Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 041700Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 041600Z NOV 25 – 041700Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Focus on Pokrovsk pressure, RF strategic material generation, and UAF deep strike efficacy.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational focus remains bipartite: kinetic pressure on the Donetsk front, specifically the Pokrovsk axis, and deep-strike interdiction targeting strategic logistics and CNI in both Ukraine and Russia.

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast): RF forces continue their offensive push, supported by sustained heavy fire. RF sources claim successful FPV/drone strikes on UAF evacuation vehicles (pickups and BTR-80) near Krasnoarmeisk (Pokrovsk) (CR: 16:21:46), reinforcing the intent to isolate the city. UAF Presidential/DSHV sources confirm the strategic importance of the 25th Airborne Brigade's defense in this sector (CR: 16:11:42).
• Kupiansk Axis (Kharkiv Oblast): Intense local fighting confirmed. UAF 79th Air Assault Brigade (DSHV) reports successful counter-attack FPV strikes against RF motorized assault groups (motoshurmers) (CR: 16:18:57). RF sources claim UAF counter-attacks in the Kupiansk area (CR: 16:29:59), indicating a high-attrition, dynamic contact line.
• Deep Rear (Dnipropetrovsk/Sumy): RF continues probing the UAF rear area with UAVs. A strike hit a central town in the Pokrovsk Hromada (Synelnykove district, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast), resulting in civilian casualties and damage to commercial infrastructure (CR: 16:30:08). This indicates RF is maintaining its campaign of harassing civilian infrastructure well behind the FLOT.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• UAV/FPV operations are confirmed across all axes, indicating conditions remain permissive for low-altitude, short-range aerial systems (CR: 16:07:07, 16:17:13, 16:18:57).
• Shahed UAV activity noted over Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts (CR: 16:08:56, 16:17:13), suggesting favorable flying conditions for persistent, deep-strike reconnaissance and attack missions.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: RF maintains political control over strategic force generation with the confirmed implementation of year-round conscription (CR: 16:07:07). This political action underpins the military's intent to sustain high-attrition warfare indefinitely. RF is showcasing multi-domain integration by synchronizing deep strikes (KAB/drones) with immediate IO exploitation, especially around Pokrovsk (CR: 16:21:46).
• UAF: UAF retains operational control over the Pokrovsk defense, bolstered by high-level political support (CR: 16:11:42) and tactical effectiveness in the drone domain (79th DSHV success, CR: 16:18:57). UAF GUR/SSO confirmed long-range strike success against the Nizhny Novgorod refinery (CR: 16:31:19), proving continued capacity for strategic depth interdiction.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Sustained Attrition: The formalized year-round conscription (CR: 16:07:07) significantly enhances RF’s long-term troop generation capability, offsetting current heavy personnel losses.
2. Strategic Deep Strike/Terror: RF retains the ability to strike soft civilian targets far from the front, as demonstrated by the attack on Pokrovsk Hromada (Dnipropetrovsk, CR: 16:30:08). This capability supports the intent to degrade Ukrainian morale and economic resilience.
3. Hybrid Labor Force: Confirmation that 5,000 DPRK military construction personnel have been deployed to Russia (CR: 16:05:09) indicates RF is utilizing proxy labor to free up domestic construction/repair capacity, potentially for military infrastructure projects, thereby enhancing logistical resilience.

Intentions (Operational - 12-48 hours):

1. Sever Pokrovsk GLOCs (CRITICAL): RF intent is to completely interdict the UAF reinforcement corridor into Pokrovsk by concentrating KAB and FPV/SpN attacks against all remaining evacuation/supply routes, as evidenced by the targeting of UAF mobility assets near Krasnoarmeisk (CR: 16:21:46).
2. Force AD Misallocation: RF will likely continue low-density Shahed probes (Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, CR: 16:08:56, 16:17:13) to draw UAF AD attention and reveal system locations ahead of the anticipated large-scale saturation strike identified in the previous report.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF: Increased reliance on IO to inflate localized successes and degrade UAF morale, e.g., the immediate, aggressive claim of surrounding Krasnoarmeisk/Pokrovsk and destroying evacuation attempts (CR: 16:21:46).
• UAF: UAF forces (79th DSHV) are now successfully deploying fiber-optic guided FPV drones ("оптоволоконними FPV," CR: 16:18:57), a significant technological advance that potentially negates RF EW efforts and provides robust C2 links for FPV strikes.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are being indirectly supported by the arrival of DPRK military construction personnel (CR: 16:05:09), which aids in infrastructure recovery/hardening and frees domestic RF capacity for front-line military support. UAF logistics are under sustained strain, highlighted by the successful targeting of UAF rear-area mobility assets near Pokrovsk (CR: 16:21:46) and the civilian infrastructure strike in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (CR: 16:30:08).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is demonstrating successful strategic synchronization (conscription law, DPRK labor) aimed at long-term conflict sustainment. UAF C2 continues its focus on direct support to critical front-line units (25th DSHV) and maintaining strategic deterrence via deep-strike capability (Nizhny Novgorod, CR: 16:31:19).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture remains defensive and counter-offensive in key sectors. The presence and recognition of the 25th DSHV (Air Assault Forces) in the Pokrovsk defense (CR: 16:11:42) indicate a commitment of elite forces to hold the line. Readiness is high, supported by morale-boosting public recognition and technical innovation (fiber-optic FPV, STING interceptor).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. Strategic Interdiction: GUR/SSO confirmed successful deep strike on the Nizhny Novgorod refinery (CR: 16:31:19), degrading RF strategic energy logistics. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. FPV Technological Superiority: The 79th DSHV's use of fiber-optic FPV (CR: 16:18:57) is a key tactical adaptation against RF EW assets. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
3. Personnel Recovery: Footage confirming the successful, tactical rescue and evacuation of an injured UAF soldier (CR: 16:07:36) highlights effective TCCC and quick-reaction force capabilities.

Setbacks:

1. Logistics Attrition: Confirmed loss of UAF mobility assets (BTR-80, pickups) to FPV strikes near Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmeisk (CR: 16:21:46). This directly impedes reinforcement and casualty evacuation (CASEVAC).
2. Civilian Casualties: The strike on Pokrovsk Hromada (Dnipropetrovsk) resulted in 2 KIA and 4 WIA civilians, achieving RF terror objectives (CR: 16:30:08).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. EW-Resistant Systems: Urgent requirement for greater deployment of fiber-optic and other EW-resistant C2/ISR platforms to maintain tactical advantage against RF counter-UAS teams and jammers.
2. Rear Area AD: Immediate reinforcement of mobile air defense (AD) units in the Dnipropetrovsk-Synelnykove area to counter persistent RF deep-strike harassment of civilian targets.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Denial & Aggression: RF public denial of sharing accurate front-line maps with the US (CR: 16:04:04) signals RF’s intent to control the narrative of conflict status and deny the US the ability to confirm battlefield realities, likely preceding localized offensives.
• National Unity/Sovereignty: Putin's continued emphasis on unity and sovereignty (CR: 16:13:03) and the opening of new military memorials (CR: 16:05:18) is designed to normalize the conflict and prepare the RF population for indefinite, high-cost warfare.
• IO Amplification: RF sources are actively amplifying claims of encirclement at Krasnoarmeisk (Pokrovsk) (CR: 16:21:46) to project dominance and encourage UAF surrender.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is actively maintained through public recognition of troop achievements (25th DSHV, CR: 16:11:42) and showcasing effective CASEVAC/rescue operations (CR: 16:07:36). Local political friction regarding the procurement of mobile shelters (Kyiv KMVA, CR: 16:10:23) indicates internal governance challenges that could subtly undermine public confidence in security preparations.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF is actively using diplomatic channels to pressure Ukraine's international partners, demonstrated by Peskov's public statement regarding Serbian ammunition being used against RF soldiers (CR: 16:10:08, 16:30:14). This is a hybrid tactic aimed at disrupting Ukraine's military supply chain through diplomatic coercion.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF leverages its strategic material advantage and focuses on operational isolation.

1. Coordinated Strike on Pokrovsk GLOC: RF utilizes intensified KAB strikes and small, highly mobile FPV/SpN teams (utilizing the просачивание doctrine) to target choke points and known mobility assets along the Pokrovsk-Krasnoarmeisk reinforcement corridor. The goal is to maximize the destruction of UAF supply/evacuation assets and fully isolate the city.
2. Shahed Pre-Attack Reconnaissance: RF launches another wave of 8-15 Shahed UAVs over Central and Eastern Ukraine (Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Sumy), primarily focused on identifying AD radar emissions and testing UAF response times, in preparation for the larger saturation strike anticipated later this week.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 72-96 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF attempts a deep operational disruption coinciding with a major ground push.

• RF executes the identified large-scale (50-80+ platform) Shahed saturation strike against CNI in key logistics hubs (e.g., Dnipro/Pavlohrad area), coinciding with a maximalist, high-firepower RF assault attempting to breach the Pokrovsk defensive perimeter. The simultaneous loss of power/C2 in the operational rear while ground forces are under extreme pressure could lead to a systemic failure to coordinate reserves and CASEVAC, potentially forcing a localized operational withdrawal from Pokrovsk.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J6 (C2 & EW): PROTECT EW-RESISTANT ASSETS. Immediately deploy tactical security elements and localized anti-SpN patrols to protect the launch sites and command centers of the newly confirmed fiber-optic FPV units (e.g., 79th DSHV's PERUN CORPS). The loss of this technology would be a major setback. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE).
2. J3/J4 (Logistics & Force Protection): ADAPT CASEVAC/SUPPLY ROUTES. Revise all CASEVAC and supply movement SOPs within 15km of the Pokrovsk FLOT. Mandate movement during hours of low RF ISR coverage and utilize heavily armored transport or tracked vehicles only, ceasing the use of soft-skin pickup trucks for tactical transport in high-threat zones. (HIGH PRIORITY - FORCE PROTECTION).
3. J2/J5 (Intelligence & Planning): EXPLOIT SERBIAN AMMO NARRATIVE. Brief diplomatic and IO/PSYOP elements on Peskov's statement regarding Serbian munitions (CR: 16:30:14). Develop messaging to highlight RF's attempt to intimidate sovereign nations and pressure UAF allies, thereby bolstering support for continued materiel supply. (MEDIUM PRIORITY - STRATEGIC IO).

//END SITREP//