Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 051100Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 051000Z NOV 25 – 051100Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM (The operational focus remains on maintaining the Pokrovsk corridor amidst systemic logistics pressure, while RF claims suggest localized tactical progress on secondary axes.)

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk/Rodynske): Fighting confirms RF penetration tactics are being actively countered.
  • Rodynske (near Pokrovsk): Video confirmation shows UAF 95th Brigade airborne elements engaging and eliminating RF personnel who had successfully infiltrated the town (проникли в містечко) (1024Z). JUDGMENT: This validates the previous assessment (MDCOA) regarding RF infiltration (просачивание) tactics and confirms intense close-quarters combat is occurring along the immediate approaches to Pokrovsk. Rodynske is critical for maintaining the western reinforcement corridor.
• Donetsk Axis (Yampil): RF channels (Marochko) claim control over approximately 30% of Yampil (1023Z). JUDGMENT: This claim suggests RF pressure is increasing on the northern flank of the Donbas front, likely aimed at tying down UAF reserves and preventing their redeployment to the Pokrovsk decisive point. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM (due to source bias).
• Kharkiv Axis (Vovchansk): RF claims control over nearly 80% of Vovchansk (1003Z). JUDGMENT: If accurate, this represents a significant shift in the tactical geometry, placing renewed pressure on UAF forces near the international border. It is likely an attempt to force UAF High Command to commit reserves away from Donetsk. CONFIDENCE: LOW (due to source bias and lack of confirmation).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• UAV Activity: Continued RF Shahed/Geran drone activity is confirmed, tracking movements from Sumy towards Poltava (1013Z, 1018Z) and from Dnipropetrovsk towards Mykolaiv (1025Z, 1029Z). This indicates continued favorable atmospheric conditions for deep-strike operations, aligning with the previous warning of an imminent saturation strike.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Counter-Mobility/Engineering: UAF forces are actively procuring and deploying ground-based robotic complexes (NRC TERRIKON-X for the 425th SBP) (1018Z). IMPLICATION: This confirms UAF is enhancing its forward engineer/mobility capabilities, likely for mine-laying, casualty extraction, or logistics in high-threat areas, directly addressing the threat posed by RF infiltration tactics.
• Air Defense (AD): Air raid sirens were active but lifted in Zaporizhzhia Oblast (1032Z). The drone traffic confirmed over Sumy, Poltava, and Dnipropetrovsk indicates UAF AD forces are engaged and tracking the incoming waves.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Tactical Infiltration: RF forces, specifically the 95th Brigade, demonstrate continued ability to bypass forward UAF lines using small infiltration groups (просачивание), as seen in Rodynske. CONFIDENCE: HIGH.
2. Multiaxis Pressure: RF is capable of applying simultaneous pressure across multiple axes (Pokrovsk, Yampil, Vovchansk) to stretch UAF reserves and divert attention from the main effort. CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM.

Intentions (Operational - Next 6-12 hours):

1. Sustain KAB/Infiltration at Pokrovsk: RF will continue to use KAB-supported assaults and SpN infiltration teams to destabilize the Pokrovsk-Rodynske area, seeking to isolate the city completely.
2. Target Logistics Hubs: The confirmed drone movements towards Poltava and Pavlohrad (1029Z) suggest RF intent to target major rail or road logistics nodes that are now carrying the burden of front-line resupply following the previous day's rail power strikes.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF External Arms Sales (IW/Geopolitical Signal): RF military blogger channels are publicizing plans to sell 2,000 Geran-2 (Shahed-type) UAVs to Venezuela (1016Z). IMPLICATION: While the sale itself is geopolitical, the immediate propaganda signal reinforces the narrative of vast and increasing Russian UAV production capacity, serving as a psychological deterrent aimed at Ukrainian morale and international partners.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF UAV Inventory/Production: The Venezuelan sale propaganda, combined with the previously reported quadrupled launch rate, strongly suggests RF is confident in its ability to produce Shahed/Geran UAVs at a high, sustainable rate. This confirms the long-term nature of the strategic strike threat.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• UAF C2: UAF is demonstrating effective tactical C2 response by immediately deploying counter-infiltration forces (95th Airborne) to clear penetrated areas (Rodynske) and rapidly procuring robotic engineering support.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• High Readiness (Donetsk): The presence and actions of the 95th Brigade in Rodynske (1024Z) confirm the commitment of high-readiness airborne forces to secure the critical Pokrovsk reinforcement corridor.
• Force Modernization: Procurement of the TERRIKON-X robotic complex (425th SBP) demonstrates a proactive effort to leverage unmanned ground systems to reduce personnel risk in high-intensity areas.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Tactical Successes:

1. Counter-Infiltration: Successful neutralization of RF infiltration groups in Rodynske by the 95th Brigade (1024Z). Confidence: HIGH (Video confirmation).
2. International Support: Norway confirms commitment of $7 billion in military aid to Ukraine for the following year (1011Z). Confidence: HIGH.

Setbacks:

1. Tactical Penetration: RF forces temporarily succeeded in penetrating Rodynske, requiring an immediate and costly response from high-value airborne units. Confidence: HIGH.
2. Multiaxis Diversion: RF claims of large advances in Vovchansk (1003Z) and Yampil (1023Z) pose an immediate threat of reserve diversion.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Operations)

• RF IW Main Effort: Progress/Pessimism: RF channels are pushing narratives of rapid territorial gains (Vovchansk, Yampil) and amplifying internal RF successes (Kirillov trial closure, new Geran sales) while circulating social media content that explicitly states "Everything is bad" (Все плохо) regarding the Ukrainian situation (1017Z). AIM: To generate a sense of inevitability regarding RF victory and demoralize UAF forces and supporters.
• RF Domestic Focus: Continued reporting on internal RF social/legal issues (children's SIM cards, domestic court cases) (1005Z, 1017Z) aims to maintain an image of normalcy and stable governance within Russia despite the war's demands.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• The confirmed large-scale Norwegian aid ($7B) is a significant external morale boost, directly countering the RF pessimism narrative.
• The Coordination Staff continues to actively engage with families of POWs/MIAs (1005Z), which is critical for maintaining home front morale and trust in UAF institutions.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to deliver the anticipated strategic saturation strike against logistics infrastructure now bearing the burden of the rail disruption.

1. Focused Deep Strike on Road/POL Hubs: RF will target major road junctions, bridges, and bulk fuel/POL storage facilities in or near the Poltava/Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts, using the confirmed wave of Shahed UAVs (as tracked towards Pavlohrad). This aims to achieve systemic interdiction of road transport, compounding the previous rail power loss.
2. Intensified Ground Attack (Rodynske): RF infiltration groups will launch follow-up attacks on Rodynske and the Pokrovsk corridor, supported by maximum available artillery and KAB fires, aiming to exploit UAF resource expenditure on AD and logistics recovery.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

• Simultaneous Multi-Sector Breakthrough: RF successfully commits reserves (possibly including reported DPRK personnel, if confirmed) to exploit the claimed advances in Vovchansk (Kharkiv) and Yampil (Northern Donbas). This forces UAF High Command to rapidly strip essential reserves (AD, logistics support, maneuver brigades) from the Pokrovsk defense to prevent a collapse on secondary axes, allowing RF forces to finally achieve operational encirclement at Pokrovsk.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Fires/Maneuver): PRIORITIZE COUNTER-INFILTRATION (CRITICAL PRIORITY). Reinforce the 95th Brigade's efforts with dedicated ISR and fires support targeting known RF infiltration approach routes and forward assembly areas near Rodynske. Immediate deployment of the newly acquired NRC TERRIKON-X complex to the Pokrovsk-Rodynske area should be fast-tracked to enhance mobility/engineer support in the high-threat zone.
2. J3 (AD): DEFEND ROAD LOGISTICS NODES (HIGH PRIORITY). Shift mobile AD assets (e.g., Gepard, Avenger, short-range SAM) to provide point defense for major road intersections, temporary POL depots, and logistics transfer points in the Poltava and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts, based on the confirmed drone flight paths.
3. J2 (Analysis): VALIDATE MULTIAXIS THREAT (HIGH PRIORITY). Dedicate increased ISR effort to confirm or deny the veracity of RF claims regarding Vovchansk (80%) and Yampil (30%). A verified breakthrough on these secondary axes will require an immediate revision of the UAF strategic reserve allocation.

//END SITREP//