Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 041900Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 041830Z NOV 25 – 041900Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Focus remains on synchronized RF strategic signaling and immediate Pokrovsk defense requirements.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Pokrovsk Axis remains the main effort.

• Pokrovsk (Donetsk Oblast): UAF ground units are confirming successful tactical engagement of RF personnel within the immediate area. Drone footage from the SKELYA Regiment confirms 10+ confirmed hostile eliminations in both wooded and residential areas (CR: 18:46:32). This indicates persistent RF close-in combat and infiltration efforts continue despite the recent UAF reinforcement corridor success.
• Deep Rear (RF Territory): UAF General Staff officially confirms the successful strike on the Petrochemical Plant in Sterlitamak (Bashkiria), the Nizhny Novgorod Refinery (NNPZ), and a POL depot in occupied Kherson Oblast (CR: 19:01:07). This confirms the expansion of UAF strategic interdiction operations deep into RF territory.
• Sumy Oblast: UAF Air Force reports launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) targeting Sumy Oblast (CR: 18:59:04). This confirms the continuation of RF high-explosive stand-off attacks against northern Ukrainian positions and logistics.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Low-light/night conditions persist, favoring drone operations (UAF SKELYA Regiment successful night strikes confirmed, CR: 18:46:32).
• Scheduled power outages are now confirmed for Kyiv Oblast on 5 November (CR: 18:52:48), expanding the CNI vulnerability zone beyond Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk. This reinforces the high probability of an imminent RF saturation strike.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF: High-level political-military synchronization is confirmed. President Zelenskyy visited the Command Post of the 7th Corps Air Assault Forces (AAF), recognizing defenders in the Pokrovsk area (CR: 18:50:42). This signals high command prioritization of the Pokrovsk defense. UAF units (92nd Separate Mechanized Brigade) also claim successful operations and fundraising efforts in the Popasna direction (CR: 18:43:23), indicating active operations on secondary axes.
• RF: RF forces continue the heavy use of drone and artillery assets across the front, while simultaneously prioritizing high-level strategic information operations regarding strategic nuclear weapons (CR: 18:34:54, 18:35:50, 18:38:43).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Strategic Signaling/Deterrence: RF leadership possesses the ability to synchronize domestic military announcements (e.g., Saramat, Burevestnik, Poseidon, Oreshnik) to project power, counter UAF deep strike narratives, and deter Western escalation (CR: 18:34:54, 18:43:24, 19:02:06).
2. High-Volume Air Offense: RF maintains the capability to execute widespread KAB strikes (Sumy confirmation, CR: 18:59:04) and is assessed to be preparing a full-scale saturation strike using its quadrupled Shahed inventory (Previous Daily Report).

Intentions (Operational - 12-48 hours):

1. Systemic Disruption: RF intent to execute the large-scale saturation strike against Ukrainian CNI (energy grid, C2) is now NEAR CERTAINTY, evidenced by the scheduled power outages expanding to Kyiv Oblast (CR: 18:52:48). The strike is intended to degrade operational tempo and morale while attention is fixed on Pokrovsk.
2. Maintain Pokrovsk Pressure: RF will continue employing small-unit infiltration (просачивание) tactics, supported by heavy fires, to sever UAF GLOCs (SKELYA Regiment successful counter-infiltration confirmed, CR: 18:46:32).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has begun overtly announcing the serial production of the "Oreshnik" missile system (CR: 18:38:43, 19:02:06), likely a hybrid operation designed to influence UAF resource allocation toward counter-ballistic missile defense, potentially masking preparations for the saturation strike.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

FACT: UAF deep strikes have now confirmed operational suspensions or damage at the NNPZ, Sterlitamak petrochemical plant, and a Kherson POL depot. ANALYTICAL JUDGEMENT (HIGH CONFIDENCE): This strategic interdiction will severely compress RF refined fuel stocks, particularly aviation and specialized military fuels, over the next 30-60 days, forcing internal redistribution and increased reliance on reserve stockpiles.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective in synchronizing strategic messaging with tactical realities. UAF C2 demonstrates effective high-level support for frontline defenders and continuous strategic deep strike capabilities.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture remains high-tempo defensive on the Donetsk axis, supported by critical counter-infiltration and deep strike assets. The Presidential visit to the 7th Corps AAF CP (CR: 18:50:42) serves as a critical morale booster and confirmation of mission priority. AD units must shift to maximum readiness for the imminent saturation strike.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. Expanded Strategic Interdiction: Confirmed strikes on three strategic targets: NNPZ, Sterlitamak Petrochemical Plant, and Kherson POL Depot (CR: 19:01:07). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Effective Counter-Infiltration: SKELYA Regiment FPV/ISR operations successfully neutralized 10+ RF personnel on the Pokrovsk axis (CR: 18:46:32). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. High-Level Support: Political support confirmed for the crucial 7th Corps AAF defense of Pokrovsk (CR: 18:50:42). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

Setbacks:

1. None identified in this reporting period. RF ground action is being contained by UAF counter-fire.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate constraint is Air Defense missile and interceptor inventory required to counter the anticipated saturation strike. The expansion of planned power outages to Kyiv Oblast (CR: 18:52:48) indicates national energy grid resilience remains the primary strategic constraint.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Operations)

• RF Strategic Distraction/Escalation: RF leadership is dominating the information space with announcements regarding strategic nuclear systems ("Burevestnik," "Poseidon," "Sarmat") and new missile systems ("Oreshnik") (CR: 18:38:43, 18:55:55, 19:02:06). The timing is assessed to be a direct attempt to overshadow UAF deep strike successes and project strategic momentum.
• RF Morale: State media (TASS) frames these announcements as proof of RF military power ensuring security for "a century ahead" (CR: 18:34:54).
• UAF Counter-Narrative: UAF channels counter RF claims with humor and factual rebuttals (CR: 18:43:47, 18:48:01), maintaining focus on the critical tactical situation in Pokrovsk.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF military morale remains high due to visible tactical successes (counter-infiltration) and leadership support (Zelenskyy visit). Public awareness of the CNI threat is increasing, demonstrated by the acceptance and publication of scheduled blackouts across multiple critical regions (Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

No significant international developments affecting the immediate operational picture were observed, though the aggressive RF strategic signaling (Burevestnik/Sarmat) may generate increased political support for Western military aid in the near term.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-36 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF executes the anticipated saturation strike, synchronized with continued high-tempo attrition on the Donbas front.

1. Saturation Strike Launch: Within the next 12 hours, RF will launch a large-scale, coordinated air attack (Shaheds and potential cruise/ballistic missiles) targeting CNI (energy infrastructure) in Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa Oblasts, leveraging the predictive cover of the scheduled power outages.
2. Pokrovsk Attrition Continuation: RF Ground Forces maintain high pressure on the Pokrovsk salient, utilizing concentrated KAB strikes (targeting GLOCs) and reinforced просачивание infiltration groups to test the resilience of the recently established UAF reinforcement corridor.
3. KAB Strikes North: RF continues focused KAB strikes against logistical and troop concentration areas in Sumy and possibly Kharkiv Oblasts.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 72 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF achieves a systemic breakdown through synchronized multi-domain attack.

• RF executes a highly successful saturation strike that causes simultaneous, widespread CNI failure across three or more vital Oblasts (Kyiv, Dnipro, Odesa), degrading national C2 and logistical capacity. Simultaneously, RF forces achieve a tactical breakthrough or sever the key Pokrovsk GLOC, forcing UAF to divert operational reserves from stabilizing the rear to contain the front, leading to severe fragmentation of the defense.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Air) / J2 (Intelligence): EXECUTE STRATEGIC AD PROTOCOLS (CODE RED). Immediately move all designated AD assets (mobile SAMs, AAA, EW) to pre-selected alternate/hardened positions in Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa. Disperse vulnerable C2 nodes. The threat is imminent and covers the capital region. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - CNI DEFENSE).
2. J3 (Operations) / J3 (Fires): SUSTAIN LOGISTICAL INTERDICTION. Utilize available long-range precision fires (LRPF) to follow up on the successful NNPZ/Sterlitamak strikes by targeting RF rail transit hubs, specialized repair depots, or known strategic POL storage facilities in Western Russia/occupied Crimea to maximize the long-term impact on RF sustainment. (HIGH PRIORITY - STRATEGIC INTERDICTION).
3. J3 (Operations) / J3 (F3EAD): PRIORITIZE COUNTER-FPV/INFILTRATION. Allocate dedicated electronic warfare (EW) and small-unit FPV teams to specifically counter RF drone-enabled infiltration attempts on the Pokrovsk reinforcement corridor, leveraging the confirmed success demonstrated by the SKELYA Regiment. (HIGH PRIORITY - TACTICAL DEFENSE).

//END SITREP//