Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 050045Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 050030Z NOV 25 – 050045Z NOV 25 (Immediate Update) ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Focus on active kinetic operations and immediate threat warnings.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Eastern Front (Donetsk/Synelnykove): Active confirmed threat of Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) and other aerial munitions affecting Donetsk Oblast and Synelnykivskyi Raion (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) (CR: 00:22:00, 00:26:30). This confirms the MLCOA of using massed KAB strikes to support the Pokrovsk axis and degrade rear-area logistics/C2.
• Southern Axis (Mykolaiv): Confirmed entry of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) into Nizhnodniprovskyi National Park, tracking toward Oleksandrivka, Mykolaiv Oblast (CR: 00:23:54). This opens a new vector for the ongoing strategic saturation strike, requiring immediate reallocation of AD assets.
• Sumy Direction: Open-source RF media confirms continued kinetic activity and targeting in the Sumy direction via UAV footage showing successful engagement of a camouflaged position (CR: 00:33:02). This highlights RF continued tactical pressure along the northern border.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Night conditions continue. No significant new weather impacts reported, allowing RF forces to maintain high tempo of KAB and UAV strikes.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF AD: Air Force (PS ZSU) is actively issuing urgent threat warnings across multiple sectors (Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv), indicating high state of readiness but also high threat saturation.
• RF Media/IO: Continues the synchronization of denial and distraction, pushing high-volume domestic news (social benefits, police competitions) to bury tactical setbacks and deep strike narratives (CR: 00:15:29, 00:30:36).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Multi-domain Attack: RF is executing simultaneous KAB strikes on the forward operational zone (Donetsk/Synelnykove) and high-volume UAV strikes on central/southern rear areas (Mykolaiv vector).
2. Adaptive Targeting: The new UAV vector toward Mykolaiv (Oleksandrivka) suggests RF is testing the depth of UAF AD coverage and seeking alternative routes/targets after the previous confirmed vector towards Poltava.

Intentions (Operational - 0-6 hours):

1. Pin and Bleed: RF intends to pin UAF forward forces in Donetsk/Synelnykove using overwhelming KAB fires while simultaneously bleeding UAF AD resources and degrading logistics/CNI via the deep UAV strikes (Poltava/Mykolaiv vectors).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• New Southern UAV Vector: The confirmed trajectory towards Oleksandrivka, Mykolaiv (CR: 00:23:54) is a tactical adaptation, expanding the geographic scope of the current saturation strike and forcing UAF AD to cover wider areas.
• KAB Focus Maintenance: The immediate threat warnings of KAB usage in Donetsk/Synelnykove (CR: 00:22:00, 00:26:30) confirm the dedication of tactical aviation to supporting the Pokrovsk offensive, prioritizing kinetic fire support over strategic reserve conservation.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (RF)

UAF analysis of RF logistics remains focused on the impact of deep strikes (Orel, Bashkiria). The continued high-tempo use of expensive KABs suggests that current RF aerial munition and fuel sustainment for tactical aviation remains adequate, despite UAF interdiction efforts.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is demonstrating effective multi-axis coordination, managing ground pressure (Donetsk), KAB operations (Donetsk/Dnipropetrovsk), and the dispersed strategic UAV campaign (Poltava/Mykolaiv).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF Air Force (PS ZSU) is maintaining a high tempo of threat communication, essential for civil defense and force protection. The rapid identification of the new UAV vector indicates effective sensor and C2 processing.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setbacks:

• Increased expenditure of AD interceptors is confirmed against multiple incoming vectors.
• Frontline units in Donetsk/Synelnykove are under sustained pressure from KAB strikes, increasing the risk to personnel and materiel.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate requirement is for flexible, deployable AD assets (Shikla, Gepard, Manpads) to counter the newly identified Mykolaiv UAV vector while maintaining robust defense of the primary Poltava CNI targets.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Operations)

• RF Distraction Campaign: RF state and regional media (TASS, Khabarovsk Police) continue their information denial strategy, pushing benign domestic topics (maternity benefits, police awards) to neutralize the impact of UAF deep strikes and the reality of the ongoing conflict (CR: 00:15:29, 00:30:36).
• RF Tactical Confirmation: RF milbloggers (Colonelcassad) are confirming tactical strikes in the Sumy region, maintaining a narrative of RF military effectiveness on secondary fronts (CR: 00:33:02).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

High alert levels and sustained KAB/UAV threats across eastern, central, and now southern Ukraine place continuous strain on civilian and military morale, requiring robust counter-messaging and timely security updates.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Open-source reporting highlights the continued importance of energy infrastructure and logistics (e.g., LUKOIL/Gunvor transaction, CR: 00:07:01), reinforcing the strategic significance of RF deep strikes against Ukrainian energy systems.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 0-6 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will maximize kinetic effect before sunrise.

1. Mykolaiv Vector Prosecution: RF will press the newly identified UAV vector toward Mykolaiv Oblast, likely targeting CNI or logistics infrastructure (e.g., ports, fuel storage) to disrupt the southern logistic spine supporting the Kherson/Black Sea axes.
2. Sustained KAB Assault: The immediate danger in Donetsk/Synelnykove will continue, with RF focusing KAB strikes on the Pokrovsk reinforcement corridor (identified in previous daily report) to sever the UAF lifeline.
3. Follow-on Fires: Should the UAV wave penetrate and strike CNI targets, RF will be prepared to launch cruise or ballistic missiles (e.g., Iskander/Kalibr) against targets identified as crucial secondary nodes or exposed AD systems.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF achieves a decisive AD breach in the south/center.

• The coordinated, multi-vector Shahed saturation strike (Poltava, Mykolaiv) successfully overwhelms UAF AD coverage, resulting in systemic failure of rail transport nodes in Dnipropetrovsk and crippling a major power generation/distribution hub in Mykolaiv/Odesa. This dual-axis degradation severely restricts the strategic movement of UAF reinforcements and materiel towards the active Pokrovsk front, forcing a localized UAF operational withdrawal due to logistical starvation.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Air) / J3 (Fires): IMMEDIATE AD REALLOCATION. Initiate immediate redeployment of mobile short-range air defense assets from areas of lower assessed threat to the identified Mykolaiv UAV vector (Oleksandrivka/Nizhnodniprovskyi Park area). Recommendation: Prioritize the defense of port infrastructure and the regional energy distribution network over generalized area defense. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - FORCE PROTECTION).
2. J3 (Fires) / J2 (Targeting): INTERDICT KAB ENABLERS. Given the confirmed KAB threat in Donetsk/Synelnykove, execute pre-emptive counter-fire against suspected RF air defense systems or confirmed KAB FAFPs/storage depots identified in previous targeting cycles. Recommendation: Maintain aggressive use of long-range fires to disrupt the air superiority required for KAB delivery. (HIGH PRIORITY - OFFENSIVE ACTION).
3. J4 (Logistics): ACTIVATE MYKOLAIV/DNIPRO LOGISTICS CONTINGENCY. Assume successful penetration of the strategic strike and begin activating alternate/redundant logistics routes for the southern and eastern axes. Recommendation: Initiate the strategic movement of fuel and ammunition reserves out of major, above-ground logistics hubs in Mykolaiv/Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts. (HIGH PRIORITY - LOGISTICS RESILIENCE).

//END SITREP//