Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 041730Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 041700Z NOV 25 – 041730Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Focus on Pokrovsk counter-infiltration and RF strategic targeting of EW/CNI.)

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The situation remains CRITICAL on the Pokrovsk axis, characterized by intense close-quarters combat and asymmetric warfare (UAV/SpN operations).

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast): The primary focus is now the neutralization of Russian Federation (RF) infiltration groups (просачивание). Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SSO), specifically the 3rd Regiment, are confirmed to be actively engaged in reconnaissance and clearing operations against infiltrating enemy forces near Pokrovsk (CR: 17:00:13, 17:00:14). RF sources acknowledge heavy fighting and claim near-access to Hryshyne (Hryshyno) (CR: 16:57:06), which lies northwest of Pokrovsk and is a key junction for the operational rear.
• Deep Rear (RF Territory): UAF deep strike capacity continues to demonstrate high efficacy, with confirmed strikes causing oil spills and operational disruption at the Tuapse oil terminal (CR: 16:56:27) and confirmed joint GUR/SSO/Air Force involvement in the strike on the Lukoil refinery in Kstovo (Nizhny Novgorod region) (CR: 16:37:43).
• Air Domain (Kharkiv Oblast): Shahed UAV activity is confirmed near Zolochiv and Merafa, moving south (CR: 16:42:25). This aligns with the MLCOA of using persistent reconnaissance to probe UAF AD systems and logistics hubs ahead of a major strike.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• UAV operations remain permissive on both sides. RF forces are actively utilizing drone footage for Information Operations (IO) showcasing successful strikes on UAF Electronic Warfare (EW) assets and light armored vehicles (CR: 16:50:07, 17:00:01).
• Confirmed oil spill following the Tuapse strike (CR: 16:56:27) indicates successful material damage and environmental consequence, which will impact RF morale and infrastructure resilience.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: RF is adapting its ground tactics by formalizing the use of infiltration groups (просачивание) supported by heavy fire, while simultaneously focusing deep strikes on UAF C2/EW infrastructure (e.g., claimed destruction of 'Bukovel' EW station, CR: 16:50:07). RF also continues to leverage strategic political actions to sustain the war effort (continuous conscription, CR: 16:41:41; mobilizing reservists for CNI protection, CR: 16:57:15).
• UAF: UAF is employing high-value SSO units (3rd Regiment) to counter RF infiltration (CR: 17:00:13). UAF technical innovation in the C-UAS domain is evident with the confirmed deployment of the STING interceptor drone against Shaheds (CR: 16:42:01), indicating continued efforts to overcome the deep strike threat.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Anti-EW/Anti-C2 Targeting: RF drones are explicitly targeting UAF EW systems (Bukovel) and communication antennas (CR: 16:50:07). This suggests a deliberate operational intent to degrade UAF's technical asymmetric advantage (UAV/FPV) ahead of major ground movements.
2. Long-Term Force Generation: RF has finalized legislation for year-round conscription (CR: 16:41:41) and the use of mobilization reserves to protect critical infrastructure (CR: 16:57:15). This frees up regular military units for front-line deployment and ensures long-term conflict endurance.
3. Advanced UAV Capability: RF is showcasing the use of modified long-range UAVs (e.g., 'Molniya-2' with custom payloads, CR: 17:00:01) demonstrating increased range and accuracy for high-value operational strikes.

Intentions (Operational - 12-48 hours):

1. Isolate Pokrovsk by C2/EW Degradation (CRITICAL): RF intends to suppress UAF EW and C2 networks west of Pokrovsk to prevent timely coordination of reserves and to cripple UAF FPV support for counter-infiltration operations.
2. CNI Hardening and Reserve Integration: RF is focused on using new legal mandates (mobilization of reservists, CR: 16:57:15) to harden its own rear area (CNI) against continued UAF deep strikes (Tuapse, Kstovo). This indicates RF is preparing for prolonged UAF interdiction efforts.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF: Increased emphasis on просачивание combined with direct fire support (KAB) and C-UAS/Anti-EW missions. The claimed proximity to Hryshyne (CR: 16:57:06) suggests infiltration elements are pushing hard for a tactical breakthrough.
• UAF: Confirmed deployment of SSO assets (3rd Regiment) to counter the new RF infiltration doctrine (CR: 17:00:13), indicating rapid doctrinal response. UAF forces are also utilizing the new STING Shahed interceptor (CR: 16:42:01).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UAF deep strikes continue to inflict strategic economic and logistical damage on RF energy infrastructure (Tuapse oil spill, Kstovo refinery suspension). RF is attempting to mitigate rear-area vulnerability by utilizing mobilization reserves for CNI security (CR: 16:57:15). RF forces on the Pokrovsk axis are well-supplied with KABs and reconnaissance/attack UAVs.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is demonstrating effective integration of deep strike, political force generation, and tactical infiltration, showing a coherent strategy for sustained conflict. UAF C2 is responding effectively at the tactical level by deploying SSO to critical flashpoints.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness remains high, particularly within SSO and specialized units responsible for C-UAS and counter-infiltration. The deployment of the 3rd SSO Regiment near Pokrovsk underscores the critical nature of the current engagement (CR: 17:00:13).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. Deep Strike Synchronization: Confirmed joint GUR/SSO/Air Force involvement in the Kstovo refinery strike (CR: 16:37:43), indicating a high degree of inter-service coordination for strategic missions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Counter-Infiltration: SSO units are actively engaged in clearing RF infiltration groups near Pokrovsk (CR: 17:00:13). (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
3. C-UAS Innovation: Deployment of the STING interceptor demonstrates effective indigenous technological response to the Shahed threat (CR: 16:42:01).

Setbacks:

1. RF Anti-EW Success: RF claims successful targeting and destruction of a Bukovel EW station (CR: 16:50:07). If confirmed, this is a significant degradation of local spectrum dominance capabilities near the front.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. EW System Redundancy: Immediate requirement for rapid replacement or relocation of front-line EW systems targeted by RF. Increased protection for high-value AD/EW nodes.
2. C-UAS Scale-up: Urgent scaling of production and deployment of interceptor drones (STING) and other mobile C-UAS platforms to counter the anticipated large-scale Shahed wave.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Tactical Inflation: RF sources are pushing claims of approaching Hryshyne (CR: 16:57:06) and showcasing 'outstanding results' against UAF EW/C2 (CR: 16:50:07) to project momentum and demoralize UAF defenders in the Pokrovsk area.
• RF Internal Unity: Putin's continued public appearances emphasizing unity (CR: 17:02:36) and the normalization of continuous mobilization (CR: 16:41:41) are designed to prepare the domestic audience for a long war footing.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is buoyed by visible successes in the deep strike domain (Tuapse, Kstovo, CR: 16:37:43, 16:56:27) and by the showcasing of technological innovation (STING, CR: 16:42:01). Internal security concerns are highlighted by the reports of searches targeting the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) near the Prosecutor General's Office (CR: 17:03:11), which could signal internal political friction.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Poland's stated intent to create its own "drone wall" against the Russian threat (CR: 16:34:13) indicates a growing strategic recognition among NATO allies of the scale of RF asymmetric threats. The statement by the EU Ambassador regarding the completion of EU accession talks by 2028 (CR: 16:35:14) provides a long-term strategic anchor for Ukraine. The US lifting sanctions on Belavia (Belarusian airline) (CR: 16:43:49) warrants monitoring for potential unintended consequence on sanctions enforcement against RF/Belarus.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF focuses on systemic disruption of Pokrovsk defenses and strategic AD.

1. Anti-EW/Anti-C2 Campaign: RF will prioritize the targeting of UAF EW and C2 nodes (especially those supporting SSO counter-infiltration) along the Pokrovsk corridor using FPV/Shahed/Orlan platforms, aiming to blind and deafen the defense before a main force push towards Hryshyne.
2. Targeted Shahed Strike: A focused wave of Shahed UAVs (est. 20-30 platforms) will target the logistics and AD networks in the Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk axes (CR: 16:42:25 confirms current flight paths), attempting to draw down AD missile stocks and pre-positioning for the larger saturation strike.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 72-96 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The synchronized saturation strike detailed in the previous report remains the MDCOA.

• RF executes the massive (50-80+ platform) Shahed saturation strike against critical logistics and energy infrastructure in Central/Eastern Ukraine, aiming for systemic CNI failure. Simultaneously, RF ground forces, capitalizing on the temporary degradation of UAF EW/C2 and the distraction of deep-area AD assets, launch synchronized frontal assaults supported by massed KAB strikes, attempting to sever the Pokrovsk corridor decisively and force a major UAF operational retreat.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J5 (Operations & Planning): ESTABLISH COUNTER-INFILTRATION FIRES ZONE. Define a Restricted Fire Zone (RFZ) immediately west of Pokrovsk focused on the likely routes toward Hryshyne. Authorize pre-planned indirect fires (artillery, MLRS) against identified RF assembly/infil locations, prioritizing engagement within 15 minutes of SSO confirmation of contact. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - POKROVSK DEFENSE).
2. J6 (C2 & EW): DECEIVE RF TARGETING. Implement a deception plan using false EW emitters (e.g., rubber decoys or low-power non-critical jammers) near the front to draw RF drone targeting away from actual UAF C2 and EW assets, in response to the RF anti-EW campaign. (HIGH PRIORITY - FORCE PROTECTION).
3. J3 (Air) / J4 (Logistics): ACCELERATE C-UAS DEPLOYMENT. Immediately streamline the deployment pipeline for new C-UAS systems like STING (CR: 16:42:01). Prioritize deployment to protect high-value CNI nodes and the Pokrovsk operational rear area (e.g., rail unloading points, forward POL storage). (HIGH PRIORITY - DEFENSE AGAINST MDCOA).

//END SITREP//