Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 051433Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 051400Z NOV 25 – 051433Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (The operational picture is dominated by the strategic-level RF nuclear signaling coinciding with the immediate tactical threat to the Pokrovsk rear area. This synchronized multi-domain pressure is assessed as an attempt to force a strategic decision under duress.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad Axis (Decisive Point): FACT: UAF Command has made the political-military decision to hold the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad conglomeration for the "maximum possible time" (051429Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This confirms UAF commitment to a high-risk defense, making the integrity of the Myrnohrad logistics hub paramount. The continued presence of RF Spetsnaz/infiltration groups in this deep rear area remains the most immediate kinetic threat.
• Air Threat (Southern/Northern Axes): FACT: KABs are reported targeting Zaporizhzhia Oblast (051417Z NOV 25). Enemy UAVs (Shaheds) are reported near the Odesa coast, inbound toward Zatoka (051422Z NOV 25). A separate UAV group is reported from Bryansk Oblast, RF, heading towards northern Chernihiv Oblast (051407Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This confirms the predicted large-scale, multi-vector, and multi-domain RF air strike is underway, targeting logistics and CNI in the South, and forcing AD dispersion in the North, concurrent with the main ground effort in the Donbas.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• No new weather data, but previous reporting suggests deteriorating conditions favoring RF drone saturation strikes and deep infiltration efforts, which is now confirmed by the multiple inbound UAV threats across the theater.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Posture: UAF operational command is prioritizing the defense of the Pokrovsk logistical rear despite confirmed deep RF penetration. Reserve forces must be rapidly committed to counter-infiltration (Myrnohrad) and simultaneously prepare for the immediate AD response to the widespread UAV/KAB threat.
• RF Posture: RF is executing a synchronized Multi-Domain Attack (MDA):
  • Strategic Signaling: Maximum nuclear signaling to deter Western reinforcement.
  • Deep Kinetic: SpN action against logistics (Myrnohrad).
  • Air Shaping: Saturation UAV/KAB strikes to degrade CNI and AD capacity across multiple axes.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities (Escalated):

1. Strategic Coercion: RF leadership (Putin, Belousov, Gerasimov) has publicly ordered preparations for possible full-scale nuclear tests (051407Z, 051410Z, 051412Z, 051413Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This capability is strategic and aimed entirely at Western/NATO resolve, synchronizing maximum strategic pressure with the peak of the Donbas offensive.

Intentions (Tactical/Operational):

1. Exploit C2 Confusion: The multi-vector air threat (Chernihiv, Odesa, Zaporizhzhia) is designed to force UAF AD commanders to split resources and delay response times, ensuring maximum damage from the main Shahed/KAB wave (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
2. Ensure Operational Breakthrough: The strategic nuclear signaling and the tactical deep-rear disruption (Myrnohrad) are intended to induce paralysis in UAF high command, preventing the timely commitment of strategic reserves needed to hold the Pokrovsk FLOT.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Formal Nuclear Test Preparation: The public instruction by Putin to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and intelligence services to submit proposals for nuclear test preparation moves the signaling from mere rhetoric to institutional action. This is a critical escalation of the hybrid threat (051412Z NOV 25).
• Widespread Air Attack: The confirmed simultaneous air assaults across four major regions (Donetsk/Zaporizhzhia/Odesa/Chernihiv) demonstrates sophisticated command and control capacity for synchronized kinetic operations.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF Sustainment: RF logistics remain capable of sustaining high-tempo kinetic operations (UAV/KABs).
• UAF Interdiction Success: FACT: UAF drone strikes have successfully halted fuel exports from the RF port of Tuapse (051418Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This strategic interdiction is important for long-term RF energy exports and military fuel revenue but has no immediate impact on the tactical fight in the Donbas.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 demonstrates high effectiveness in synchronizing strategic information operations (nuclear signaling) with deep tactical operations (SpN in Myrnohrad) and widespread air strikes.
• UAF C2 is challenged by the necessity to defend the high-value Myrnohrad rear area while simultaneously managing multiple large-scale air attack warnings across the entire operational depth.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Strategic Hold: The high-level decision to hold the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area (051429Z NOV 25) indicates a firm defensive intent, likely committing last major operational reserves. This places maximum pressure on rear security (counter-infiltration) and AD readiness.
• Brigade Readiness: The 93rd Mechanized Brigade (OMBr) is actively soliciting donations for transport and combat kit (051416Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This indicates the strain on specific frontline units, forcing reliance on civilian support networks for critical equipment resupply, a common but worrying indicator of attrition and logistic strain.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Tactical Successes:

1. Decision to Hold: Formalizing the defense of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad axis provides clarity for resource allocation and commitment.
2. Strategic Economic Interdiction: Confirmed halting of fuel exports from Tuapse applies pressure to RF finances.

Setbacks:

1. Myrnohrad Threat: Confirmed, persistent deep threat to the most critical logistics node supporting the Donbas front.
2. Widespread Air Saturation: UAF AD is now actively engaged across a geographically dispersed theater, stretching already thin resources.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Operations)

• RF Strategic Signaling: The most significant IO development is the public, multi-channel broadcast of high-level meetings discussing nuclear test preparation (051403Z - 051428Z NOV 25). This messaging seeks to amplify strategic risk and cognitive deterrence against Western military aid provision or direct intervention.
• RF Tactical IO: RF milbloggers are increasingly claiming "Ukrainska Zaliznytsia" (Ukrainian Railways) is failing (051426Z NOV 25). This narrative is likely designed to preemptively cover for or amplify the success of deep SpN raids against railway targets, reinforcing the perception of UAF logistical collapse.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• UAF efforts are focused on local stability and resilience (Kharkiv OVA establishing support centers, 051416Z NOV 25), mitigating the morale impact of recent air strikes and front-line setbacks. However, the simultaneous threat of nuclear escalation and deep penetration (Myrnohrad) poses a serious risk of public and frontline demoralization.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will prioritize overwhelming UAF air defense while exploiting deep logistical vulnerabilities.

1. Air Strike Peak: The inbound Shahed waves (Odesa, Chernihiv) will reach their target areas, synchronized with continued KAB strikes (Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk). Primary targets will be power generation/transmission nodes and military logistics depots.
2. Myrnohrad Sabotage: RF SpN elements will execute a high-impact kinetic action against the Myrnohrad rail line or C2/GLOC, aiming to validate the RF IO narrative of logistical collapse and severely impede resupply to the Pokrovsk salient.
3. Frontal Pressure Continuation: The RF ground assault against the 110th OMBr (Uspenivka) will increase in intensity, capitalizing on the chaos and potential resupply failure in the rear.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - ESCALATED)

• Operational Rear Collapse: Successful SpN action in Myrnohrad, coupled with effective Shahed saturation strikes that disrupt regional C2 (e.g., in Dnipro or Poltava), creates a cumulative effect of operational paralysis. UAF defending units at Pokrovsk find themselves cut off or unable to receive critical resupply and C2, leading to an immediate, forced tactical retreat under heavy attrition. This withdrawal could expose significant operational flank, potentially endangering Kostiantynivka.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J4 (Logistics & Maneuver): DEDICATE AIR COVER TO MYRNOHRAD LOGISTICS (CRITICAL PRIORITY).

   • Action: Immediately commit the most capable available SHORAD system to the defense of the Myrnohrad rail hub and forward supply points. This is a high-risk decision but critical to preserving the operational rear. Accept increased risk to the Chernihiv/Odesa axes for this prioritization.

2. J3 (Maneuver): ESTABLISH INNER CORDON IN MYRNOHRAD (URGENT PRIORITY).

   • Action: Transition from area sweep to securing specific HVTs (railhead, power substation, C2 nodes) in Myrnohrad. Use dismounted infantry (QRF/National Guard) with night vision/thermal sights to establish hardened, localized perimeters around these assets, denying RF SpN quick access and forced withdrawal.

3. J2/J7 (Hybrid Warfare/Strategic): COUNTER NUCLEAR NARRATIVE (HIGH PRIORITY).

   • Action: Pre-emptively disseminate clear communication to friendly forces and international partners that RF nuclear signaling is a deliberate cognitive operation synchronized with tactical failure/exploitation, designed solely to deter support. Stress that the kinetic reality in Donbas requires continued, non-deterred military aid delivery.

//END SITREP//