Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 051335Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 051305Z NOV 25 – 051335Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Confirmation of continued high-intensity combat, RF propaganda focus on Pokrovsk, and escalation in the deep battlespace.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad Axis (FLOT & Rear): FACT: RF media (Colonelcassad) released propaganda video featuring captured Ukrainian personnel claiming encirclement and heavy losses near Pokrovsk (051315Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This confirms that the battle for the Pokrovsk salient is currently the central focus of RF operational and information efforts. The claims of encirclement must be treated as hostile propaganda aimed at fracturing UAF morale, but the high-casualty narrative aligns with the reported high-intensity combat.
• Rodynske (Pokrovsk Rear): FACT: UAF sources (BUTUSOV PLUS) claim 95th Airborne Brigade paratroopers are "clearing Rodynske of remnants of Russian DRGs" (051318Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This is a CRITICAL update. Rodynske is immediately north of Myrnohrad (Dymytrov) and deep within the operational rear area. This confirms that the previously reported RF infiltration (просачивание) groups are now being actively engaged by UAF high-readiness forces in counter-infiltration operations, validating the assessment that RF deep disruption is kinetic and ongoing.
• Pleshchyivka (Eastern Axis): FACT: UAF 157th Separate Mechanized Brigade (OMBr) releases footage of successful FPV drone strikes against RF personnel in trenches near Pleshchyivka (051305Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: Confirms sustained high-attrition contact in the trenches and effective UAF asymmetric warfare against entrenched RF manpower.
• Deep Battlespace (CNI Strikes): FACT: Ukrainian Ministry of Energy confirms Russia conducted five air strikes using guided aerial bombs (KABs) against coal enterprises in Donetsk Oblast (051318Z NOV 25; 051322Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This confirms a precision component to the RF CNI attack, focusing not just on power generation (substations) but on industrial and resource supply capacity (coal mines). This is part of the broader systemic paralysis effort.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Ongoing Shahed Threat: UAF Air Force reports new groups of UAVs moving towards Sumy/Stepaniivka and another on the south of Kharkiv Oblast towards Chaplyne (051311Z, 051331Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: The anticipated large-scale Shahed attack is now confirmed to be developing along multiple axes, coinciding with the poor weather (fog/rain) previously assessed to degrade AD performance.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Focus: UAF C2 has initiated necessary counter-infiltration operations in the Rodynske/Kostiantynivka/Dymytrov sector utilizing high-mobility forces (95th Brigade elements). This effort is concurrent with a complex AD defense against the multi-wave Shahed attack (now confirmed in motion).
• RF Focus: RF is sustaining maximum pressure on the Pokrovsk FLOT while synchronizing deep effects (SpN raids and CNI/industrial strikes) to induce systemic failure in the UAF rear area.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Multi-Modal Deep Strike: RF is demonstrating the ability to strike deep with missiles/Shaheds (CNI) and KABs (industrial targets), effectively denying UAF the ability to mass high-value assets securely in the operational rear.
2. Effective Propaganda Synchronization: RF media is immediately leveraging captured personnel and localized gains (Pokrovsk) to create psychological pressure on UAF combat units and decision-makers.

Intentions (Tactical/Operational):

1. Paralyze Pokrovsk Sustainment: The primary RF intent remains to disrupt the logistical and C2 functions of the Pokrovsk salient defense (confirmed by attacks on coal enterprises and SpN activity in Rodynske/Dymytrov).
2. Force Premature Commitment of Reserves: RF ground assaults on the FLOT, combined with the chaos in the rear, are designed to force UAF command to commit reserves piecemeal to internal security (counter-infiltration) and logistics protection rather than FLOT reinforcement.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Targeting of Industrial Assets: The confirmed use of KABs against coal enterprises signifies an escalation in targeting beyond simple energy infrastructure to attack the resources needed to sustain the civilian economy and potentially military industrial support capacity.
• Shift to Active Propaganda: The rapid deployment of Prisoner of War (POW) videos targeting specific operational areas (Pokrovsk) confirms the high priority RF places on demoralization within the current offensive phase.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• The sustained, multi-axis deployment of UAVs and KABs confirms RF maintains adequate strike munition stockpiles and delivery capacity to sustain the current systemic disruption campaign.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 remains effective in synchronizing the kinetic deep battle (strikes and SpN raids) with the information campaign (POW videos, Vovchansk claims).
• UAF C2 is actively executing counter-infiltration and AD defense, confirming rapid response capability, but remains highly stressed by concurrent high-priority threats.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Counter-Infiltration Response: The involvement of the 95th Brigade in Rodynske demonstrates UAF C2 is correctly prioritizing the elimination of deep threats using high-readiness maneuver units.
• Artillery and UAV Effectiveness: UAF forces (157th OMBr) demonstrated continued lethality in counter-battery and anti-personnel strikes, successfully neutralizing RF assets including 2S1 Gvozdika, M102 Howitzer, and an Infantry Fighting Vehicle (051303Z NOV 25).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Tactical Successes:

1. Effective Counter-Battery/Anti-Personnel Fire: Confirmed destruction of multiple RF artillery pieces and manpower targets across the FLOT using UAVs.
2. Active Rear Security: Active engagement with RF infiltration groups in Rodynske by elite UAF forces.

Setbacks:

1. Industrial Infrastructure Damage: Confirmed KAB strikes against coal enterprises in Donetsk Oblast, impacting long-term resource security.
2. Psychological Warfare Penetration: RF successfully deployed propaganda material (POW videos) focused on the Pokrovsk salient, potentially impacting the morale of defending units.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Operations)

• RF Narrative Focus (Pokrovsk): RF media is fully focused on creating a narrative of UAF collapse and surrender at Pokrovsk, evidenced by the release of POW videos and claims of encirclement.
• RF Counter-Narrative (Strategic): RF media (TASS, War Correspondents) are attempting to overshadow US actions (Minuteman III test) by linking them to Trump and creating a narrative of unnecessary escalation, shifting global focus away from RF actions in Ukraine.
• UAF Domestic Morale: Actions in Kyiv supporting POWs (Mariupol garrison) indicate continued domestic focus on the status of captured personnel, which RF seeks to exploit via the Pokrovsk surrender videos.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• The combination of deep strikes (CNI/industrial) and the release of POW videos targeted at the Pokrovsk sector poses a significant dual threat to both military and civilian morale in the Donbas region.
• The reported action of an 11-year-old girl asking Putin about her family (ASTRA, 051310Z NOV 25) highlights RF domestic sensitivity regarding casualties and mobilization, which UAF IO can exploit to target RF morale.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will consolidate the systemic disruption and attempt to trigger a decisive operational move.

1. FLOT Assault Exploitation (Pokrovsk): RF ground forces will increase the tempo and mass of armored assaults against the Pokrovsk FLOT, immediately following the peak impact of the current Shahed/CNI/SpN campaign (likely during the early morning hours, 05/06 NOV 25). The goal is to force a withdrawal before UAF can fully restore C2 redundancy and supply lines.
2. Escalated Counter-ISR/Electronic Warfare: RF forces will increase EW activity across the Pokrovsk and Kharkiv axes, specifically targeting UAF counter-infiltration forces (95th Brigade) and AD sensor arrays to deny situational awareness during the ground assault phase.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - UNCHANGED)

• Systemic C2 and Logistics Failure leading to Forced Withdrawal: The CNI strikes and SpN action (Rodynske/Dymytrov) successfully disrupt UAF communication and logistics, leading to the isolation of forward brigades at the Pokrovsk FLOT. RF ground forces achieve a tactical breakthrough, forcing a disorganized operational withdrawal from the salient, resulting in the loss of significant equipment and personnel.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Maneuver): PRIORITIZE COUNTER-INFILTRATION KINETIC OVERWATCH (CRITICAL PRIORITY).

   • Maintain the current high operational tempo for counter-infiltration. Deploy dedicated fixed-wing UAV/high-endurance ISR to provide continuous, all-weather kinetic overwatch for the 95th Brigade and other QRF elements operating in the Rodynske/Dymytrov-Kostiantynivka triangle. The goal is to eliminate remaining SpN cells before they can execute further high-value targeting.

2. J4 (Logistics) / J3 (AD): DEFENSE OF INDUSTRIAL AND LOGISTICS NODES (CRITICAL PRIORITY).

   • Immediately assess the survivability and redundancy of remaining coal/industrial facilities and critical rail trans-load points in Donetsk Oblast.
   • Reposition available Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems (MANPADS) and mobile SHORAD units to provide point defense for these specific non-energy CNI targets, particularly those near railheads.

3. J2 (IO/PSYOP): COUNTER RF POW PROPAGANDA (URGENT PRIORITY).

   • Initiate a coordinated, immediate public information campaign to counter the RF Pokrovsk POW videos. The campaign should focus on: a) Geolocation/identification of the captured soldiers to initiate formal POW protocols; b) Reaffirming the strength of the main defense line; and c) Highlighting the RF’s own internal struggles (e.g., the ASTRA report on casualties/mobilization).

//END SITREP//