Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 050300Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 050045Z NOV 25 – 050300Z NOV 25 (Immediate Update) ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Focus on kinetic events and immediate tactical outcomes in the Southern Axis.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Southern Axis (Mykolaiv Oblast): This region is the immediate focus of kinetic activity. UAVs, identified as Shahed-type systems by their flight profile, entered Mykolaiv from the south and concentrated on the Ingulsky District and Kulbakino Airbase vicinity (CR: 00:38:29, 00:40:49). This confirms the MLCOA of using saturation strikes against high-value logistics or former military air infrastructure.
• Kharkiv/Dnipropetrovsk Boundary: A secondary UAV group was reported in the Krasnopavlivka-Oleksandrivka area (Kharkiv Oblast), with a primary vector south (CR: 00:34:13). This indicates the continuation of a dispersed, multi-axis Shahed attack across the Eastern/Central front.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Night conditions continue, favoring UAV operations and limiting UAF visual-range counter-UAS responses. No significant change from the previous report.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF AD (Mykolaiv): UAF Air Defense units (likely combined short-range and MANPADS teams) achieved multiple confirmed intercepts against the incoming UAV wave near Kulbakino, resulting in multiple "minus" reports (CR: 00:44:29, 00:51:42). This suggests effective, localized Point Defense readiness in Mykolaiv.
• UAF Air Force (PS ZSU): Continues effective early warning dissemination, tracking UAVs across the Kharkiv-Mykolaiv vector.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Shahed Persistence: RF is demonstrating the ability to maintain a high-tempo, multi-vector Shahed saturation strike, drawing from the previously identified increased inventory.
2. Precise Targeting (Urban/CNI): The specific targeting of the Ingulsky District and the Kulbakino Airbase area in Mykolaiv suggests intent to strike port-related logistics, former military air assets, or command/control nodes within the urban environment.

Intentions (Operational - 0-6 hours):

1. Degrade Southern Logistics: RF intends to disrupt the southern UAF logistics spine (supporting Kherson/Odesa) via repeated, coordinated UAV strikes, forcing UAF to divert resources from the Pokrovsk defense.
2. Test AD Vulnerability: RF will continue to probe AD system readiness and coverage gaps along the Mykolaiv axis and the southern-tracking Kharkiv UAV group.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Target Confirmation (Mykolaiv): The shift from merely tracking a UAV vector to observing the specific concentration on military/industrial sites within Mykolaiv (Kulbakino, Ingulsky) is a key tactical confirmation. This aligns with the MDCOA in the previous daily report regarding systemic failure of logistics/power hubs.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (RF)

The continuous prosecution of high-volume Shahed strikes across multiple axes (Mykolaiv, Kharkiv/South vector) indicates that the RF strategic UAV inventory remains sufficient to sustain the ongoing saturation campaign.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 demonstrated effective control in prosecuting the Mykolaiv strike, leveraging the darkness and dispersed entry points to maximize stress on UAF AD.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF AD posture in Mykolaiv demonstrated high readiness and successful point-defense engagement, resulting in confirmed intercepts ("minus" reports) of at least two UAVs near Kulbakino (CR: 00:44:29).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Success:

• Confirmed intercepts of incoming UAVs in Mykolaiv, minimizing kinetic damage within the city center (CR: 00:44:29, 00:51:42).

Setback:

• Confirmed explosions ("вибухи") in Mykolaiv (CR: 00:58:25), suggesting at least one penetration or successful strike, requiring immediate Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The high interception rate confirms the effectiveness of locally deployed AD assets, but the ongoing saturation strike continues to deplete interceptor inventories. Need to confirm if the mobile AD assets were successfully re-tasked as recommended in the previous SITREP.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Operations)

• RF Distraction Campaign: RF state media (TASS) continues to push high-profile international news (e.g., US cargo plane crash, CR: 00:46:23) to distract domestic and international audiences from the ongoing kinetic operations in Ukraine.
• RF Psychological Operations (PSYOPS): RF milblogger channels (Colonelcassad) are disseminating video propaganda featuring an alleged Ukrainian prisoner of war (POW) describing mistreatment (CR: 01:00:48). This is a focused PSYOPS effort to erode international support, delegitimize UAF conduct, and inflame internal emotions.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Confirmed explosions in Mykolaiv, following immediate threat warnings, cause temporary high stress levels in the region, which is partially mitigated by the rapid local confirmation of successful AD intercepts.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

N/A for this reporting window, aside from RF diversionary media.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 0-6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to complete the current saturation strike, focusing on the second wave of UAVs and follow-on damage assessments.

1. Mykolaiv Strike Continuation: RF will launch residual UAVs along the Mykolaiv axis, exploiting any identified breaches or depleted AD sectors to strike CNI (e.g., energy substations or port logistics) not successfully defended in the initial wave.
2. Kharkiv/South Vector Penetration: The Kharkiv/Oleksandrivka UAV group will continue its south-tracking mission, likely targeting rail or energy infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast or linking up with the broader Mykolaiv attack.
3. KAB Resumption at Dawn: As predawn light approaches, RF tactical aviation will likely resume massed KAB strikes on the Pokrovsk axis (Donetsk/Synelnykove), synchronized with ground efforts to interdict the UAF reinforcement corridor.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF achieves systemic CNI failure in the South.

• The synchronized UAV assault successfully destroys two major logistics nodes (e.g., rail marshalling yard and a fuel storage depot) in Mykolaiv, severely degrading UAF capacity to sustain defensive operations in Kherson Oblast and limiting materiel flow to the Donbas front. This would be immediately followed by RF launching long-range missile strikes (Iskander/Kalibr) against newly identified, exposed UAF C2 centers attempting to manage the logistics disruption.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Logistics) / J3 (Fires): PRIORITIZE MYKOLAIV BDA AND RESILIENCE. Immediately task Damage Control Teams to the explosion site in Mykolaiv. Recommendation: If the target was a logistics hub or power substation, initiate immediate activation of pre-planned redundancy and alternate power solutions to prevent cascading failure, following the recently passed telecommunications hardening legislation. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION).
2. J3 (Air): SHIFT AD FOCUS EAST. Given the successful containment of the initial Mykolaiv wave, immediately begin repositioning short-range mobile AD assets to cover critical rail/power nodes in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Kryvyi Rih/Pavlohrad) along the expected trajectory of the south-tracking Kharkiv UAV group. Recommendation: Maintain only essential point-defense in Mykolaiv while reinforcing the Central sector. (HIGH PRIORITY - FORCE PROTECTION).
3. J2 (Counter-IO): PREPARE PSYOPS COUNTER-FIRE. Develop and rapidly disseminate counter-narratives to neutralize the RF POW propaganda push (CR: 01:00:48). Recommendation: Immediately publish verified content on UAF compliance with Geneva Conventions and highlight RF's consistent use of disinformation tactics. (MEDIUM PRIORITY - IO).

//END SITREP//