Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 051400Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 051335Z NOV 25 – 051400Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Confirmation of sustained deep strike activity, escalated RF threat signaling, and continued operational chaos in the UAF rear.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad Axis (Deep Disruption): FACT: RF military channels (Операция Z) are broadcasting thermal drone footage claiming Spetsnaz is destroying "encircled enemy" (UAF) in Myrnohrad (Dymytrov) (051336Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This is a CRITICAL tactical update. This shifts the confirmed SpN activity from Rodynske (reported in the previous SITREP) further south/west into Myrnohrad, a major city and key logistics hub west of Pokrovsk. This confirms the RF operational intent to paralyze the entire Pokrovsk sustainment network.
• Eastern FLOT (Uspenivka): FACT: RF sources (Воин DV) claim UAF 110th Mechanized Brigade (OMBr) is suffering heavy losses attempting to hold Uspenivka, a village southeast of Pokrovsk (051349Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: If accurate, this indicates RF is applying maximum frontal pressure, concurrent with deep attacks, to force the 110th OMBr (a long-standing defender in the sector) into a decisive attritional battle, maximizing losses before the expected breakthrough attempt.
• Deep Battlespace (KAB/Missile Threat): FACT: UAF Air Force reports ongoing threat of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) targeting Donetsk Oblast and southern Kharkiv Oblast (051349Z, 051354Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This confirms RF continues the air-delivered CNI/force-shaping strikes, ensuring UAF forces remain pinned down and logistics nodes are degraded ahead of the ground assault.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• High-Speed Aerial Threat: FACT: UAF Air Force warns of a high-speed projectile approaching Kharkiv Oblast from the East (051354Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This likely indicates a ballistic missile or a fast cruise missile, confirming the multi-layered air defense threat (Shahed saturation, KAB precision, high-speed kinetics) against the key northern operational sector.
• Drone Alert in RF Rear: FACT: RF local authorities in Bryansk Oblast announce an immediate drone danger, advising citizens to take shelter (051403Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This confirms UAF long-range ISR/Strike assets remain active, maintaining pressure on RF logistics and command nodes despite the RF escalation.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Posture: UAF C2 is fully engaged in a multi-domain defense: (a) Counter-infiltration operations (95th Brigade in Rodynske/Kostiantynivka) must now extend to Myrnohrad/Dymytrov; (b) Active Air Defense against KABs and high-speed threats; (c) Maintaining FLOT integrity at high cost (110th OMBr).
• RF Posture: RF is executing the most dangerous phase of their current offensive, synchronizing deep-kinetic and information operations to induce operational chaos and clear the operational rear of UAF HVT protection prior to the main armored push.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Deep Spetsnaz Penetration: Confirmed ability to insert and sustain SpN/infiltration groups up to 40km behind the FLOT (Myrnohrad/Kostiantynivka sector), directly targeting the UAF operational core.
2. Strategic Signaling: RF leadership (Defense Minister Belousov) is engaging in overt nuclear signaling (proposing immediate preparation for nuclear tests), likely intended to deter Western intervention and project extreme confidence/escalation dominance during the current offensive phase (051359Z, 051401Z NOV 25).

Intentions (Tactical/Operational):

1. Exploit Deep Chaos: RF intends to use the confirmed SpN activity in Myrnohrad (Dymytrov) to sever the primary supply artery into Pokrovsk, forcing defending units to deplete supplies and potentially execute an emergency tactical withdrawal under pressure.
2. Pressure Strategic Decision-Making: The synchronized nuclear signaling is intended to apply maximum cognitive pressure on Ukrainian and NATO decision-makers during a critical tactical moment, discouraging external support or reinforcement.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Shift to Myrnohrad: The confirmed SpN presence in Myrnohrad is a significant tactical shift, targeting the final major logistics rail hub before Pokrovsk. This prioritizes rapid operational paralysis over slow attrition.
• Nuclear Signaling Coincidence: The public call for immediate preparation for nuclear tests by RF leadership coincides exactly with the peak phase of the Pokrovsk offensive, marking a return to high-stakes, asymmetric hybrid signaling.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF continues to sustain high-volume air strikes (KABs, high-speed missiles, UAVs) across multiple axes, confirming adequate munition stockpiles to sustain the current offensive tempo.
• UAF deep strikes, such as the confirmed suspension of oil exports from Tuapse (051355Z NOV 25), serve as a necessary counter-pressure, albeit on RF strategic sustainment rather than immediate tactical logistics.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 is highly coordinated, effectively merging SpN action, air strike missions, and strategic political signaling.
• UAF C2 is under extreme duress, fighting a simultaneous battle at the FLOT, in the operational rear (counter-infiltration in multiple cities), and in the air defense domain. The need to extend counter-infiltration operations to Myrnohrad strains already committed Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• FLOT Endurance (110th OMBr): The 110th OMBr remains heavily engaged at the FLOT (Uspenivka sector). Their continued ability to hold is critical, but attrition rates are assessed as HIGH.
• Rear Defense Commitment: UAF is correctly prioritizing the deep threat by committing high-readiness units (like elements of the 95th Brigade reported earlier) to secure Kostiantynivka and Rodynske. This effort must now be extended to Myrnohrad/Dymytrov to prevent logistical collapse.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Tactical Successes:

1. Strategic Interdiction: UAF long-range strikes successfully halted fuel exports from the Russian port of Tuapse, applying economic pressure.
2. Active Rear Interdiction (RF): The UAF-linked drone activity in Bryansk (RF territory) confirms offensive freedom of action in the strategic depth, forcing RF to commit AD assets away from the FLOT.

Setbacks:

1. SpN Penetration Depth: RF infiltration is now confirmed deep inside Myrnohrad, indicating a significant and rapidly worsening rear security crisis.
2. FLOT Attrition: RF reports of heavy losses to the 110th OMBr near Uspenivka suggest the frontal defense is highly costly.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Operations)

• RF Narrative (Operational): RF milbloggers (Операция Z) are utilizing captured drone footage to propagate the narrative of UAF encirclement and destruction in Myrnohrad, aiming to achieve a psychological breakthrough before a kinetic one.
• RF Narrative (Strategic/Global): RF officials (Belousov, Naryshkin) are aggressively engaging in nuclear brinkmanship, linking the call for nuclear test preparation to perceived US strategic escalation (Minuteman III test). This is a classical hybrid tactic to distract from operational setbacks (Tuapse) and amplify the existential threat.
• UAF Domestic Focus: UAF social media remains focused on internal corruption (ex-military commissar bail), which, while important, dilutes focus on the critical, immediate military threat in the Donbas.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• The combination of confirmed deep SpN raids into major operational rear cities (Myrnohrad, Kostiantynivka) and the RF focus on FLOT attrition is designed to maximize panic and demoralization among defending troops and local populations.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to achieve kinetic and psychological operational paralysis in the Pokrovsk rear area.

1. Myrnohrad Raid Escalation: RF Spetsnaz groups in Myrnohrad (Dymytrov) will conduct high-visibility raids (e.g., targeting rail lines, main power substations, or a confirmed military headquarters) to force a total cessation of logistics and create mass media panic.
2. Decisive FLOT Attack: RF ground forces will launch a multi-echeloned armored assault against a perceived weak point along the Pokrovsk FLOT (likely near Uspenivka, where the 110th OMBr is strained), immediately following the peak disruption caused by the deep raids and the expected large-scale Shahed attack.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - ESCALATED)

• Myrnohrad Logistics Severance and Breakthrough: RF SpN/infiltration successfully cuts the main rail line west of Myrnohrad and simultaneously forces the UAF 110th OMBr to exhaust its reserves defending the FLOT. The resulting logistical failure and tactical exhaustion allow RF armored units to achieve a critical operational breakthrough, rendering the Pokrovsk defense untenable and forcing an unplanned, rapid withdrawal.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Maneuver): SECURE MYRNOHRAD (CRITICAL PRIORITY).

   • Action: Immediately divert and task available high-readiness QRF (currently focused on Kostiantynivka/Rodynske) to focus on the Myrnohrad/Dymytrov urban area. Use localized air superiority (heavy drone presence, EW) to support the QRF in eliminating confirmed SpN cells and securing critical logistics infrastructure (rail hub, fuel depots).

2. J4 (Logistics): EMERGENCY GLOC CONTINGENCY (URGENT PRIORITY).

   • Action: Assume the main Myrnohrad rail line will be temporarily severed within the next 6 hours. Initiate immediate contingency plans to reroute high-volume ammunition and fuel convoys onto secondary roads and establish forward ammunition supply points (ASPs) closer to the Pokrovsk FLOT to bypass the Myrnohrad choke point.

3. J2 (Targeting): KAB/Missile Defense Prioritization (HIGH PRIORITY).

   • Action: Given the confirmed threat of KABs on Donetsk/Kharkiv and high-speed threats on Kharkiv, dynamically prioritize mobile AD assets to protect key FLOT command posts and forward logistics depots from precision air strikes, accepting increased risk to fixed CNI sites.

//END SITREP//