Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 041600Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 041300Z NOV 25 – 041600Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Focus on Pokrovsk pressure and RF strategic adaptation through extended-range precision strikes.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Pokrovsk Axis remains the decisive kinetic and political focus. All new intelligence points to continued RF efforts to isolate the city through logistics interdiction, despite the recently established UAF reinforcement corridor.

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast): Kinetic pressure remains high. Ukrainian General Staff (Genshtab) confirms the Commander-in-Chief (CinC) met with the defending 25th Separate Airborne Sicheslav Brigade in their Area of Responsibility (AoR) near Pokrovsk to discuss the operational situation (CR: 15:51:56). This high-level visit underscores the strategic importance and severity of the threat in this sector.
• Kupiansk Axis (Kharkiv Oblast): Intense FPV drone activity reported by both sides. RF claims the destruction of a UAF T-64BV (CR: 15:34:07). UAF claims the destruction of 35 RF assault troops by the 77th Airmobile Brigade FPV operators (CR: 15:38:07). This area is characterized by heavy attrition, often facilitated by drones.
• Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka Direction: RF reports a successful FPV ambush on a UAF pickup truck by the "Southern" Grouping Volunteer Corps (CR: 16:00:01). This indicates RF FPV teams are successfully projecting power deeper into UAF tactical rear areas to target mobility assets.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No new environmental intelligence. Previous reporting on severe mud/waterlogging in the Vovchansk/Northeast area remains relevant (Previous SITREP CR: 15:24:12). FPV drone operations, as noted across multiple axes, are unhindered by current conditions.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: RF continues to showcase advanced hybrid capabilities: integrated FPV drone operations (CR: 15:34:07, 16:00:01) synchronized with Information Operations (IO) (e.g., historical revisionism, CR: 15:44:41; POW exploitation, CR: 15:41:29). RF MoD provided a daily summary (CR: 16:02:59) claiming success across multiple axes, signaling coordinated operational planning.
• UAF: UAF maintains strategic C2 focus on Pokrovsk (CinC visit, CR: 15:51:56). UAF defense industry is actively developing and deploying Counter-UAS solutions (e.g., the 'STING' Shahed interceptor, CR: 15:48:32) to mitigate the strategic deep-strike threat identified in the previous report. The high volume of FPV-on-infantry strikes (CR: 15:38:07) indicates continued successful UAF tactical adaptation in the drone domain.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Extended Range Precision Strike (REITERATED/CRITICAL): The confirmed serial production of 200km KMPB (reactive KABs) remains the single most critical strategic threat, expanding RF's ability to interdict deep UAF logistics and C2 hubs (CR: 15:40:26).
2. Hybrid and IO Effectiveness (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF effectively integrates kinetic action with immediate IO exploitation, using channels to disseminate FPV strike footage (CR: 16:00:01) and POW interrogation videos (CR: 15:41:29) for maximum psychological effect and demoralization.
3. Sustained Attrition Capacity: Putin’s signing of the year-round conscription law (CR: 15:57:33) formalizes RF’s ability to conduct sustained, high-casualty operations indefinitely, directly supporting the high-attrition nature of the current conflict.

Intentions (Operational - 12-48 hours):

1. Neutralize Pokrovsk Corridor: RF will concentrate KAB strikes and FPV infiltration (e.g., просачивание) on the recently established UAF ground corridor into Pokrovsk to cut off the 25th Airborne Brigade and other defending units.
2. Validate Deep Strike Threat: RF is highly likely to conduct the inaugural deployment of the 200km KMPB to validate its capability and force a massive reallocation of scarce UAF AD assets away from the front line.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF: Increased visibility of light mobility targeting on the Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka axis (targeting pickup trucks, CR: 16:00:01) suggests RF FPV teams are adapting to attack UAF forward logistical dispersal and quick-reaction transport.
• UAF: The successful development and public announcement of the STING Shahed interceptor (CR: 15:48:32) demonstrates UAF's rapid, domestic adaptation to counter the imminent RF saturation strike threat.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UAF logistics remain under intense pressure, now exacerbated by the confirmed 200km KMPB threat. The loss of tactical mobility assets (pickup trucks, CR: 16:00:01) on key routes like Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka underscores the difficulty of maintaining dispersed supply lines.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 successfully aligns strategic legislation (conscription, CR: 15:57:33) with current operational needs (high attrition). UAF C2 demonstrates robust morale maintenance and operational oversight through the CinC visit to the 25th Airborne Brigade at the front (CR: 15:51:56).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is high, particularly in critical sectors like Pokrovsk, where the presence of the 25th Airborne Brigade (Air Assault Forces) signals the dedication of high-quality troops to the defense (CR: 15:51:56). Readiness is constrained by the need to immediately integrate and deploy new domestic Counter-UAS technologies like STING (CR: 15:48:32) to counter the impending strategic strike.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. Pokrovsk C2/Morale: The CinC's visit directly to the 25th Brigade in their AoR provides a critical morale and political boost, confirming the defense of Pokrovsk is a national priority (CR: 15:51:56).
2. Drone Dominance (Kupiansk): UAF 77th Airmobile Brigade demonstrated highly effective FPV strikes, claiming 35 RF personnel losses (CR: 15:38:07).
3. Domestic C-UAS Innovation: The STING interceptor is an essential domestic solution to the persistent Shahed threat, mitigating reliance on limited Western AD assets (CR: 15:48:32).

Setbacks:

1. Light Vehicle Losses: Confirmed loss of a pickup truck on the Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka GLOC due to FPV ambush (CR: 16:00:01), impacting tactical mobility and quick supply runs.
2. IO Exploitation: RF successfully captured and immediately exploited a UAF POW (claimed 24th Brigade, Kyiv origin, CR: 15:41:29), representing a tactical failure in force protection and an IO victory for the enemy.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint remains the massive expansion of the battlespace due to the 200km KMPB threat.

1. AD Integration: Urgent resources are needed to mass-produce and rapidly integrate the STING system (CR: 15:48:32) into the UAF layered air defense architecture, particularly around second-echelon logistics centers and CNI.
2. Counter-FPV Warfare: Increased allocation of electronic warfare (EW) and localized C-UAS jamming systems (e.g., trench-mounted jammers) to protect forward logistics and tactical mobility assets (trucks, infantry) in exposed areas like the Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka corridor.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Narrative of Necessity: Putin's continued emphasis on historical defense of sovereignty (CR: 15:44:41, 16:02:07) is synchronized with the new conscription law (CR: 15:57:33) to solidify domestic support for protracted conflict and high casualties.
• POW Exploitation: RF immediately disseminated footage of a captured UAF soldier (24th Brigade, CR: 15:41:29) to degrade UAF morale and project RF dominance in kinetic capture operations.
• Atrocity Allegations (Kupiansk): Competing narratives exist regarding the killing of civilians allegedly carrying a white flag near Kupiansk (CR: 15:50:58). Analytical Judgment: This type of ambiguity is a classic hybrid warfare tactic used by RF to generate international distrust and neutralize the legitimacy of UAF operations near the line of contact.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukrainian morale is being actively supported by high-level visits to critical sectors (Pokrovsk, CR: 15:51:56) and public transparency regarding the management of casualties (POW/MIA support meetings, CR: 16:01:46). The successful, visible deployment of domestic technology (STING) provides a tangible symbol of resilience and self-reliance (CR: 15:48:32).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF media continues to push narratives of international appeal (TASS reports on Putin's desire for friendship, CR: 16:02:07) and domestic religious/political unity (CR: 15:42:02). Ukrainian political leadership is rejecting any conditional membership in the EU, indicating a firm commitment to full integration (CR: 15:51:28).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF conducts a decisive effort to exploit the confirmed strategic deep-strike capability while maximizing pressure on Pokrovsk.

1. KMPB Stress Test: RF VKS launches 4-6 newly manufactured 200km KMPB against two key logistics nodes that were previously considered safe (e.g., a large fuel depot or railhead west of Dnipro). This action serves to test the weapon system and force UAF AD dispersal.
2. Pokrovsk Logistical Collapse Attempt: RF increases the density of KAB and artillery fires along the Pokrovsk corridor, focusing specifically on known road choke points. Concurrently, RF will increase SpN/FPV infiltration operations (просачивание) to physically cut and hold sections of the main supply routes, attempting to sever the recent UAF reinforcement link.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 72-96 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF attempts a deep C2/power paralysis via coordinated saturation strike.

• RF executes a large-scale (70+ platform) Shahed strike wave, synchronized with a smaller cruise missile salvo, targeting CNI in Kyiv/Central Ukraine. The goal is to maximize AD engagement and reveal UAF AD radar signatures. Immediately following the AD response, RF employs high-precision assets (such as the 200km KMPB) to target exposed high-value AD sites (PATRIOT/NASAMS batteries) protecting the front-line operational rear area (e.g., Kramatorsk or Pokrovsk C2). Successful neutralization of this AD umbrella would allow sustained, high-altitude KAB saturation over key military concentrations on the Donetsk front, potentially leading to a localized operational collapse.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/G4 (Logistics & Force Protection): IMPLEMENT 200KM THREAT DISPERSAL PROTOCOL. Immediately execute plans to move all strategically valuable fuel, ammunition, and repair facilities out of the 200km range envelope, or enhance local physical and AD protection for those that cannot be moved. Utilize the STING system for immediate point defense against Shaheds around these newly threatened assets. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - STRATEGIC ASSET PROTECTION).
2. J3/J6 (C2 & EW): ESTABLISH COUNTER-FPV PROTECTION ZONES. Designate the Kramatorsk-Druzhkivka corridor and the Pokrovsk reinforcement route as priority EW zones. Deploy all available mobile and fixed jammers (e.g., Bukovel, portable tactical jammers) to saturate these GLOCs against the RF FPV ambush threat. (HIGH PRIORITY - TACTICAL MOBILITY).
3. J2/J5 (Intelligence & Planning): IMMEDIATE COUNTER-IO/FORCE PROTECTION PROTOCOL. Distribute a FLASH report to all forward units emphasizing the RF intent to exploit captured personnel (CR: 15:41:29). Implement enhanced communications security (COMSEC) and mandate immediate equipment destruction/retrieval SOPs for at-risk units (e.g., 25th Airborne Brigade) operating near the FLOT to deny RF intelligence and propaganda material. (MEDIUM PRIORITY - IO/SECURITY).

//END SITREP//