Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 041400Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 041300Z NOV 25 – 041400Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM (New tactical data confirms RF focus on counter-UAS operations and IO targeting of UAF C2. High confidence remains on RF strategic intent.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational focus remains the Pokrovsk Axis and critical UAF rear-area logistics nodes.

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast): The confirmed establishment of a UAF GUR reinforcement corridor into Pokrovsk (Previous Daily Report) has placed RF forces under increased pressure to sever this lifeline. New RF IO (DNR Militsiya) claims successful targeting of a UAF Forward Operating Base (FOB) and UAV Control Point (PU BLA) near Dmytriv (Dimytrova). Analytical Judgment: If confirmed, Dmytriv, located west of Pokrovsk, is a key potential support and staging area for the UAF reinforcement corridor. This indicates RF is actively employing counter-UAS and SpN assets to neutralize UAF tactical ISR and C2 supporting the Pokrovsk defense.
• Zaporizhzhia Axis: RF IO (Colonelcassad) is explicitly publicizing an alleged increase in UAF UAV crew deployments in the Zaporizhzhia region. Analytical Judgment: While this is likely propaganda aimed at justifying future RF strikes, it signals RF perception of a high concentration of UAF ISR/Strike assets in the south, potentially drawing RF attention and resources away from Pokrovsk or setting conditions for pre-emptive RF strikes.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change from the previous report. The high volume of RF Shahed launches and confirmed SAR activity at missile arsenals indicate RF is postured to exploit any favorable weather window for deep strikes (low winds, clear visibility for terminal guidance).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: RF forces are transitioning from broad penetration tactics to specialized, precision counter-UAS and counter-C2 operations (via the 57th Separate Reconnaissance SpN - DNR Militsiya claim). This shift prioritizes the disruption of UAF asymmetric advantages (UAV dominance) and C2 resilience. RF continues to utilize IO channels to broadcast these successful strikes for morale/deterrence purposes.
• UAF: UAF forces are defensively committed in Pokrovsk while strategically hardening C2 resilience (telecoms legislation). The priority control measure must be the establishment of secure, redundant C2 pathways for the newly reinforced units and the active defense of the reinforcement corridor GLOC.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Counter-UAS/SpN Operations (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF demonstrates the capacity to identify, locate, and engage UAF forward UAV control stations and command posts using specialized reconnaissance and strike assets (57th SpN claim).
2. Strategic Saturation Strike (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The fourfold increase in Shahed use and rising activity at missile arsenals confirms RF's ability to launch an imminent, high-volume strategic strike wave.

Intentions (Immediate - 0-24 hours):

1. Neutralize UAF Tactical ISR: RF will prioritize the hunting and destruction of UAF UAV/C2 nodes along the Pokrovsk supply lines (e.g., Dmytriv area) to blind UAF forces and degrade precision fire support.
2. Saturate Rear Areas: RF will likely proceed with the large-scale Shahed strike wave (MLCOA) targeting non-hardened infrastructure to exploit the tactical opportunity created by the fighting in Pokrovsk.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Focus on Asymmetric Advantage Denial: The targeted strike on a UAV control point (Dmytriv) and the public emphasis on UAF UAV density in Zaporizhzhia (Colonelcassad) signals a significant RF adaptation: actively neutralizing UAF's tactical dominance in the air/ISR domain. This aligns with the previously identified threat of RF Counter-UAS Hunter-Killer Teams.
• Integrated IO/Kinetic Targeting: RF is immediately publicizing successful strikes on UAF C2/UAV nodes, serving the dual purpose of achieving kinetic effect and degrading UAF morale/confidence in their operational security.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains robust enough to support high-volume KAB strikes (Pokrovsk) and strategic UAV launches (Shahed inventory), despite UAF deep strikes on POL/Petrochemical facilities. UAF success in forcing operational suspensions deep inside RF territory (Bashkiria, Nizhny Novgorod) is a strategic friction, but the immediate tactical impact on the Pokrovsk front is minimal.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in coordinating combined-arms and multi-domain operations (SpN assets, tactical air, and strategic deep strike). UAF C2 is actively hardening against the predicted deep strike threat (telecoms law), demonstrating proactive resilience.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is defensively focused. The successful establishment of the GUR reinforcement corridor into Pokrovsk is a key achievement, but this success is now explicitly being targeted by RF specialized units. UAF must rapidly increase operational security (OPSEC) for C2 and UAV ground control stations.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. Reinforcement Corridor: Successful establishment of the ground link into Pokrovsk (Previous Daily Report).
2. Strategic Interdiction: Successful strikes forcing suspension of RF petrochemical operations (Previous Daily Report).

Setbacks:

1. UAV/C2 Vulnerability: The RF claim of successfully targeting a UAF UAV control point (Dmytriv) highlights a critical vulnerability in the OPSEC and protection of tactical C2 nodes, essential for supporting the urban defense.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The critical constraint remains the need for integrated, close-range air defense (SHORAD/VSHORAD) to protect forward C2/UAV nodes and reinforcement GLOCs from SpN/drone hunter-killer teams and tactical air. The need for long-range strike capacity (Storm Shadow) against KAB launch sites remains paramount.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO Focus: Operational Security Failure: RF channels (DNR Militsiya) are actively promoting the destruction of UAF UAV/C2 facilities, attempting to signal UAF operational insecurity and erode trust in UAF C2 effectiveness. The imagery used in the SpN claim reinforces the narrative of UAF forces being systematically hunted.
• RF IO Focus: Justification for Strikes: The deliberate amplification of UAF UAV buildup in Zaporizhzhia (Colonelcassad) aims to legitimize future RF deep strikes against any location in the region, regardless of the actual target.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF public sentiment must balance the strategic success of the EU alignment progress with the increased domestic insecurity caused by the imminent strategic Shahed strike threat and the high-intensity combat in Pokrovsk. The loss of tactical C2/UAV assets, if confirmed, could damage frontline morale.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

No new developments within this reporting period. The Storm Shadow delivery and EU accession progress remain critical strategic offsets to the current battlefield pressure.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to destroy the UAF reinforcement corridor by integrating long-range fires and specialized infiltration teams targeting C2 and logistics.

1. Targeted Corridor Interdiction: RF will execute multiple, focused artillery and KAB strikes on the known (or suspected) UAF reinforcement GLOC between Pokrovsk and Dobropillya/Dmytriv. RF SpN/infiltration teams will prioritize hunting UAF C2/UAV nodes in this immediate vicinity to disrupt coordination and intelligence flow.
2. Strategic UAV Saturation: RF will initiate the projected large-scale Shahed UAV wave (50-80+ platforms) against critical energy infrastructure in the Central/Eastern Oblasts (Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava) to create strategic friction and test UAF C2 resilience measures.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48-72 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF achieves localized operational surprise by combining kinetic and non-kinetic effects to paralyze the Pokrovsk salient.

• Synchronized C2 Paralysis and GLOC Severance: RF executes the full-scale Shahed saturation strike, successfully overwhelming mobile AD assets and causing systemic temporary disruption to regional power and military communications (e.g., cell towers, tactical radio repeaters). Simultaneously, RF infiltration groups, having successfully neutralized forward UAV/ISR capacity, exploit the resulting intelligence vacuum to rapidly sever the UAF reinforcement corridor via sustained indirect fire, trapping the reinforced UAF elements inside Pokrovsk and forcing an operational crisis.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/G3 (Operational Security): IMMEDIATE RELOCATION AND C-UAS DEPLOYMENT. Issue a FLASH order for all forward-deployed UAF UAV/C2 stations within 40km of Pokrovsk to immediately relocate or establish hardened, redundant positions. Simultaneously deploy dedicated, organic C-UAS protection elements (EW/kinetic) to guard the reinforcement corridor and these C2 nodes. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - C2 PROTECTION)
2. J3/JFSCC (Deep Strike Interdiction): EXECUTE TARGETING PACKAGES AGAINST KAB ENABLERS. Reaffirm the tasking of newly delivered Storm Shadow missiles against verified RF forward airfields and associated logistics supporting KAB operations (CRITICAL PRIORITY - KAB MITIGATION).
3. J2/G2 (Counter-Infiltration): INITIATE GUR/SOF HUNT MISSIONS. Task GUR and Special Operations Forces (SOF) units with rapid deployment to the Dobropillya-Dmytriv area to actively hunt RF просачивание and SpN counter-UAS groups identified in the new intelligence. (HIGH PRIORITY - GLOC PROTECTION)

//END SITREP//