Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 050400Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 050300Z NOV 25 – 050400Z NOV 25 (Immediate Update) ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM (Increased confidence in ground kinetic events, but low confidence in specific BDA from Mykolaiv.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk Area): Confirmed launch of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) targeting Donetsk Oblast (CR: 01:13:21). This directly correlates with the previous daily report’s MDCOA to sever the Pokrovsk GLOC by massed KAB strikes and indicates RF forces are prioritizing the disruption of the recently established UAF reinforcement corridor.
• Southern Axis (Zaporizhzhia/Mykolaiv): The Air Raid alert for Zaporizhzhia Oblast has been canceled (CR: 01:04:14), suggesting the initial Shahed wave in the South has largely concluded or shifted vectors.
• Eastern Axis (Donetsk): New threat warning issued for the use of UAVs in Donetsk Oblast (CR: 01:05:07), suggesting RF forces are immediately shifting the Shahed threat from the saturated Southern/Central axis to the critical tactical area around Pokrovsk/Donetsk.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Night conditions continue, favoring RF ISR and infiltration operations on the ground, and permitting continued use of KAB strikes supported by thermal/IR guidance systems.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Air Defense (AD): AD activity in Zaporizhzhia has ceased. The focus must immediately shift to the Eastern front (Donetsk) and preparing counter-measures for follow-on KAB strikes and the predicted UAV shift.
• UAF Ground Forces (Donetsk): Should be on high alert for RF reconnaissance and SpN activity, given the TASS reporting of a UAF scout capture in the Krasnolymansk direction (CR: 01:23:37). This indicates proactive RF counter-reconnaissance efforts aligned with the new просачивание doctrine.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Sustained KAB Fire: RF maintains the capacity for rapid, massed KAB strikes against critical tactical targets (GLOCs, forward positions).
2. Effective Counter-Reconnaissance: RF forces are actively utilizing specialized sniper/reconnaissance teams to capture/eliminate UAF forward elements, supporting the infiltration doctrine.

Intentions (Operational - 0-12 hours):

1. Sever Pokrovsk Lifeline: RF's immediate intent (HIGH CONFIDENCE) is to isolate the UAF defenders in Pokrovsk by continuously striking the reinforcement corridor using KABs and utilizing infiltration teams to target forward logistics/C2 nodes.
2. Psychological Warfare (PSYOPS): RF continues to use captured UAF personnel and internal political turmoil (e.g., Polish spy claim) to create domestic and international destabilization.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Synchronization of Effects: RF is attempting to synchronize strategic effects (UAV saturation in the South, previous report) with immediate tactical effects (KAB strikes on Donetsk). The shift of the UAV threat warning to Donetsk suggests RF is trying to use drones for direct tactical support or to exhaust AD assets protecting the Pokrovsk sector.
• Active Counter-Reconnaissance: Confirmed capture of a UAF scout near Krasnolymansk demonstrates proactive RF targeting of UAF ISR capabilities, as identified in the previous daily threat assessment.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The ability to maintain a high tempo of KAB launches (CR: 01:13:21) reinforces the criticality of striking the identified KAB Forward Arming/Fueling Points (FAFPs) and storage depots mentioned in the previous daily report (Priority 2 Gap).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, demonstrating flexibility by shifting the UAV threat focus to Donetsk following the conclusion of the Zaporizhzhia/Mykolaiv alerts.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces must rapidly adjust from the strategic deep strike threat (Southern/Central) to the immediate tactical threat (Donetsk KABs and infiltration). The loss of a scout near Krasnolymansk requires an immediate review of forward operating procedures (SOPs) for UAF reconnaissance teams in high-risk sectors.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setback:

• Confirmed capture of a UAF scout/reconnaissance element on the Krasnolymansk axis (CR: 01:23:37). This is a loss of intelligence capacity and risks exploitation of captured documents/information.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate requirement is for ISR support to track and preempt the threat posed by RF KAB launches and infiltration groups targeting the Pokrovsk corridor.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Operations)

• RF External Distraction (US Crash): RF state media and affiliated channels (ASTRA, RBK-Ukraine—republishing) continue to give high prominence to the US cargo plane crash (CR: 01:07:11, 01:12:23), confirming the continued effort to divert international attention from Ukraine operations.
• RF PSYOPS (POW/Capture): TASS explicitly highlights the capture of a UAF scout (CR: 01:23:37), intended to demoralize UAF front-line units and assert RF tactical dominance in the sector.
• RF Disinformation (Internal Instability): RF milblogger channels are attempting to generate internal dissent and confusion in Allied states by pushing unsubstantiated claims of an FSB operative in Poland (CR: 01:19:44).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The shift of the active threat to the heavily engaged Donetsk region (KABs, tactical UAVs) likely increases the stress on local UAF personnel and civilian population there, following the reprieve in Zaporizhzhia.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

N/A. Focus remains on RF distraction efforts.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 0-6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will maximize pressure on the Pokrovsk GLOCs.

1. Sustained KAB Assault: RF tactical aviation will maintain a high tempo of KAB strikes targeting identified UAF logistics chokepoints and the reinforcement corridor west of Pokrovsk until dawn, attempting to render the GLOC unusable.
2. Infiltration Escalation: RF просачивание groups will increase activity, leveraging night cover to target UAF forward assembly areas, ammunition caches, and temporary C2 nodes along the Pokrovsk supply route, supported by tactical UAV ISR.
3. IO Exploitation: RF will aggressively disseminate video evidence of the captured UAF scout to amplify their claim of local tactical success.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF establishes air superiority over the Pokrovsk corridor.

• RF utilizes the tactical UAV warning over Donetsk to conduct a feint, drawing UAF mobile AD assets away from the immediate Pokrovsk corridor. This allows RF strike aircraft to operate with greater impunity, leading to a successful massed KAB strike that physically destroys a key bridge or road segment along the GLOC, effectively isolating Pokrovsk defenses.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Fires) / J3 (Ground): PRIORITIZE CORRIDOR DEFENSE. Immediately activate TST protocols against any confirmed RF infiltration groups operating along the Pokrovsk-GLOC axis, leveraging existing TST authority (from previous daily report). Recommendation: Deploy thermal ISR assets with high refresh rates to continuously monitor the GLOC for signs of RF troop movement or KAB impact damage. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - FORCE PROTECTION).
2. J3 (Air): COUNTER KAB LAUNCH POINTS. Reiterate the tasking for long-range assets (e.g., Storm Shadow, if available) to strike the high-activity GRAU Missile Arsenal and confirmed KAB FAFPs/storage depots as identified in the previous daily report. Recommendation: This remains the single most effective way to degrade the KAB threat enabling the Pokrovsk assault. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - OFFENSIVE ACTION).
3. J2 (Counter-Intelligence) / J3 (Ground): MITIGATE COMPROMISE. Immediately adjust communication frequencies and change call signs for UAF reconnaissance teams operating in the Krasnolymansk/Donetsk area following the confirmed capture. Recommendation: Implement a temporary "dark" period for non-essential digital communications in the sector to assess potential signal compromise. (HIGH PRIORITY - C2 SECURITY).

//END SITREP//