Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 050600Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 050330Z NOV 25 – 050600Z NOV 25 (Immediate Update) ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH (Threat axis remains highly volatile, but the immediate ballistic threat has been confirmed as temporary, allowing UAF AD to prioritize the ongoing threat in Donetsk.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Northern Axis (Sumy/Kyiv): De-Escalation Confirmed. The immediate threat of ballistic missile (S-300 derivatives) application has ceased, confirmed by UAF Air Force (PS ZSU) and Kyiv Military Administration (KMVA). Unofficial reports suggest approximately seven S-300 rockets were fired, primarily targeting the forward line of troops (FLOT) near the border rather than deep logistics or CNI.
• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk): Sustained Kinetic Pressure. Confirmed continued launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) targeting Donetsk Oblast, directly supporting the RF ground assault doctrine (as predicted in the previous Daily Report).
• Zaporizhzhia Axis: New Air Threat. Air raid warnings confirm the threat of Russian aviation-delivered ordnance (likely KAB or similar long-range stand-off weapons) targeting Zaporizhzhia Oblast. This suggests a potential expansion of the RF KAB interdiction zone.
• Deep Strike/Strategic Domain (UAF): Confirmed successful UAF drone strike on energy infrastructure in the Vladimir region, deep inside the Russian Federation. This demonstrates continued UAF asymmetric deep strike capability, directly countering RF escalation.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Night conditions continue to provide concealment for UAV and long-range fire delivery. The shift to aviation-delivered ordnance (KABs/Zaporizhzhia) indicates RF is leveraging favorable air/wind conditions for precision delivery.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Force Posture: RF has temporarily eased the ballistic pressure on the Northern Axis, allowing focus to shift back to the primary operational effort in Donetsk (Pokrovsk). The confirmed use of aviation strikes (KABs) in Zaporizhzhia suggests RF intends to widen the operational area requiring UAF AD/counter-fire resources.
• UAF Air Defense (AD): AD assets are transitioning from managing the ballistic threat (Sumy/Kyiv) back to managing the persistent KAB saturation threat in Donetsk and the emerging aviation threat in Zaporizhzhia.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. S-300 Ground Strike (Refined): RF retains the capability to use S-300 derivatives for ground attack, but the primary tactical intent in this window appears to have been localized intimidation and forward line disruption rather than strategic infrastructure strikes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Sustained KAB Saturation: RF maintains a high tempo of KAB launches, confirming the doctrine to use massed guided glide bombs to obliterate strongpoints ahead of ground forces, particularly on the Donetsk front.

Intentions (Operational - 0-12 hours):

1. Isolate Pokrovsk (Donetsk): RF intends to continue KAB saturation around the Pokrovsk salient to neutralize the recent UAF reinforcement corridor (per previous daily report) and prevent effective defense. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Test UAF AD in the South: The new air threat in Zaporizhzhia suggests RF intent to probe UAF AD coverage in a new sector, potentially drawing AD assets away from the critical Pokrovsk or Odesa axes.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Ballistic Constraint: The immediate cessation of ballistic strikes and the unofficial reporting of localized S-300 impacts (FLOT) suggest the RF intent was primarily a short-duration diversionary tactic to pull UAF AD focus, rather than the start of a sustained ballistic campaign.
• Propaganda Focus: Pro-RF channels are immediately publishing close-air support footage ("Our birds make chaos") suggesting RF is attempting to regain the narrative after the deep UAF strike on Vladimir energy infrastructure.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The continued high rate of KAB usage, even with localized S-300 application, confirms that RF fire support logistics are not immediately constrained.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 demonstrated synchronized, albeit short-lived, multi-domain fires across the Northern/Eastern axes (Ballistics, KABs). UAF has, however, demonstrated C2 resilience by executing a deep counter-strike in the Vladimir region.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF Air Defense demonstrated high readiness and effective threat assessment, managing the ballistic threat and allowing for the quick stand-down of major city alerts. Ground forces in Donetsk remain under extreme kinetic stress from KABs.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Success: UAF executed a confirmed deep strike on RF energy infrastructure in Vladimir, demonstrating offensive reach and strategic interdiction capability. This directly counters RF attempts at operational escalation.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint remains the allocation of high-end mobile air defense systems (e.g., Patriot) to counter the persistent KAB and aviation threat in the East/South, versus maintaining strategic defense (Kyiv/CNI).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Operations)

• RF Counter-Narrative: TASS rapidly reported the UAF strike on Vladimir energy infrastructure but framed it via a local governor (limiting the national scope), then immediately pivoted to unrelated domestic safety warnings (fraud), attempting to normalize the deep strike event and divert public attention.
• RF Morale Boost: Colonelcassad immediately published videos of successful air/drone strikes ("Our birds make chaos") to project tactical victory and counter the impact of the UAF deep strike on Russian morale.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The successful UAF deep strike in Vladimir Oblast likely boosts domestic Ukrainian morale and confidence in long-range capability. Conversely, the rapid cessation of the high-level ballistic threat minimizes domestic stress compared to a sustained strategic bombardment.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

N/A. Current reporting focuses on immediate kinetic and information operations.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 0-6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will revert to the primary operational plan of KAB saturation and ground exploitation on the Donetsk axis.

1. Continued KAB/Assault Cycle (Donetsk): RF will intensify KAB strikes on the Pokrovsk reinforcement corridor and use infiltration groups (просачивание) to seek breaches, leveraging the softening effect of the sustained KAB fires.
2. Southern Aviation Pressure (Zaporizhzhia): RF will conduct follow-on aviation-delivered strikes (KABs/Rockets) in Zaporizhzhia Oblast to fix UAF AD assets in the South, anticipating the MDCOA strike.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(CRITICAL CONFIDENCE - UNCHANGED) The tactical diversion in the North (S-300s) and the new pressure in the South (Zaporizhzhia KABs) are classic shaping operations for the large-scale saturation strike.

• Massed Shahed Saturation Strike: RF executes the predicted massed Shahed UAV strike (50-80+ platforms) against major logistics/CNI nodes in Central/Eastern Ukraine (Dnipropetrovsk/Poltava/Kharkiv), synchronized with a maximum-effort, combined-arms ground assault to achieve a decisive breakthrough near Pokrovsk. The goal is to maximize systemic chaos while UAF C2 is distracted by dispersed kinetic threats.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Ground - Donetsk): PROTECT THE POKROVSK CORRIDOR. Immediately task specialized counter-infiltration units (UAF SpN/GUR elements) to hunt and neutralize RF просачивание groups operating on the west flank of Pokrovsk, as these groups are key to severing the recently established logistics lifeline. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - TACTICAL)
2. J3 (Air) / J3 (Fires): FOCUS COUNTER-FIRE ON KAB ENABLERS. Given the temporary nature of the ballistic threat, refocus AD and long-range fire assets (Storm Shadow/HIMARS) toward prosecuting confirmed KAB launch airfields (FAFPs) and storage sites supporting the Donetsk and now Zaporizhzhia fronts. Disrupt the RF primary kinetic enabler. (HIGH PRIORITY - OPERATIONAL)
3. J2 (All-Source) / J3 (Air): REINFORCE MDCOA WARNING. The strategic environment is ripe for the Massed Shahed Strike. Reinforce the readiness warning and ensure mobile AD systems are postured not only for the FLOT but also for the immediate protection of key energy (transformer) and logistics nodes in Central Ukraine. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - STRATEGIC WARNING)

//END SITREP//