the front and denies RF a major IO victory.
2. Drone Reinforcement: New drone shipments to the Siversk axis indicate successful logistics pipeline operation despite constant RF kinetic pressure.

Setbacks:

1. CNI Degradation (Confirmed): The nationwide power outage scheduling (051700Z NOV 25) is a significant strategic setback, constraining military planning and mobility, particularly in the rear.
2. ISR Vulnerability: The confirmed successful RF strike on a UAF UAV launch system (from previous reporting) highlights a persistent vulnerability that the new counter-robotics capabilities of the RF (051645Z NOV 25) may exacerbate.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Priority Requirement: Immediate AD resources must be prioritized to protect the high-value logistics nodes (rail, road hubs, C2) in the Kostiantynivka rear area, even at the cost of providing full coverage to some non-critical CNI during the imminent Shahed attack.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO (Operational Focus): RF channels (Podoubny) are heavily promoting the narrative of Myrnohrad (Dimitrov) being "doomed" and "completely surrounded" (051634Z NOV 25), contradicting open-source assessments of current battlefield geometry. AIM: To preemptively claim victory, demoralize UAF defenders, and incite panic/displacement in the operational rear to clog UAF logistics routes.
• RF IO (Strategic Deterrence): The immediate synchronization of official nuclear signaling (Belousov/Medvedev statements) with military action seeks to anchor the conflict in the domain of strategic risk, complicating NATO decision-making. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• UAF IO (Mobilization Counter-Narrative): UAF channels are addressing the sensationalist claims regarding Angelina Jolie’s security detail and TCC (051639Z, 051654Z NOV 25). AIM: To normalize TCC activities and dispel claims of indiscriminate/illegal mobilization practices, thereby maintaining public trust in the call-up process.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• The immediate UAF requirement to schedule widespread power outages will generate significant civilian frustration and may be exploited by RF IO to undermine governmental trust. This is partially offset by confirmed tactical victories in Pokrovsk.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4-8 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The synchronization is now underway.

1. Shahed Saturation Attack Execution: RF will launch the main wave of the Shahed attack, exploiting the initial ingress via Sumy/Chernihiv to draw out Northern AD assets, before shifting focus to the CRITICAL logistics nodes (Rail, Energy Hubs) in Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava Oblasts.
2. Kostiantynivka Direct Attack: RF SpN infiltration groups in Kostiantynivka will initiate their planned disruption operation (ambush, C2/GLOC sabotage) concurrent with the peak of the Shahed attack (within the next 2-4 hours) to maximize operational chaos.
3. Ballistic Strikes: RF will likely utilize ballistic missiles (Iskander/S-300 variant) targeting Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv regions to maintain pressure and degrade AD effectiveness against the lower-speed Shahed threat.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Operational Rear Decapitation: RF SpN successfully targets and neutralizes a Battalion/Brigade C2 node or a major railway junction near Kostiantynivka while the Shahed strike degrades regional power and communications. The resulting C2 vacuum and logistics failure lead to the forced, immediate, and disorganized withdrawal of UAF elements from Pokrovsk, allowing RF mechanized units to enter Myrnohrad and achieve the desired operational breakout toward Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J2 (Counter-Infiltration): EXECUTE KOSTIANTYNIVKA CORDON AND SWEEP NOW.

   • Action: Immediately transition QRF elements in the Kostiantynivka area from standby to active counter-infiltration sweeps. Use local knowledge and thermal ISR (layered ground and air assets) to aggressively search for SpN groups. Decision Point: If the SpN groups are not located within the next 2 hours, assume they are fully embedded and prioritize defense of key rail bridges and C2 bunkers.

2. J3 (Air Defense): DIVERSIFY NORTHERN AD RESPONSE.

   • Action: Given the confirmed Northern ingress (Sumy/Chernihiv), utilize SHORAD assets to address the initial threat but retain the majority of mobile AD assets (e.g., Gepard/Patriot repositioning capability) to defend the central logistics nodes (Dnipropetrovsk/Poltava) against the inevitable shift in Shahed vector. Do not overcommit AD resources to the Northern perimeter.

3. J4 (Logistics): IMPLEMENT CONTINGENCY MOVEMENT PLAN (MYRNOHRAD).

   • Action: Initiate pre-planned contingency procedures for logistical bypasses and distributed ASPs near Myrnohrad (Dimitrov). All critical resupply convoys heading into the Pokrovsk salient must immediately transition to the highest alert level (CON LEVEL 1), utilizing dispersed, hardened convoys and integrating QRF escort teams.

//END SITREP//