Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 041700Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 041500Z NOV 25 – 041700Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Confirmation of continued high-tempo combat on the Pokrovsk axis and increased use of DPRK ammunition by RF. The CRITICAL threat remains the imminent strategic strike and the newly identified OPSEC vulnerability.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational focus remains the Pokrovsk Axis and the security of its reinforcement/logistics arteries.

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast): Combat remains intense, characterized by RF infiltration doctrine (просачивание) and high-volume indirect fire. SBU Spetsnaz reports continued success using FPV drones against RF personnel and armored vehicles, including an IFV/APC equipped with anti-drone cage armor. This confirms UAF is successfully degrading RF attempts to achieve localized breakthroughs via infiltration.
• Sumin Oblast: RF tactical aviation is confirmed to be launching Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) against targets in Sumy Oblast (CR: 13:48:55). Analytical Judgment: This expands the KAB threat beyond the immediate Pokrovsk front, forcing UAF to maintain extensive SHORAD coverage across multiple northern axes.
• RF Rear Area (Kursk Oblast): Power supply was restored to Rylsky, Korenevsky, and Glushkovsky districts following a reported UAF strike on a substation (CR: 13:34:56). This confirms UAF interdiction capacity against tactical RF infrastructure near the border.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change from the previous report. FPV footage from both sides (SBU, Colonelcassad's "Rubikon" footage) confirms operational conditions allow for continuous small-drone operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: RF forces are continuing combined-arms operations, relying heavily on KAB strikes and specialized drone units (e.g., "Rubikon" as shown in propaganda - CR: 13:41:47). Crucially, RF is confirmed to be utilizing North Korean (DPRK) 170mm Koksan Artillery Ammunition (CR: 14:01:41). Analytical Judgment: This underscores the continued strategic reliance on DPRK supply chains to sustain high-volume, long-range indirect fire.
• UAF: UAF continues layered defense using specialized assets (SBU FPV teams) for tactical attrition and deep strike capability against RF support elements (KAB interdiction, deep strikes on RF rear-area infrastructure). The passage of mobilization delay legislation (CR: 13:39:54) focuses on optimizing personnel retention/management.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Strategic Strike (CRITICAL CONFIDENCE): RF maintains the capacity for a massive Shahed saturation strike, now backed by confirmed SAR activity at missile arsenals (Previous Daily Report).
2. Sustained Indirect Fire (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The integration and confirmed use of 170mm DPRK Koksan ammunition demonstrate RF's capability to sustain long-range, high-volume fire missions, particularly against fixed UAF defensive lines and logistics.
3. Counter-UAS/EW (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF continues to deploy and utilize specialized drone units ("Rubikon") for both strike and counter-UAS missions, focusing on communication nodes and UAF FPV teams (CR: 13:41:47).

Intentions (Immediate - 0-24 hours):

1. Exploit OPSEC Failure: RF targeting cycle is likely prioritizing the Dobropillya C2 cluster (4th NGU CP) following the public visit. (MLCOA - Precision Strike/SpN, previous SITREP).
2. KAB Pressure and Interdiction: RF will sustain intense KAB and long-range artillery strikes (including DPRK 170mm shells) to isolate the Pokrovsk reinforcement corridor and apply pressure on newly reinforced UAF positions.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF: Confirmed use of specialized DPRK 170mm artillery ammunition. This adapts RF’s reliance on rapidly depleting Soviet-era stocks and requires UAF counter-battery targeting to account for the unique characteristics and potential extended range of this system. RF counter-FPV adaptation (e.g., cage armor on armored vehicles) is evident, but UAF FPV teams (SBU) continue to achieve kills against these targets (CR: 13:43:26).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The logistics status remains stable for RF due to the strategic pipeline from DPRK supplying critical 170mm artillery shells. This mitigates the impact of successful UAF deep strikes on POL/petrochemical targets within Russia.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains capable of coordinating complex operations (KAB strikes on Sumy, combined-arms assault on Pokrovsk). However, the previously noted successful GUR strike on the RF "Rubikon" UAV HQ suggests temporary localized C2 degradation in the specialized drone domain.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF maintains an active defensive posture. The confirmed deployment of SBU FPV teams on the Pokrovsk axis (CR: 13:43:26) indicates aggressive localized counter-attrition operations, crucial for securing the reinforcement corridor. Strategic readiness against the imminent large-scale UAV strike remains paramount.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. SBU FPV Attrition: SBU Spetsnaz continued high-impact FPV strikes on the Pokrovsk axis against RF personnel and armored vehicles, including a vehicle utilizing an anti-drone cage (CR: 13:43:26).
2. Counter-Infrastructure Strike: UAF successfully targeted a power substation in Kursk Oblast, temporarily disrupting power (CR: 13:34:56).

Setbacks:

1. Internal Corruption: The detention of a Ministry of Defense Lieutenant Colonel suspected of helping military-age men flee the country highlights ongoing internal security and corruption challenges that threaten mobilization efforts (CR: 14:00:22).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Constraints include the persistent threat from DPRK-sourced 170mm artillery, requiring dedicated and accurate counter-battery fire. The immediate resource requirement is robust protection (mobile SHORAD, EW) for the Dobropillya C2/GLOC cluster against the highly probable RF precision strike.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO Focus (External): RF channels (TASS, Janus Putkonen) are pushing narratives related to Western distraction (e.g., Caribbean "chess moves") and internal Western dissent (Italy's structural issues, torture claims in Ukraine prisons). This attempts to project RF strategic dominance and Ukraine's moral/institutional decay.
• RF IO Focus (Internal/Force Generation): RF sources are exaggerating UAF reliance on foreign fighters (claims of 2,000 Columbian fighters, 20,000 mercenaries overall) (CR: 13:59:24, 13:51:00). Analytical Judgment: This narrative serves to downplay the effectiveness of the UAF regular forces while potentially justifying high RF casualty rates by attributing them to engagements with "Western mercenaries."

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukrainian public sentiment is bolstered by continued international support commitments (Germany, EU) and tactical successes. However, concerns regarding winter energy security are being actively exploited by RF propaganda, with claims that Zelenskyy is "terrified" of public reaction to power cuts (CR: 13:55:02).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Germany Military Support (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Germany plans to increase military support to Ukraine by €3 billion in 2026 (CR: 13:58:17). This complements the recently disbursed EU tranche, confirming long-term commitment.
• EU Membership Outlook: Estonia's Prime Minister Kallas noted Ukraine could join the EU by 2030 (CR: 13:34:01), reinforcing long-term strategic alignment.
• International Legal Cooperation: Ukraine successfully extradited a suspected Russian war criminal to Lithuania (CR: 13:50:00), underscoring commitment to international justice processes.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to exploit the OPSEC vulnerability in Dobropillya, supported by high-volume DPRK artillery.

1. C2 Kinetic Targeting: RF intelligence/SpN executes a high-speed strike attempt (Iskander, KAB, or SpN infiltration) against the former/suspected 4th NGU CP location near Dobropillya, coupled with intense ISR activity in the area.
2. KAB/DPRK Barrage on GLOC: RF massed indirect fire (including 170mm Koksan) focuses on key choke points and infrastructure along the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya GLOC to disrupt reinforcement flow and logistics sustainment.
3. Strategic UAV Launch: The large-scale Shahed wave (50-80+ platforms) commences, targeting energy infrastructure in Central/Eastern Oblasts.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48-72 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF achieves localized kinetic and systemic effects simultaneously, leading to operational friction.

• GLOC Severance and C2 Neutralization: RF successfully utilizes infiltration tactics (просачивание) supported by massive KAB strikes to physically sever the primary Pokrovsk reinforcement corridor. This is synchronized with the strategic Shahed strike, which succeeds in neutralizing multiple regional power grids and C2 relay nodes (despite UAF resilience efforts). The combination of tactical isolation and strategic communication disruption places unsustainable pressure on the Pokrovsk defense.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/G3 (C2 Protection/OPSEC): IMMEDIATE RELOCATION AND C2 DECOY MISSION. Execute emergency relocation protocols for the 4th NGU CP. Deploy active EW/SIGINT decoys at the former location to draw RF targeting resources and delay a successful strike on the new location (CRITICAL PRIORITY - C2 PROTECTION).
2. J2/J3 (Counter-Battery): TARGET DPRK 170MM SYSTEMS. Incorporate the unique signature of DPRK Koksan artillery systems into target acquisition matrix. Prioritize dedicated counter-battery missions to suppress this new high-volume, long-range indirect fire threat on the Pokrovsk axis (CRITICAL PRIORITY - FIRE INTERDICTION).
3. J3/G3 (Counter-Infiltration): AUGMENT FPV AND SOF RESPONSE. Increase density and sustainment for SBU/GUR FPV drone teams on the Pokrovsk axis. Task additional SOF rapid reaction units to patrol the Dobropillya GLOC against identified RF infiltration (просачивание) tactics and potential SpN activity targeting C2 (HIGH PRIORITY - TACTICAL SECURITY).

//END SITREP//