Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 041730Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 041700Z NOV 25 – 041730Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Continued focus on kinetic operations on the Donetsk axis, confirmed new Shahed launches, and significant Ukrainian FPV asset deployment on the Zaporizhzhia axis.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational environment remains defined by RF pressure on the Pokrovsk Axis and the systemic threat posed by RF deep strike capacity.

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast): The RF continues its combined-arms assault. The latest reporting confirms new launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) targeting Donetsk Oblast (CR: 14:30:15). This confirms the sustained use of tactical aviation to suppress UAF defenses and isolate the city, directly supporting the MLCOA of severing GLOCs.
• Chernihiv Oblast (Northern Axis): UAF Air Force reports one unidentified UAV (likely Shahed or reconnaissance platform) in the Novhorod-Siverskyi district, tracking south (CR: 14:10:33). Analytical Judgment: This likely represents either a reconnaissance effort prior to a larger strike wave or an early launch component of the anticipated saturation strike, attempting to probe northern AD defenses.
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Southern Front): UAF logistics hubs are actively distributing significant quantities of domestically produced FPV and reconnaissance drones ("Mriya 4.5.0," Mavic series) to frontline units (CR: 14:31:59). This indicates a successful effort to maintain asymmetric warfare capacity in a critical defensive sector.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change from the previous report. Conditions support continuous air and drone operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: RF forces are prioritizing high-volume kinetic suppression (KABs) on the Donetsk front. RF propaganda claims UAF positions in Dymytrove and Rodynske are facing encirclement (a "fire cauldron") (CR: 14:23:01). Analytical Judgment: This is an IO effort to pre-condition the battlefield narrative but suggests RF priorities in the Pokrovsk approach are focused on isolating UAF forward defenses near these towns. RF 37th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade (Group "Vostok") is showcasing high-precision UAV strikes, confirming effective combined ISR/strike capacity (CR: 14:25:13).
• UAF: UAF is emphasizing technological superiority in the drone domain (FPV production/deployment, CR: 14:31:59) to counter RF armored/logistics movements. UAF Air Force is on high alert for KAB strikes (CR: 14:30:15) and UAV activity (CR: 14:10:33).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Strategic Strike (CRITICAL CONFIDENCE): The data showing a four-fold increase in Shahed launches in 2025 vs. 2024 (CR: 14:24:00) strongly validates the previous report's assessment of an imminent, massive saturation strike designed to overwhelm AD capacity (CRITICAL THREAT). The detection of a UAV heading south in Chernihiv may be an early indicator of this strike.
2. Sustained Precision Fire (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF maintains high-volume KAB capacity targeting the Donetsk front (CR: 14:30:15). RF drone units (e.g., "Snegiri," 37th GMRB) demonstrate high-precision strike capability against concealed UAF positions (CR: 14:25:13).
3. IO Warfare Capacity: RF quickly exploits tactical claims (Dymytrove/Rodynske "cauldron") and coordinates internal propaganda (Putin's public appearances, CR: 14:31:31) to project confidence and internal cohesion.

Intentions (Immediate - 0-12 hours):

1. Kinetic GLOC Interdiction: Sustain KAB and high-volume artillery strikes along the Pokrovsk supply lines and target perceived weak points (Dymytrove, Rodynske) to isolate the city.
2. Initiate Saturation Strike: Commence the large-scale Shahed strike wave, likely utilizing multiple vectors to probe and saturate AD defenses in the Central and Northern Oblasts.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF: RF is increasingly coupling tactical assaults with heavy KAB suppression, indicating a reduction in reliance on traditional tube artillery on the main axis where UAF counter-battery fire is effective. The targeting of the 119th TerO Brigade's forward staging area (PVD) near a railway (CR: 14:22:05) highlights effective RF ISR on UAF logistics nodes in the near rear, possibly exploiting rail transport vulnerabilities.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF strategic logistics remain stable, supported by DPRK supply chains (Previous SITREP). UAF deep strikes against RF petrochemical plants have forced operational suspensions (Previous Daily Report), but this is a long-term systemic impact, not an immediate tactical one.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, capable of coordinating KAB strikes in the deep rear (Sumy) and near the frontline (Donetsk). UAF counter-intelligence reports concerning RF soldier criminal activity (CR: 14:08:02) suggest localized RF troop indiscipline in rear areas (Belgorod), which does not affect frontline C2 but impacts force generation and internal security.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF maintains an active, technology-driven defense. The continuous supply of specialized, locally produced FPV drones to the Zaporizhzhia front (CR: 14:31:59) confirms a proactive effort to maintain tactical advantage and attrition capacity.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. Technological Sustainment: Successful production and deployment of "Mriya 4.5.0" FPV drones to the Zaporizhzhia front, demonstrating capability to strike enemy logistics and artillery (CR: 14:31:59).
2. Tactical Attrition: 79th Air Assault Brigade (DShBr) continues to use fiber-optic tethered drones for effective attrition strikes near Pokrovsk (CR: 14:20:14).

Setbacks:

1. Logistics Node Vulnerability: The confirmed successful RF strike against a UAF 119th TerO forward staging/logistics point (PVD) near a railway (CR: 14:22:05) suggests vulnerabilities in UAF rear-area operations and rail logistics security.
2. Internal Corruption: Ex-Mayor Trukhanov appealing his house arrest (CR: 14:33:03) underscores ongoing challenges with high-profile corruption, which affects public trust and resource focus.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint is the ability of Air Defense (AD) to manage the severe saturation threat posed by the four-fold increase in Shahed volume (CR: 14:24:00). Resources must be dynamically repositioned to protect high-value C2/logistics nodes, especially the Pokrovsk GLOC, against KAB strikes and the imminent UAV wave.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Internal Cohesion: RF state media heavily promoted Putin’s presence at the "Day of National Unity" events (CR: 14:06:05, 14:28:07, 14:31:31), utilizing nationalistic music and symbolism to reinforce internal unity and project state stability amidst the war effort.
• RF Tactical Narrative: RF expert claims of a UAF "fire cauldron" forming at Dymytrove and Rodynske (CR: 14:23:01) are being used to inflate tactical gains and pressure UAF morale on the Pokrovsk axis.
• RF Legal Justification: Russian courts are utilizing participation in the war as a mitigating factor for severe crimes (e.g., bank robbery by a Wagner fighter, CR: 14:24:14), reinforcing a narrative that military service absolves domestic criminal accountability, potentially incentivizing recruitment from prison populations.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukrainian public morale is supported by reports of increased domestic drone production and frontline successes (CR: 14:31:59). However, reports concerning the welfare of POW families (36th Marine Brigade, CR: 14:22:52) remain a continuous emotional pressure point, requiring active support from coordination centers.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• RF Diplomacy: Putin is sending Oreshkin to lead the G20 delegation (CR: 14:04:52), signaling RF intent to maintain engagement with major international forums despite isolation.
• Western Policy Cohesion: Reports of EU leaders skipping the Colombia summit to avoid "irritating Trump" (CR: 14:19:06) signal potential future friction points and a desire among European capitals to hedge against post-election US foreign policy shifts, which could impact Ukraine support.
• DPRK Context: The death of former DPRK official Kim Yong Nam (CR: 14:15:19) is noted, but no immediate impact on the DPRK-RF strategic arms supply is assessed.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) The synchronization of saturation strike and frontline pressure.

1. Strategic Saturation Strike Execution: RF launches the pre-positioned, large-scale Shahed UAV strike wave (50-80+ platforms) targeting energy and military logistics infrastructure in Dnipro, Poltava, and possibly Kyiv Oblasts.
2. Concentrated KAB/Infiltration Push: The KAB strike campaign on Donetsk Oblast intensifies, focusing specifically on softening defenses in Dymytrove and Rodynske to facilitate a high-risk RF infiltration/assault push designed to establish an encirclement threat around the recently reinforced Pokrovsk corridor.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48-72 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF achieves systemic C2 degradation coupled with critical tactical breakthrough.

• RF successfully exploits a vulnerability (e.g., the previously exposed Dobropillya C2 cluster or a key railway hub targeted by KABs) while the AD system is overwhelmed by the Shahed saturation strike. This success allows RF tactical units to establish fire control over the main Pokrovsk-west GLOC, effectively trapping UAF forces within the salient, while concurrent strategic power/communications outages prevent timely large-scale UAF counter-mobilization or reinforcement.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/G3 (Air Defense): MAXIMUM ALERT AND REPOSITIONING. Initiate the strategic strike dispersal protocol immediately. Reposition mobile SHORAD assets to defend C2 nodes and critical logistics hubs (rail and fuel depots) in Central/Eastern Oblasts against the 50-80+ Shahed MLCOA. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - STRATEGIC DEFENSE).
2. J4/G4 (Logistics Security): HARDEN RAIL LOGISTICS. Issue immediate mandatory dispersal orders for all military equipment and supplies at rail-side staging areas (PVDs) across the Eastern Theater, implementing a new security protocol based on the confirmed RF strike on the 119th TerO logistics hub (HIGH PRIORITY - FORCE PROTECTION).
3. J3 (Zaporizhzhia Sector): SUSTAIN DRONE ATTRITION. Ensure continuous and secure logistics pipeline for the newly deployed "Mriya 4.5.0" and Mavic drone assets in Zaporizhzhia. Utilize this FPV capacity to aggressively counter RF forward logistics and artillery positions to prevent a build-up for a winter offensive (HIGH PRIORITY - TACTICAL ATTRITION).

//END SITREP//