Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 041500Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 041400Z NOV 25 – 041500Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Focus on Pokrovsk GLOC protection confirmed by new UAF deployment data and renewed counter-battery success. Strategic deep strike threat remains Critical.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational geometry is defined by the critical Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast) and the strategic depth necessary to sustain the fight.

• Pokrovsk Axis: RF continues localized tactical pressure, but UAF tactical successes are noted. The successful counter-battery strike by the 55th OABR (CAESAR) against a 2A36 Giatsint on the Pokrovsk axis (CR: 13:20:44) indicates successful active counter-fire measures are being applied to neutralize RF indirect fire supporting ground assault/infiltration.
• Dobropillya-Pokrovsk GLOC: The visit by President Zelenskyy to the Command Post (CP) of the 4th NGU "Rubizh" Brigade, which defends the Dobropillya direction (CR: 13:05:19), is a strategic signaling move. Analytical Judgment: This confirms the critical importance of the Dobropillya area as a rear-area staging and C2 hub supporting the Pokrovsk defense and, critically, securing the newly established reinforcement corridor. This public exposure immediately elevates the Dobropillya C2 nodes to a high-value target for RF specialized reconnaissance and long-range fire.
• Avdiivka (Former): Confirmed successful GUR drone strikes against the Russian "Rubikon" UAV systems center/staff in Avdiivka (CR: 13:27:44) demonstrates continued UAF capacity to degrade RF C2 and specialized drone capability in areas recently captured by RF.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. The strategic threat of a massive Shahed strike remains, suggesting RF is either postured to exploit a weather window or is prepared to execute the strike regardless of minor environmental friction. Tactical FPV drone use (SBU, Vremivka axis) indicates current visibility and wind conditions permit low-altitude drone operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: RF forces continue to rely on long-range artillery (Giatsint, KABs) and infiltration groups (просачивание). The loss of the Giatsint (55th OABR strike) and the "Rubikon" UAV HQ (GUR strike) indicates UAF is effectively applying precision counter-fire and deep strike against RF support and specialized C2.
• UAF: UAF is actively consolidating the Pokrovsk defense and reinforcing key logistics/C2 hubs (Dobropillya). The confirmed deployment and effectiveness of the 5th Kyiv OShBr (tanks) and SBU "Alpha" teams (FPV strikes, 1500 casualties claimed) indicates UAF is utilizing high-mobility/high-impact units to counter RF infiltration and localized assaults.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Combined-Arms Assault/Infiltration (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF maintains the capability to coordinate KAB strikes, artillery, and specialized infiltration teams (просачивание) to pressure the Pokrovsk GLOC.
2. Strategic Strike (CRITICAL CONFIDENCE): The readiness for a large-scale Shahed saturation strike (previous report) remains the most critical threat to UAF operational sustainment.

Intentions (Immediate - 0-24 hours):

1. Target C2 and GLOC: RF intelligence will highly likely exploit the open-source information regarding the Dobropillya CP (4th NGU) to rapidly formulate a kinetic targeting package (MLCOA - Deep Strike/SpN).
2. Counter-UAS Denial: RF will likely increase counter-UAS and EW activity in response to confirmed UAF deep strikes against the "Rubikon" center (Avdiivka) and sustained SBU/GUR FPV effectiveness on the Pokrovsk axis.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has not demonstrated a successful tactical counter to UAF FPV/ISR dominance within this period. Instead, UAF has successfully struck RF counter-UAS infrastructure (Rubikon HQ). This places increased pressure on RF to rapidly re-establish secure C2 for drone operations and deploy active EW protection for forward assets.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UAF successful interdiction of an RF 2A36 Giatsint-B on the Pokrovsk axis (CR: 13:20:44) indicates successful degradation of RF indirect fire capability. However, the overall RF logistics posture remains capable of sustaining the high tempo of KAB strikes and the imminent strategic UAV strike wave.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 effectiveness is being tested by targeted UAF deep strikes against specialized C2 nodes (Rubikon HQ). UAF C2 resilience is proactive (telecoms legislation) and demonstrated by the successful coordination of counter-battery fire (55th OABR).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensive-offensive: holding Pokrovsk while actively applying counter-battery and FPV strikes to attrite RF assault and support elements. The presence of the 4th NGU "Rubizh" CP in the Dobropillya area confirms high-value assets are positioned to secure the rear logistics for Pokrovsk.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. Counter-Battery Victory: 55th OABR successfully destroyed a Russian 2A36 Giatsint-B howitzer on the Pokrovsk Axis. (CR: 13:20:44)
2. Specialized C2 Interdiction: GUR successfully struck the Russian "Rubikon" UAV center in Avdiivka. (CR: 13:27:44)
3. Active Attrition: SBU "Alpha" claims high rates of attrition (1500 casualties/month, 20+ equipment/day) on the Pokrovsk axis, corroborated by FPV footage. (CR: 13:32:05)
4. Operational Presence: HUR/Bratstvo confirmed control over the "grey zone" in the former Kakhovka Reservoir bed. (CR: 13:23:02)

Setbacks:

1. OPSEC Breach (CRITICAL): The official release of the President's location at the 4th NGU CP near the Dobropillya direction creates a critical, time-sensitive OPSEC vulnerability, immediately signaling a primary rear-area C2 hub to RF forces.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint remains the vulnerability of critical C2 nodes and GLOCs to RF SpN and precision strike, now exacerbated by the self-inflicted OPSEC failure regarding the Dobropillya CP. The need for mobile SHORAD and dedicated C-UAS protection for high-value rear assets (C2, logistics) is immediate.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• UAF Morale Boost: Zelenskyy's frontline visit (CR: 13:05:19) and the continued release of successful strikes (SBU, GUR, 55th OABR) are high-impact morale boosters, counteracting the stress of the Pokrovsk urban fight.
• RF IO Focus: Unity & Normalcy: RF channels (TASS, Colonelcassad) are heavily focused on celebrating "National Unity Day" (Nov 4th), utilizing historical revisionism (Colonelcassad on Poland/Smuta) and civilian/technological displays (TASS robots) to project internal cohesion and normalcy despite the conflict.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is reinforced by high-profile domestic visits, confirmation of international financial support (EU tranche - CR: 13:16:57), and tactical successes. The return of POWs (Snake Island Defenders - CR: 13:08:44) further reinforces national confidence.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• EU Financial Support (HIGH CONFIDENCE): EU Council disbursed the fifth tranche of €1.8 billion to Ukraine, confirming continued fiscal stability. (CR: 13:16:57)
• Germany Aid Posture (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Germany plans to increase aid to Ukraine, but explicitly excluded Taurus cruise missile delivery. Analytical Judgment: This provides fiscal assurance but places the onus of deep strike capability (against KAB FAFPs/Missile Arsenals) solely on current UAF inventory (Storm Shadow). (CR: 13:18:17)

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to exploit the OPSEC vulnerability in Dobropillya and proceed with the planned strategic strike.

1. Kinetic Targeting of Dobropillya C2: Within 6-12 hours, RF long-range reconnaissance (ISR/SIGINT) will focus intensely on the Dobropillya area. RF is highly likely to launch a precision strike (Iskander or KAB) or task a high-priority SpN/infiltration mission against the 4th NGU CP location (or associated infrastructure) identified by the presidential visit. This aligns with RF's priority to disrupt UAF C2 supporting Pokrovsk.
2. Strategic UAV Saturation: RF initiates the large-scale Shahed UAV wave (50-80+ platforms) against critical energy infrastructure and logistics hubs in Central/Eastern Oblasts.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48-72 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF successfully neutralizes the Dobropillya C2 hub, creating immediate operational friction in Pokrovsk.

• C2 Paralysis and GLOC Interdiction: RF SpN/Infiltration groups successfully strike and disable the primary 4th NGU C2 node and associated communications infrastructure in the Dobropillya area, exploiting the recent OPSEC breach. Simultaneously, the strategic Shahed strike succeeds in causing systemic power outages in Dnipropetrovsk/Poltava, delaying the movement of reserves and disrupting regional logistics synchronization. This localized C2 paralysis around Dobropillya allows RF ground forces to consolidate positions and sever the reinforcement corridor with reduced coordinated UAF counter-action.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/G3 (C2 Protection/OPSEC): FLASH RELOCATION ORDER AND DECOY OPERATIONS. Immediately relocate the primary CP of the 4th NGU "Rubizh" Brigade and associated C2 assets from the publicized Dobropillya location. Deploy EW/SIGINT decoy emitters and physical security teams to the vacated site to draw RF attention and confirm immediate RF targeting response (CRITICAL PRIORITY - C2 PROTECTION).
2. J3/G3 (Counter-Infiltration): SUSTAIN COUNTER-BATTERY AND FPV HUNT MISSIONS. Maintain aggressive counter-battery engagement (e.g., 55th OABR) against identified RF indirect fire assets. Augment SBU "Alpha"/GUR FPV drone teams operating on the Pokrovsk axis to actively hunt RF infiltration (просачивание) groups and tactical C2 nodes (HIGH PRIORITY - ATTRITION/GLOC SECURITY).
3. J3/JFSCC (Deep Strike Interdiction): RE-TASK STORMSHADOW FOR KAB MITIGATION. Given Germany's non-delivery of Taurus, maximize use of available deep strike assets (Storm Shadow) to prosecute verified KAB FAFPs (CRITICAL PRIORITY - KAB MITIGATION).

//END SITREP//