Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 051100Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 051000Z NOV 25 – 051100Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM (Increased confirmation of RF multi-axis pressure and strategic Deep Strike capability, offset by continued UAF tactical resilience in Pokrovsk.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmiysk): RF sources (TASS/Marochko) claim control over the majority of Krasnoarmiysk (Pokrovsk) (1056Z). FACT: This is a maximalist RF claim unsupported by independent observation and directly contradicts previous reports of UAF GUR successfully establishing a reinforcement corridor. JUDGMENT: This claim is highly likely an Information Warfare effort aimed at sowing panic and preempting the formal announcement of a breakthrough. RF ground forces remain committed to severing the western GLOCs into Pokrovsk.
• Kharkiv Axis (Vovchansk): Drone footage confirms continued engagement in urban/residential areas (Rubezhansky residential array) (1039Z). RF personnel movement suggests occupation or clearing operations in heavily damaged structures. JUDGMENT: This supports the previous assessment of continued RF pressure on the Kharkiv axis, aiming to fix UAF units and prevent their deployment to Donetsk.
• UAF Tactical Withdrawal (Pokrovsk): UAF footage (NVO perspective, 1047Z) documents UAF personnel conducting an organized tactical withdrawal/repositioning at night from the Pokrovsk area. IMPLICATION: This validates the intensity of the fighting and the necessity of maneuver to avoid encirclement, confirming the operational focus remains highly dynamic and contested.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• UAS Activity: Air Force of Ukraine confirms continued drone movement toward Kherson from the North (1053Z). JUDGMENT: This activity continues the pattern of deep strike operations targeting rear area logistics and infrastructure, often preceding or coinciding with major ground pushes.
• Ground Mobility: Image of equipment near Bakhmut suggests extremely muddy/poor mobility conditions (1043Z). IMPLICATION: This condition generally favors defensive lines and smaller, dismounted infiltration groups (RF просачивание) over large-scale mechanized assaults.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Deep Strike Posture: UAF attacks on deep RF infrastructure continue:
  • Tuapse Port halted fuel export following drone strikes (1054Z).
  • Substation in Vladimir Oblast struck by UAF drones (1053Z).
  • IMPLICATION: UAF is maintaining a strategic counter-interdiction campaign aimed at degrading RF fuel and energy logistics, directly challenging the RF strategic deep strike capability.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Deep Strike Sustainment: RF continues to absorb UAF deep strikes (Tuapse, Vladimir) while maintaining high-tempo Shahed/Geran launches, confirming significant resilience and inventory depth. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
2. Multinational Force Integration (High-Risk/High-Reward): South Korean intelligence reports an additional 5,000 DPRK military personnel dispatched to Russia since autumn (1039Z). JUDGMENT: If confirmed, this deployment would significantly augment RF force generation capacity, likely in construction or rear-echelon roles, freeing up RF combat units for the front line. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM (due to source chain, but consistent with previous threat reporting).

Intentions (Tactical/Operational):

1. Exploit Pokrovsk Pressure: RF forces will continue to press hard on the Pokrovsk corridor, utilizing infiltration tactics to disrupt UAF re-supply and force costly repositioning of high-value UAF units (e.g., Airborne/GUR elements).
2. Degrade UAF Logistics Resilience: RF will launch the anticipated saturation strike (MLCOA in previous report) to compound the recent rail power loss and road GLOC interdiction.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Propaganda Focus: RF military bloggers are amplifying videos of alleged UAF POWs (from 23rd Brigade) urging surrender and exit from the conflict (1038Z). JUDGMENT: This is a concentrated PsyOps effort targeting morale and combat cohesion, particularly within specific brigades identified as operating in contested areas.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• UAF Interdiction Effect: The confirmed halting of fuel export at Tuapse Port (1054Z) indicates UAF deep strikes are achieving operational effects on RF fuel logistics, potentially limiting the sustainment of large armored formations or deep-strike aviation assets.
• RF Morale Maintenance: RF domestic media emphasizes non-war-related normalization efforts (Moscow metro/weather) (1036Z, 1037Z, 1050Z) to shield the home front from the realities of the front line and the economic consequences (auto price increases, 1051Z).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 Disruption: UAF strikes on power substations (Vladimir) are assessed to cause localized C2 disruption for RF civil-military infrastructure.
• UAF C2 Resilience: UAF High Command demonstrates rapid awareness and response to tactical repositioning requirements (Pokrovsk withdrawal) and the prioritization of strategic counter-strikes (Tuapse, Vladimir).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Force Generation: UAF is reported to be continuing the formation of new brigades (1056Z), indicating a sustained commitment to long-term force capacity growth despite ongoing losses.
• Legal/Societal Readiness: Ombudsman reports 5,000 complaints regarding TCC actions during mobilization in 2025 (1033Z). IMPLICATION: While UAF maintains high operational readiness, internal societal friction surrounding mobilization practices remains a constraint on full force potential.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Tactical Successes:

1. Strategic Interdiction: Successful strikes on Tuapse fuel export and Vladimir substation demonstrate sustained UAF ability to project force and interdict critical RF infrastructure.
2. Organizational Maneuver: Documented successful night-time tactical repositioning/withdrawal of UAF units from high-pressure zones near Pokrovsk (1047Z) indicates command discipline and proficiency in complex combat exits.

Setbacks:

1. Socio-Political Pressure: RF disinformation regarding the status of Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmiysk (1056Z) and the internal TCC complaint rate (1033Z) highlight vulnerabilities in the information and political environment.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Operations)

• RF Main Narrative: Isolation and Success: RF channels are pushing the narrative of complete RF control over major cities (Krasnoarmiysk/Pokrovsk) and circulating POW videos to undermine UAF fighting spirit.
• EU Support Weakness (IW): RF channels are amplifying statements by Hungarian PM Orbán regarding Ukraine’s inability to join the EU (1033Z). AIM: To degrade international political support for Kyiv and reinforce the domestic Russian narrative that Western support is fracturing.
• UAF IW Main Effort: Deep Strike Success: UAF channels are effectively leveraging verified deep strike operations (Tuapse, Vladimir) to project strength and maintain domestic morale.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• UAF morale is sustained by the successful deep strikes, but the high TCC complaint rate suggests ongoing public anxiety regarding mobilization fairness and practices.
• RF propaganda highlighting civilian stability (Moscow trains, weather) attempts to maintain domestic complacency and support for the conflict.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF ground forces will intensify fire missions (KAB/Artillery) against the established UAF reinforcement corridor west of Pokrovsk, particularly targeting any confirmed vehicle movements or known staging areas.

1. Strategic Saturation Strike Execution: The anticipated mass Shahed/Geran strike will be launched, targeting key logistics nodes (POL/MTS) in Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava, exploiting the window of opportunity before UAF can fully adjust AD posture following the confirmed attacks on Vladimir.
2. Reserve Fixation: RF will maintain high pressure on Yampil and Vovchansk to draw UAF reserves away from the decisive Pokrovsk axis.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(MEDIUM-HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Combined-Arms Interdiction and Encirclement: RF SpN/Infiltration groups successfully neutralize a critical section of the Pokrovsk GLOC (e.g., key bridge or road junction) simultaneously with the strategic saturation strike causing widespread power/C2 failure in the rear area. This operational paralysis prevents UAF High Command from effectively deploying reserves, leading to the isolation of UAF forces inside Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmiysk, forcing a major operational defeat.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Maneuver): SECURE POKROVSK CORRIDOR AGAINST INFILTRATION (CRITICAL PRIORITY). Task engineer and EW units with rapid deployment of mobile counter-infiltration defenses (mines, C-UAS EW) along all known and suspected RF infiltration routes adjacent to the Pokrovsk reinforcement corridor. Utilize specialized thermal optics (e.g., for robotic systems) for 24-hour surveillance of the western approaches.
2. J3 (Fires/AD): PRIORITIZE AD FOR POL/MTS DEPOTS (HIGH PRIORITY). In anticipation of the MLCOA saturation strike, immediately reposition short-range air defense assets to provide layered point defense for major railheads, road hubs, and bulk fuel storage facilities in the Dnipropetrovsk/Poltava areas. Disperse critical fuel reserves immediately.
3. J2 (Counter-IW): COUNTER THE POKROVSK NARRATIVE (HIGH PRIORITY). Immediately task the Information Operations cell to counter RF claims of control over Krasnoarmiysk (Pokrovsk) with verified footage and reports of UAF successful tactical repositioning and continued defense. Use strong counter-narratives to mitigate the impact of RF POW propaganda videos.

//END SITREP//