Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 041830Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 041800Z NOV 25 – 041830Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Focus remains on the Pokrovsk deep battle and strategic interdiction trade-off.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Pokrovsk Axis remains the decisive operational center of gravity.

• Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmiisk): Current intelligence (DeepState mapping, UAF operations reporting) confirms intense, sustained combat within the immediate Pokrovsk perimeter and associated villages (Щербакова/Shcherbakova). The operational tempo is extremely high (CR: 18:04:27, 18:05:27).
• Deep Rear (RF Territory): UAF General Staff officially confirms successful strikes on the Nizhniy Novgorod Refinery (NNPZ), a petrochemical plant, and a POL depot in occupied Kherson Oblast (CR: 18:29:43, 18:33:37). This validates the strategic interdiction effort noted in the previous report.
• Harkiv/Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts: RF UAV activity is confirmed targeting eastern Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv Oblasts (CR: 18:09:35, 18:11:27), indicating the initiation of localized strike activity, potentially precursors to the MLCOA saturation strike.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Low-light conditions favor FPV drone operations, as evidenced by multiple strike videos from both sides (CR: 18:22:07, 18:23:09, 18:32:16).
• Scheduled power outages are confirmed for Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts on 5 November (CR: 18:21:46, 18:25:22). This factor, while a CNI disruption, provides predictive defense visibility for the UAF.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: RF forces continue to rely heavily on FPV/Loitering Munition strikes against UAF materiel and personnel (T-80BVM destruction confirmed, CR: 18:15:48; FPV strikes near Kupiansk, CR: 18:23:09). RF forces are confirming UAF drone activity over their territory (Бобры flying again, CR: 18:05:09).
• UAF: UAF units are executing complex, high-risk operations, including successful MEDEVAC from enemy-controlled territory ("Operation GVER," CR: 18:23:28) and successful defensive strikes against RF armor (T-80BVM destruction, CR: 18:15:48).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Strategic Propaganda: RF leadership (Putin) is actively engaging in strategic messaging focused on advanced nuclear capabilities ("Burevestnik" and "Poseidon," CR: 18:28:13, 18:29:00), likely intended to distract from tactical setbacks and project long-term power to both domestic and international audiences.
2. Adaptive Armor Camouflage: RF forces are employing heavy brushwood/natural camouflage and mine-clearing equipment on frontline armor (T-80BVM, CR: 18:15:48) in an attempt to counter persistent UAF ISR/FPV strike capabilities. (This effort was unsuccessful in the reported strike).

Intentions (Operational - 12-48 hours):

1. Maintain Pokrovsk Pressure: RF will continue to utilize infiltration tactics (просачивание) and high-volume indirect fire (KAB/Artillery) to negate the UAF reinforcement corridor and establish new forward positions in the immediate vicinity of Pokrovsk (CR: 18:04:27, 18:05:27).
2. Escalate Retaliatory Strikes: Given the confirmed high-impact UAF strikes on NNPZ/petrochemical facilities, RF intent to launch a decisive strike wave against Ukrainian CNI has increased to near certainty. Initial drone movements over Kharkiv/Dnipropetrovsk (CR: 18:09:35, 18:11:27) are likely the first phase of this effort.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF appears to be focusing FPV strikes on military transport/logistics targets (SUV/Pickup, CR: 18:23:09) and attempting to utilize heavy camouflage to protect armor.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The confirmed UAF strikes on the NNPZ and other POL facilities (CR: 18:29:43) directly impact RF domestic fuel supply and military sustainment, forcing a short-term reduction in available refined products.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains capable of coordinating large-scale air defense (claims of countering UAF strikes) and synchronizing information operations with political messaging. UAF C2 demonstrates effective synchronization of deep strike, forward defense, and complex medical operations (MEDEVAC from contested areas, CR: 18:23:28).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is dynamic, focusing on kinetic defense (Pokrovsk) supported by deep strategic offense (NNPZ strikes). Readiness is sustained by high-level leadership presence (Zelenskyy visit, CR: 18:21:51) and unit cohesion (Azov, Chervona Kalyna units confirmed in the area).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. Strategic Interdiction: Official confirmation of successful strikes on the NNPZ, petrochemical plant, and a POL depot in Kherson (CR: 18:29:43). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Armor Kill: Confirmed destruction of a heavily camouflaged RF T-80BVM tank near Yalta (Donetsk Oblast) (CR: 18:15:48). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. Complex MEDEVAC: Successful extraction of a severely wounded soldier from enemy-controlled territory (Operation GVER, CR: 18:23:28). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

Setbacks:

1. None identified in this reporting period. Previous concerns regarding RF tactical penetration in Pokrovsk are being addressed through persistent UAF counter-fire and reinforcement.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The constraint remains the resilience of the national energy grid. The confirmed advanced publication of power outage schedules for Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk (CR: 18:21:46, 18:25:22) suggests UAF energy operators are anticipating and managing the strain of the RF saturation strike MLCOA.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Strategic Distraction: RF political leadership is heavily promoting strategic nuclear deterrence technology ("Burevestnik," "Poseidon") via state media (TASS, CR: 18:28:13, 18:29:00) to project strength and overshadow current combat losses and domestic infrastructure damage from UAF deep strikes.
• RF Morale Attacks: RF channels continue to attack UAF leadership (calling Zelenskyy "Cocaine Führer," CR: 18:21:51) and leverage humanitarian incidents (drone strike near Kupiansk, CR: 18:20:17) for psychological effect, framing UAF forces as indiscriminate.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is reinforced by visible success in deep strikes and political-military synchronization. Public sentiment is highly aware of the CNI threat, as demonstrated by the proactive publication and acceptance of power outage schedules.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The US permission for financial transactions related to three Belarusian aircraft (CR: 18:16:02) is a minor sanctions update but does not significantly impact the immediate operational picture.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will execute the anticipated saturation strike.

1. Saturation Strike Execution: RF will launch a large-scale, coordinated strike (est. 50-80+ Shaheds and cruise missiles) focused on energy infrastructure and logistics nodes in Central and Eastern Ukraine, leveraging the predictive visibility offered by published power outage schedules (Dnipropetrovsk/Odesa, CR: 18:21:46, 18:25:22). Initial drone movements over Kharkiv/Dnipropetrovsk confirm this preparation.
2. Pokrovsk Attrition: RF will maintain high-intensity attrition on the Pokrovsk axis, using massed fires and infiltration teams to prevent UAF consolidation of the reinforcement corridor, seeking a localized breakthrough before the arrival of significant UAF operational reserves.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 72-96 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The most dangerous threat remains systemic failure induced by CNI damage combined with tactical collapse.

• RF achieves a successful strategic saturation strike that severely degrades electricity and C2 capabilities across multiple eastern/central Oblasts. Simultaneously, RF forces on the Pokrovsk axis manage to sever the primary supply GLOCs and force a tactical withdrawal under fire, resulting in high UAF equipment and personnel losses, setting conditions for a rapid operational advance towards Dobropillia/Kramatorsk.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3 (Air) / J2 (Intelligence): INITIATE STRATEGIC AD PROTOCOLS. Immediately execute the pre-determined dispersal and hardening protocols for CNI and C2 nodes in Central and Eastern Ukraine. Reposition mobile AD assets to provide layered defense for Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv Oblasts in anticipation of the MLCOA saturation strike beginning in the next 12 hours (CR: 18:09:35, 18:11:27). (CRITICAL PRIORITY - CNI DEFENSE).
2. J3 (Operations) / J3 (Fires): EXPLOIT RF LOGISTICS WEAKNESS. Capitalize on the successful NNPZ strike by immediately tasking long-range systems to strike secondary RF POL distribution and rail hubs within operational reach to amplify logistical pressure before RF forces can adapt. (HIGH PRIORITY - STRATEGIC INTERDICTION).
3. J2 (Intelligence) / J3 (Operations): COUNTER INFILTRATION TACTICS. Deploy specialized Counter-UAS and FPV hunter-killer teams to support frontline units (42nd Mech. Bde, etc.) in Pokrovsk, focusing on neutralizing RF small-unit ISR and FPV operations that enable the просачивание infiltration doctrine. (HIGH PRIORITY - TACTICAL DEFENSE).

//END SITREP//