Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 050800Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 050800Z NOV 25 – 050800Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM (New information primarily focused on RF psychological operations and confirmation of UAF long-range strike capabilities; ground truth data from Pokrovsk remains contested.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmiysk): Remains the main effort. RF Ministry of Defense (MoD) and MILBLOGGER reports claim the UAF grouping is "rapidly deteriorating" and "encircled" in both Kupiansk and Krasnoarmiysk (Pokrovsk) (TASS, Poddubny, 0745Z-0749Z). FACT: These claims are unverified and conflict directly with the previous UAF GUR report of a successful reinforcement corridor.
• Southern Axis (Pryiut/Huliaipole): RF sources claim successful destruction of a UAF D-30 howitzer near Pryiut (DNR Militia, 0801Z). RF MILBLOGGERS also mock UAF reports of repelling attacks on the Huliaipole axis, claiming RF continues to advance (Voen DV, 0800Z). JUDGEMENT: This indicates sustained, intense localized fire and maneuver operations in the south, likely aimed at fixing UAF forces.
• Deep Rear (RF Territory): UAF deep strike operations continue, evidenced by a MILBLOGGER report concerning an attack on P/S Vladimirska (750 kV substation) near Vladimir (Alex Parker, 0803Z). FACT: The report specifies a 750 kV substation, indicating UAF is targeting the highest voltage components of the RF national grid, a major escalation in target selection aimed at maximizing systemic disruption.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• No new significant weather data that materially affects ground operations (UNCHANGED).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Deep Strike Assets: Confirmed use of long-range UAVs against a critical RF energy node (750 kV substation) hundreds of kilometers from the border. IMPLICATION: This validates UAF capability to execute high-impact strategic interdiction strikes (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• RF AD/C2: The successful strike on the 750 kV substation (if confirmed) suggests continued weaknesses in RF AD/C2 integration in protecting strategic energy infrastructure, particularly against long-range UAVs.
• UAF Forces (South): UAF South Defense Forces report 20 shellings on 8 settlements and the destruction of 5 Shahed-136 UAVs overnight (UAF South, 0736Z-0739Z). This confirms sustained RF indirect fire and ongoing, though localized, UAV attacks in the Southern Operational Zone.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Concentrated Firepower: RF continues to demonstrate localized precision strike capability (destruction of a D-30 near Pryiut) and sustained high-volume indirect fire (20 shellings in the South).
2. Information Warfare (IW): RF MoD continues highly coordinated, aggressive messaging aimed at denying UAF successes and claiming victory in key nodes (Kupiansk, Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmiysk).

Intentions (Operational - Next 24 hours):

1. Validate/Achieve Encirclement: RF forces on the Donetsk axis will exert maximum kinetic pressure (artillery, KAB, maneuver) to attempt to confirm their claimed "encirclement" of UAF forces in Krasnoarmiysk (Pokrovsk) and Kupiansk, regardless of whether a full encirclement is achieved.
2. Degrade Morale via IW: RF will maximize propaganda dissemination (e.g., TASS, MILBLOGGERS) to create the perception of rapidly deteriorating UAF morale and inevitable operational collapse, particularly targeting the Western public and UAF domestic audiences.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Counter-Recruitment Messaging: The emergence of public protests in India regarding Russian recruitment of foreign nationals (Butusov, 0744Z) presents an escalating information risk for RF’s ongoing foreign recruitment efforts.
• Internal RF Discipline: Reports of military indiscipline (Chebarkul contract soldiers killing a comrade; one had fled the front) (Butusov, 0803Z) indicate potential deterioration in RF unit cohesion and morale, though this is localized and unconfirmed by official sources.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF deep strike logistics remain effective, supporting both mass-launch UAV attacks (previously reported) and KAB usage.
• UAF Logistics Impact (RF): UAF strikes on the 750 kV energy grid (Vladimir) present a potential future constraint on RF industrial and military sustainment, depending on the severity and duration of the damage.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 remains centralized and politically driven, evidenced by the coordinated media response denying UAF claims and amplifying encirclement narratives (TASS, Poddubny).
• INTERNAL IW C2 FRACTURE (JUDGMENT): A Russian MILBLOGGER (Alex Parker, 0803Z) openly criticized the RF political/military leadership (Peppa/Gerassimov) for avoiding strikes on 750 kV substations, suggesting internal dissent among opinion leaders regarding the effectiveness of the energy campaign strategy. This signals a fragmentation of the IW narrative, which UAF can exploit.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Strategic Interdiction Readiness: UAF demonstrated the capacity and will to strike strategic energy targets (750 kV) deep within RF territory (HIGH CONFIDENCE). This is a significant strategic shift designed to force RF to dedicate assets to deep air defense.
• Resource Mobilization: STERNENKO reports raising 5+ million UAH in the first hour for the Pokrovsk/Kostiantynivka corridor (0739Z), confirming the high morale and resource mobilization capacity of the UAF rear/civilian support structure.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Tactical Successes:

1. Strategic Targeting: Successful targeting of a 750 kV substation in Vladimir Oblast (if confirmed) represents the highest-value strike against the RF power grid to date.
2. AD Performance: Destruction of 5 Shahed UAVs in the Southern Operational Zone confirms effective point defense operations against localized threats.

Setbacks:

1. D-30 Loss: Confirmed loss of a UAF D-30 howitzer near Pryiut demonstrates the continuing effectiveness of RF counter-battery and guided munitions.
2. Uncertainty in Pokrovsk: RF's sustained and highly publicized claims of encirclement, while propaganda, mandate immediate, verifiable combat reports from the Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmiysk axis to counter the IW effect and guide operational planning.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Operations)

• RF Narrative (Denial and Encirclement): The coordinated MoD/TASS/MILBLOGGER narrative (0745Z-0755Z) is designed to deny UAF tactical success (Pokrovsk corridor, Kupiansk defense) and project overwhelming RF momentum. The use of inflammatory language (e.g., "narcissist," "lost contact with reality") is intended to discredit UAF leadership internationally.
• UAF Counter-Narrative (Resilience and Resolve): UAF messaging highlights domestic support (fundraising, anti-corruption arrests) and external support (political developments in NYC are reported favorably due to the defeat of a Trump ally).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Domestic UAF morale remains robust, driven by successful fundraising and political transparency (Prosecutor General's Office corruption arrests, 0800Z).
• The continued focus on the upcoming winter and the need for "warm shelter" (Operatsiya Z, 0737Z) indicates that the anticipation of further RF attacks on the energy grid remains a dominant feature of the Ukrainian information space and public concern.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to directly counter the UAF strategic deep strike capability and exploit the contested ground situation in Donetsk.

1. Targeting UAF Long-Range Assets (Counter-Deep Strike): RF will redirect ISR and potentially long-range precision fires (Iskander, Kh-101/555) to target suspected UAF UAV launch sites, C2 nodes, and maintenance depots associated with the strategic strike capability (Vladimir strike).
2. Maximum Pressure on Pokrovsk GLOCs: RF will maintain KAB and infiltration efforts on the Pokrovsk corridor, aiming to achieve a verifiable interdiction point that can be used to legitimize their encirclement claims.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

• Retaliatory Mass Strike (Deep Strike Parity Attempt): In direct response to the 750 kV strike, RF launches a mass strike (previously assessed at 80+ UAVs, possibly supplemented by cruise missiles) against a high-value UAF strategic target (e.g., a major Dnieper River bridge, a functioning nuclear power plant component, or the central rail hub in Lviv/Kyiv), aiming to achieve a level of systemic paralysis that mirrors the impact of the UAF's 750 kV strike.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Maneuver) / J3 (Air): CONFIRM AND CONSOLIDATE POKROVSK. (CRITICAL PRIORITY) Execute a controlled, high-visibility logistical run through the reinforcement corridor and immediately publish verifiable evidence (time-stamped video/photo) to neutralize the coordinated RF encirclement propaganda. This action directly supports both the tactical fight and the information war.
2. J2 (Targeting) / J3 (Fires): PRE-EMPTIVE COUNTER-RECOVERY. Given the confirmed UAF targeting of the 750 kV grid, identify and track key RF mobile repair teams, specialized transformer storage sites, and power station C2 hubs located near the Vladimir strike area. Prepare secondary targeting packages for these nodes to maximize the duration of the systemic impact. (HIGH PRIORITY - FIRES)
3. J7 (Engineer) / J4 (Logistics): INCREASE HARDENING OF LOGISTICS HUBS. Immediately increase physical hardening and layered AD protection (mobile AD assets) around all major UAF rail and road hubs supplying the Donbas front, especially those identified as vulnerable in previous reports (Dnipro/Poltava). This mitigates the risk associated with the MDCOA (Retaliatory Mass Strike). (HIGH PRIORITY - FORCE PROTECTION)

//END SITREP//