TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)
DTG: 050630Z NOV 25
REPORTING PERIOD: 050600Z NOV 25 – 050630Z NOV 25 (Immediate Update)
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH (The shift from the Northern diversion back to aviation strikes in the South/East is confirmed, validating the MLCOA focus.)
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
- Southern Axis (Kherson/Mykolaiv): New Confirmed Kinetic Activity. RF tactical aviation has launched Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) targeting Kherson Oblast, with confirmed continued movement toward Mykolaiv Oblast. Specific confirmed trajectory is toward Kulbakino (Mykolaiv), a critical airbase and potential logistics hub. This confirms the widening of RF KAB interdiction beyond Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia into the Mykolaiv region.
- Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk): Sustained kinetic pressure via KAB is presumed continuous (based on previous SITREP and MLCOA), although no new specific strikes were reported in this 30-minute window.
- Key Terrain: Kulbakino Airbase (Mykolaiv) is now a confirmed immediate target of RF precision-guided munitions (KAB/UMPB-5), representing a high-value operational target for RF interdiction.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
No significant changes. Night conditions and clear air are enabling accurate stand-off KAB delivery by RF aviation.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
- RF Force Posture: RF is executing the predicted MLCOA of expanding tactical aviation pressure in the South. The deployment of aviation targeting Mykolaiv (a deep rear area relative to the current FLOT) suggests RF seeks to stress UAF AD along the entire southern littoral.
- UAF Air Defense (AD): UAF Air Force (PS ZSU) is actively tracking and reporting the KAB activity, indicating effective Sensor-to-Shooter loop responsiveness. UAF AD assets must be rapidly repositioned to counter the inbound KABs targeting Kulbakino/Mykolaiv.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
- UMPB-5 Delivery: RF utilizes tactical aviation to deliver UMPB-5/KAB-class glide bombs deep into rear areas (Mykolaiv Oblast), demonstrating a range capability that threatens key UAF logistics and operational hubs far behind the FLOT. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Multi-Axis Fire Fixation: RF is clearly demonstrating the intent to engage UAF AD assets across multiple, dispersed axes (Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and now Mykolaiv) to degrade layered defense capability.
Intentions (Operational - 0-6 hours):
- Interdict Kulbakino: RF intends to strike critical military infrastructure (likely airframes, repair facilities, or stored ordnance) at Kulbakino Airbase to reduce UAF operational mobility in the South. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Fix AD Assets: The rapid shift in KAB focus from Zaporizhzhia to Mykolaiv intends to force UAF J3 (Air) to commit high-value mobile AD assets southward, making them unavailable for the MDCOA (Massed Shahed Strike) or the critical Pokrovsk defense.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
- Southern Pivot Confirmed: The rapid progression of KAB strikes from Zaporizhzhia (previous SITREP) to Kherson/Mykolaiv confirms a significant and aggressive expansion of the RF aviation-interdiction zone. This is a direct test of UAF AD depth and reaction time.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
The use of KABs (likely UMPB-5) on the Southern axis requires forward-deployed aviation fuel and ordnance. This high tempo suggests the logistics chain supporting the tactical air forces remains robust.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 is demonstrating successful execution of a rapid operational pivot, shifting kinetic fire support resources to a new axis to apply maximum stress to UAF AD.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
UAF Air Force is tracking the incoming threat effectively. The rapid dissemination of warnings (ПС ЗСУ, Николаевский Ванёк) allows for localized force protection measures. However, the confirmed trajectory toward Kulbakino necessitates immediate shelter/dispersal protocols for assets in that area.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Setback: The successful launch and sustained trajectory of the KAB toward a high-value target (Kulbakino) represents a potential operational setback if the strike is successful.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
The immediate requirement is the reallocation of short-range/medium-range AD (e.g., NASAMS, Buk) systems from lower-priority sectors to protect the Kulbakino and Mykolaiv urban/logistics areas.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Operations)
- RF Narrative (Internal): Pro-Russian channels (e.g., Дневник Десантника🇷🇺) are maintaining a positive morale narrative ("Good Morning, Airborne Brotherhood"), attempting to project confidence and normalized operational tempo, likely to counter the previous UAF deep strike on Vladimir.
- RF Diversionary Tactics: TASS messages regarding a UPS crash (Kentucky) and cultural news (Pugacheva) are classic RF state media tactics to dilute attention from active military operations on the front lines and maintain a normalized domestic narrative.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
The confirmed threat to Mykolaiv, a large city previously under heavy siege, will increase localized stress and public demand for improved AD coverage in the South.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
N/A. Current reporting focuses on immediate kinetic and information operations.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 0-6 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to synchronize KAB attacks across multiple operational axes, utilizing the Mykolaiv threat to fix AD assets while maintaining critical pressure on the ground assault zone.
- Continuation of KAB Strikes (Southern Axis): RF tactical aviation will conduct repeat sorties to prosecute targets in Mykolaiv/Kherson Oblast, likely focusing on logistics infrastructure, military depots, and fixed C2 nodes.
- Intensified Ground Assault Preparation (Donetsk): The main effort remains Pokrovsk. RF ground forces will use the distraction of the southern aviation threat to reorganize infiltration groups (
просачивание) and prepare for the next wave of ground assaults west of Pokrovsk, following the sustained KAB bombardment.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours
(CRITICAL CONFIDENCE - REINFORCED) The dispersion of UAF AD resources across Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and now Mykolaiv makes the strategic saturation strike more likely to achieve systemic disruption.
- Synchronized MDCOA Execution: RF executes the predicted Massed Shahed UAV Strike (50-80+ platforms) against CNI and logistics hubs in Central/Eastern Ukraine (Dnipropetrovsk/Poltava/Kharkiv). This strike will be synchronized with a maximum-effort combined-arms assault in Pokrovsk, attempting to achieve operational and psychological paralysis by overwhelming UAF C2 and mobility on both the strategic and tactical levels.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
| Timeframe | Event/Decision Point | Triggering Indicator |
|---|
| Immediate (0-1H) | Kulbakino Force Protection: UAF J3 (Air) must confirm the implementation of immediate dispersal/shelter protocols for all high-value assets (airframes, POL) at Kulbakino/Mykolaiv. | BDA confirmation (IMINT) of RF strike damage at Kulbakino Airbase. |
| 1-3H | Southern AD Reallocation: UAF J3 (Air) must identify which mobile AD battery (e.g., Patriot, NASAMS) can be safely and rapidly repositioned to augment Mykolaiv defense without compromising critical Pokrovsk or Kyiv air space protection. | Confirmation of repeat RF aviation sorties or new UAV activity in the Mykolaiv area. |
| 3-6H | MDCOA Warning Elevation: UAF High Command reassesses the threat matrix. If RF aviation pressure continues to disperse UAF AD, the warning for the Massed Shahed Strike must be elevated to CRITICAL/RED. | SIGINT/ELINT confirming increased activation of RF C2 nodes known to precede deep strike campaigns. |
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) |
|---|
| CRITICAL - REFINED | RF Aviation Platform Identification (Southern Axis): Identify the specific aircraft type (Su-34/Su-35) and confirmed launch points/airfields (FAFPs) supporting the KAB strikes targeting Mykolaiv/Kulbakino. | GEOINT/IMINT: Persistent SAR/IMINT of known RF tactical airfields in Crimea and the Azov Sea littoral (e.g., Yeysk, Taganrog). |
| CRITICAL - UNCHANGED | RF Ground Exploitation Intent (Pokrovsk): Assess immediate ground force deployment by RF post-KAB strikes to inform UAF maneuver decisions and protect the reinforcement corridor. | ISR/SIGINT: Persistent UAV and SIGINT coverage of the Pokrovsk corridor for RF infiltration team activity and heavy equipment staging. |
| HIGH - NEW | KAB Inventory/Production: Assess the sustainability of the current RF KAB launch tempo across three operational axes (Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv). | HUMINT/IMINT: Collection on RF industrial sites and logistics hubs storing or producing guided glide bombs. |
7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
- J3 (Air) / J3 (Fires): DEFEND KULBAKINO (IMMEDIATE). Immediately re-task a high-readiness, mobile AD asset (preferably medium-range) to the vicinity of Kulbakino Airbase. Simultaneously, update Time-Sensitive Targeting (TST) lists for long-range fires to include the confirmed or suspected FAFPs supporting the Mykolaiv strikes. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - OPERATIONAL)
- J4 (Logistics) / J3 (Ground - Mykolaiv): DISPERSAL AND HARDENING. Given the confirmed targeting of a key military facility (Kulbakino), mandate the immediate dispersal or hardening of all fuel, ammunition, and maintenance assets within a 15km radius of Mykolaiv, anticipating follow-on strikes. (HIGH PRIORITY - FORCE PROTECTION)
- J2 (All-Source) / J3 (Air): MAINTAIN MDCOA FOCUS. Despite the successful RF diversionary efforts in the South, the main kinetic effort threat remains the strategic saturation strike. Do not over-commit high-end, limited AD resources (e.g., Patriot) to the Southern axis at the expense of protecting Central/Eastern Ukraine's CNI from the imminent massed Shahed attack. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - STRATEGIC BALANCE)
//END SITREP//
