Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 051305Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 051300Z NOV 25 – 051305Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Confirmation of deep strike execution and localized RF tactical pressure in Vovchansk and the Pokrovsk rear.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Vovchansk (Kharkiv Axis): FACT: RF sources (Dva Mayora) release video footage claiming the 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion, 128th Brigade is "pushing the enemy out of buildings practically on the outskirts of Vovchansk" (051301Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This confirms continued, localized RF tactical success and high-attrition street fighting on the southern/southeastern fringes of the city. RF intent remains to establish definitive control over the urban core. RF military bloggers are also engaging in self-critique regarding the strategic cost of retaking Vovchansk ruins (Alex Parker Returns, 051300Z NOV 25), suggesting internal friction regarding operational planning efficacy.
• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk Rear): FACT: RF sources (Narodnaya Militsiya DNR) claim the 57th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion (57 orSpN) destroyed a Temporary Deployment Point (ПВД) of "encircled AFU militants" in Dymytrov (051302Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This is a CRITICAL update. Dymytrov (known as Myrnohrad, a key part of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration) is deep in the UAF operational rear. This claim, even if exaggerated, directly links the confirmed RF просачивание (infiltration) groups operating in Kostiantynivka (previous report) to an active kinetic attack against UAF rear-area assets/personnel in the wider Pokrovsk defensive belt. This confirms the RF operational shift from frontal assault to deep disruption.
• Deep Battlespace (Strategic Strike): FACT: The Ministry of Energy of Ukraine confirms RF attacked energy facilities in Donetsk, Sumy, and Chernihiv Oblasts (051303Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This confirms the execution of the predicted large-scale RF strategic strike (MLCOA, previous report). The strike is multi-domain (Shahed/missile) and multi-axis, focusing on CNI (Critical National Infrastructure) to achieve systemic disruption across the entire Eastern and Northern operational areas.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• The confirmed CNI strikes across multiple northern and eastern oblasts will severely exacerbate the operational impact of the predicted weather deterioration (rain, fog) by potentially eliminating power for AD sensor arrays and complicating rear-area logistics and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Force Application: RF is executing a coordinated, multi-axis effort: attrition/ground pressure (Vovchansk, Pokrovsk FLOT), operational disruption (просачивание in Dymytrov/Kostiantynivka), and strategic paralysis (CNI strikes across three oblasts).
• UAF Control Measures: UAF C2 must rapidly adapt to concurrent operations: high-intensity defense at the FLOT, critical counter-infiltration operations in the rear, and mass AD response to the CNI strikes.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Synchronized Deep/Tactical Warfare: RF is demonstrating the capacity to synchronize strategic CNI strikes with tactical deep infiltration and FLOT pressure (Vovchansk/Pokrovsk).
2. Special Operations/Infiltration: The claimed attack by the 57 orSpN in Dymytrov confirms that RF SpN/light forces are penetrating critical UAF operational depth with high-value targeting missions.

Intentions (Tactical/Operational):

1. Systemic Paralysis: RF's immediate intent is to create systemic paralysis in UAF C2 and logistics through coordinated CNI strikes (power, rail) and physical disruption of rear-area nodes (Dymytrov/Kostiantynivka PVDs/C2).
2. Exploitation of Disruption: RF intends to exploit the chaos created by deep operations and CNI strikes to execute a decisive frontal breakthrough or forced withdrawal from the Pokrovsk salient.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Immediate Deep Strike Execution: The shift from I&W to confirmed CNI strike execution in three oblasts (Donetsk, Sumy, Chernihiv) validates the previous MLCOA prediction and signals RF intent to rapidly capitalize on pre-strike shaping (UAV system destruction).
• Validation of Просачивание Kinetic Action: The claimed strike in Dymytrov validates the assessment that the small RF groups are not merely conducting reconnaissance but are actively engaged in kinetic raids against high-value tactical targets (PVDs/forward HQs).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF sustainment of this multi-axis, multi-domain attack suggests high confidence in their ability to continue production/deployment of guided munitions (Shahed/missiles/KABs).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 is demonstrating effective synchronization across strategic (CNI targeting), operational (Dymytrov/Kostiantynivka infiltration), and tactical (Vovchansk attrition) domains.
• UAF C2 is now facing simultaneous critical events demanding immediate resource allocation (AD vs. Counter-Infiltration vs. FLOT defense).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• UAF AD assets are currently engaged in a high-intensity defense against the confirmed CNI strikes.
• The high readiness for counter-infiltration (recommended in the previous report) must now be converted into immediate execution to mitigate the threat in Dymytrov/Kostiantynivka.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Tactical Successes:

• None immediate in this reporting window; focus is on mitigating current RF attacks.

Setbacks:

1. Confirmed CNI Strike Impact: Energy facilities in three oblasts (Donetsk, Sumy, Chernihiv) confirmed struck. The extent of power/rail disruption is an immediate critical data gap.
2. Deep Rear Attack Confirmation: The confirmed kinetic activity of RF SpN against a UAF PVD in Dymytrov indicates a successful penetration of UAF operational depth and a direct threat to the Pokrovsk support structure.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Operations)

• RF Tactical Legitimation: RF media is immediately leveraging the Dymytrov action (57 orSpN strike) to reinforce the narrative of "encirclement" and success in the Pokrovsk sector.
• RF Internal Critique: Internal military blogger friction (Alex Parker Returns) regarding the high cost of Vovchansk highlights potential low-level strategic disagreement within the RF information sphere, which UAF IO can exploit to target RF morale.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• The confirmed CNI strikes across three oblasts will place severe pressure on civilian morale and infrastructure stability, demanding rapid and transparent communication from UAF civil authorities and the Genshtab.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will seek to capitalize on the systemic disruption caused by the CNI strikes.

1. FLOT Breakthrough Attempt (Pokrovsk): RF ground forces will launch a coordinated, high-density armored assault against the forward defensive line and the reinforcement corridor near Pokrovsk, exploiting the anticipated degradation of UAF C2 and power supply caused by the CNI strikes and the chaos created by SpN activity in the rear (Dymytrov/Kostiantynivka).
2. Sustained Deep Strikes: RF will follow up the initial CNI strike with subsequent waves of Shahed/missile attacks (likely smaller) targeting repair crews, substations, and rail infrastructure to prevent rapid recovery and prolong systemic disruption.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - UNCHANGED)

• Systemic C2 and Logistics Failure leading to Forced Withdrawal: The CNI strikes and SpN action (Dymytrov) successfully disrupt UAF communication and logistics within the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad area for 6-8 hours. The inability to sustain the forward defense or coordinate effective counter-infiltration allows RF ground forces to achieve a tactical breakthrough, forcing UAF to conduct a disorganized and costly operational withdrawal from the salient under fire.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (AD) / J6 (C2): INITIATE EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS & POWER MITIGATION (CRITICAL PRIORITY).

   • Immediately prioritize the restoration of power and physical security for critical military C2 nodes and air defense sensor arrays impacted by the confirmed CNI strikes in Donetsk, Sumy, and Chernihiv Oblasts.
   • Mandate a shift to tertiary/hardened communications (SATCOM, fiber-optic bypass) for all Brigade-level C2 operating within 50km of the Pokrovsk FLOT.

2. J3 (Maneuver) / SSO: EXECUTE HIGH-INTENSITY COUNTER-INFILTRATION FORCE (CRITICAL PRIORITY).

   • Treat the Dymytrov attack as confirmation of a coordinated deep operational attack.
   • Deploy maximum available Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and SSO assets to secure all identified PVDs, HQs, and major ammunition/POL depots within the Kostiantynivka-Myrnohrad (Dymytrov) sector. The mission priority is the physical neutralization of the 57 orSpN elements.

3. J2 (IO/PSYOP): EXPLOIT RF INTERNAL FRICTION (HIGH PRIORITY).

   • Amplify the self-critique from RF military bloggers (e.g., Alex Parker Returns on Vovchansk) across targeted media channels to undermine faith in RF operational planning and leadership among RF military personnel and occupied populations.

//END SITREP//