Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 051300Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 051235Z NOV 25 – 051300Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Focus remains on the immediate tactical threats in Donbas and the pre-strike activity regarding deep fires.)

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad Agglomeration (Donetsk Axis): FACT: UAF General Staff (Genshtab) explicitly reconfirmed that the defense of the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration continues with NO encirclement of UAF units (051247Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This confirms UAF operational control over the recently established reinforcement corridor (GUR success, previous report) and directly counters persistent RF IO/PSYOP claims.
• Kostiantynivka (Donetsk Axis): FACT: Ukrainian OSINT reports indicate that small enemy groups are penetrating into Kostiantynivka (051237Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This confirms the active use of the RF doctrinal concept of 'просачивание' (infiltration/seepage) previously identified. These small groups are likely SpN or specialized infantry targeting C2, ISR, or logistics nodes, or conducting reconnaissance ahead of main force advances toward the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka axis.
• Siversk Direction (Donetsk Axis): FACT: RF military blogger channels highlight the Siversk direction (051234Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: While no kinetic action is reported, this suggests RF intent to maintain or increase pressure on this secondary axis, potentially to fix UAF reserves or threaten the northern flank of the Donbas defensive line.
• Dnipro/Kharkiv Axis: FACT: UAF Air Force reports KAB strikes targeting Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts (051250Z NOV 25). RF claims destruction of a UAF UAV launch system in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (051247Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This confirms RF focus on suppressing UAF ISR/UAS capabilities and maintaining KAB pressure on key logistics/C2 hubs (Dnipropetrovsk), directly supporting the MLCOA deep strike prediction.
• Vovchansk (Kharkiv Axis): FACT: RF sources claim the raising of the Russian flag on the southern outskirts of Vovchansk and declare the city "liberated" (051247Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This is an IO claim that exaggerates localized tactical success. The visual evidence only confirms RF control of a severely damaged building on the southern fringe, likely acquired through attrition. Street fighting and UAF resistance are assessed to continue within the urban environment.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Kharkiv Oblast: FACT: Kharkiv OVA warns of expected weather deterioration (051251Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: Poor weather (rain, fog, low cloud cover) will likely limit the effectiveness of fixed-wing close air support (CAS) for both sides but may favor RF's saturation Shahed strikes by degrading UAF AD sensor performance. Decreased visibility will aid RF infiltration operations (просачивание).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF C2/Maneuver: UAF Genshtab is utilizing rapid public information dissemination to counter RF narratives and control the operational tempo in the Pokrovsk area.
• RF Deep Strike Posture: RF is confirmed to be using KABs and kinetic ISR suppression strikes (UAV system destruction) against rear areas (Dnipro), indicating pre-strike activity ahead of the anticipated large-scale Shahed attack (MLCOA).

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Guided Bomb Saturation: RF maintains a high capacity for precision stand-off strikes using KABs (Donetsk/Dnipro axis confirmed).
2. Infiltration Warfare: The confirmed presence of small enemy groups (просачивание) in Kostiantynivka demonstrates RF's capacity to deploy light, agile units deep into the UAF tactical rear.
3. IO/PSYOP Synchronization: RF effectively synchronizes tactical claims (Vovchansk flag) with symbolic political theater (Donetsk wedding) to project inevitability and normalcy in occupied territories.

Intentions (Tactical/Operational):

1. Tactical Isolation: RF’s primary tactical intention remains the isolation and subsequent collapse of the Pokrovsk salient, utilizing a combination of KAB interdiction of GLOCs and small-group infiltration to cause disruption behind the forward line of troops (FLOT).
2. ISR Suppression: RF seeks to suppress UAF ISR capability (UAV launch system strike) in critical rear/logistics areas to blind UAF AD ahead of the imminent strategic strike.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Formalized Infiltration Doctrine: The explicit reporting of small-group penetration in Kostiantynivka (051237Z NOV 25) validates the assessment from the previous daily report regarding the aggressive operationalization of the просачивание doctrine. These are not merely reconnaissance patrols but likely targeting teams.
• Deep Strike Focus Shift: RF targeting appears to be transitioning from just CNI (Critical National Infrastructure) to direct UAF Force Enablers (e.g., UAV launch systems) in deep rear areas like Dnipropetrovsk, aiming to degrade UAF's primary ISR and kinetic advantage.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• UAF Long-Range Success: FACT: Ukrainian drone strikes halted fuel export from the Russian port of Tuapse (051255Z NOV 25). JUDGMENT: This sustains the strategic pressure on RF oil and gas refining/export capacity, directly impacting RF long-term economic sustainment.
• RF External Operations Attrition: The confirmed loss of a Russian-crewed IL-76 in Sudan (051245Z NOV 25) continues to highlight RF's logistical strain and attrition risks in support of global proxy operations, although the direct impact on the Ukrainian theater remains LOW.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF continues to use coordinated media (Colonelcassad, Операция Z) to rapidly promote tactical successes (UAV kill, Vovchansk flag) and IO/PSYOP narratives (civilians spared near Kupyansk).
• UAF C2 is demonstrating agile response (Genshtab denial) but must now focus on coordinating counter-infiltration efforts against the newly confirmed threats in Kostiantynivka.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Donbas Defense: UAF maintains a strong information posture regarding the Pokrovsk defense and has successfully prevented tactical encirclement. The main effort must now shift to proactive counter-infiltration defense in the depth (Kostiantynivka).
• Deep Strike Posture: UAF long-range UAS capability remains highly effective, as demonstrated by the Tuapse port interdiction, sustaining strategic economic pressure on the adversary.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Tactical Successes:

1. Sustained Corridor Integrity: The Genshtab re-affirmation of no encirclement (051247Z NOV 25) validates the GUR's successful establishment of the logistics corridor.
2. Strategic Denial: Continuation of strikes against RF deep logistics/economy (Tuapse port).

Setbacks:

1. Confirmed Deep Infiltration: The reported penetration of small RF groups into Kostiantynivka (051237Z NOV 25) poses an immediate threat to rear area C2, logistics, and personnel.
2. ISR Attrition: The claimed destruction of a UAF UAV launch system in Dnipropetrovsk (051247Z NOV 25) degrades local UAF ISR capability in a critical logistics hub.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Operations)

• RF Normalization/Legitimization: The media focus on a high-profile wedding in occupied Donetsk (051240Z NOV 25) involving Russian public figures (Shaman and Mizulina) serves as a potent political symbol aimed at normalizing RF control and delegitimizing Ukrainian sovereignty over the occupied territories.
• RF Ethical Projection: RF channels selectively broadcast footage claiming to spare civilians (Kupyansk, 051246Z NOV 25) to counter narratives of indiscriminate targeting and promote ethical conduct to a domestic and international audience.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• UAF domestic reporting emphasizes continued successes (Tuapse port strike) and maintains transparency regarding the defensive posture (Genshtab denial of encirclement), which likely supports domestic morale and trust.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The synchronization of deep strike preparation and tactical attrition remains key.

1. Strategic Saturation Strike Execution (IMMINENT): The large-scale Shahed UAV strike (MLCOA from previous reports) targeting CNI and logistics nodes in Central/Eastern Ukraine (Dnipro/Poltava) will initiate, likely within the next 4-8 hours, coinciding with decreasing visibility (weather deterioration, 051251Z NOV 25).
2. Max-Effort Counter-Corridor Attack: RF ground forces, supported by KAB saturation, will focus maximum pressure on the Pokrovsk GLOC, targeting both confirmed supply routes and potential UAF reserves, while the просачивание groups attempt to disrupt C2 in Kostiantynivka/rear areas.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - UNCHANGED)

• Systemic C2 and Logistics Failure: The Shahed saturation strike achieves high penetration rates due to weather-degraded UAF AD, causing systemic power outages in Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava. Simultaneously, the RF infiltration groups successfully strike a key brigade headquarters or major ammunition depot in the Kostiantynivka/Pokrovsk rear, inducing a breakdown in coordinated defense and forcing an unplanned withdrawal from the salient.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Maneuver) / J2 (Intelligence): INITIATE IMMEDIATE COUNTER-INFILTRATION OPERATION IN KOSTIANTYNIVKA (CRITICAL PRIORITY).

   • Treat the Kostiantynivka infiltration (051237Z NOV 25) as a high-priority threat aimed at operational disruption.
   • Deploy QRF/National Guard elements with reinforced counter-UAS/thermal detection capability for urban search and destroy (SAD) missions against the confirmed просачивание groups.
   • Establish immediate security perimeters around all key C2/Logistics Nodes within 10km of Kostiantynivka.

2. J3 (AD) / J4 (Logistics): MAXIMIZE AD COVERAGE OVER LOGISTICS HUBS AND DISPERSE ASSETS (CRITICAL PRIORITY).

   • Based on the confirmed KAB strikes on Dnipropetrovsk (051250Z NOV 25) and the imminent MLCOA, reposition all available mobile AD assets (e.g., Gepard, Avenger) to maximize coverage of logistics hubs and transshipment points in Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava Oblasts.
   • Implement full fuel and ammunition dispersal protocols at all rear-area depots.

3. J2 (IO/PSYOP): PREPARE COUNTER-NARRATIVE FOR VOLCHANSK (HIGH PRIORITY).

   • Prepare and deploy clear, localized messaging immediately countering the RF claim of Vovchansk "liberation." Highlight continued UAF presence and resistance in the urban center to maintain local morale and deny RF a definitive IO victory.

//END SITREP//