Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 041300Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 041230Z NOV 25 – 041300Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (High certainty on RF continued ground assault focus on Pokrovsk and sustained KAB usage. Medium certainty on RF intent to mass long-range strikes.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational center of gravity remains the Pokrovsk Axis. RF forces are confirmed to be operating within the southern quarters of Pokrovsk, transitioning the conflict into high-intensity urban warfare (Previous Daily Report).

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast): CRITICAL URBAN CONFLICT. RF ground forces are consolidating penetrations. Russian milblogger Colonelcassad explicitly links the intensified use of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) on Pokrovsk to RF ground advances, noting that the strikes are specifically targeting logistics and disrupting normal life. The channel explicitly identifies the Pokrovsk-Huliaipole highway as a key target, confirming RF intent to isolate UAF forces further south.
• Eastern Kharkiv Axis: IMMEDIATE THREAT. UAF Air Force (PS ZSU) reports launches of KABs by hostile tactical aviation toward Eastern Kharkiv Oblast. This indicates RF is maintaining pressure and interdiction operations across multiple fronts, potentially targeting UAF logistics or pre-positioning areas for reserves supporting the Donbas defense.
• Deep Strike Domain (RF): RF is demonstrably increasing its deep strike capacity. OSINT/CSIS data (cited by RF IO channels) suggests RF has launched four times more Shahed UAVs in 2025 than in all of 2024, confirming a massive escalation in RF’s long-range kinetic interdiction capability.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No major change. However, RF deep strike capacity (UAVs) remains high, confirmed by the Shahed utilization rate. The astronomical event of a full moon on 05 NOV (TASS reporting) is noted as a potential factor for increased RF air/UAV reconnaissance or ground infiltration operations reliant on ambient light (though this generally disadvantages stealth operations, it aids traditional optics/reconnaissance).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: Forces remain committed to the urban assault in Pokrovsk, heavily supported by stand-off fires (KABs). The 55th Separate Order of the Kutuzov Mountain Motorised Rifle Brigade (Tsentr Group) is actively conducting morale-boosting award ceremonies near the Line of Contact (LOC), confirming their continued presence and operational tempo in a high-intensity environment.
• UAF: UAF continues active defense in Pokrovsk while focusing on enhancing long-term operational resilience. The passing of legislation by the Rada to ensure telecommunications resilience during blackouts (RBC-Ukraine, Operatyvnyi ZSU) is a critical proactive measure to maintain C2 and civil-military coordination against RF deep strike campaigns.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Massed KAB Strike (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF demonstrates the capacity and intent to utilize KABs as primary close-support artillery in the urban environment of Pokrovsk, aiming to destroy logistics and force UAF withdrawal.
2. Strategic UAV Saturation (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The fourfold increase in Shahed use (as of late 2025) confirms RF's ability to sustain high-volume, cost-effective deep strike campaigns against UAF infrastructure and energy grid.

Intentions (Immediate - 0-24 hours):

1. Isolate and Suppress Pokrovsk: RF will continue KAB strikes and ground assaults to isolate UAF defenders in Pokrovsk, specifically targeting the key supply route to Huliaipole (Colonelcassad).
2. Exploit Rear Area Vulnerability: RF will likely initiate a new wave of Shahed strikes against critical infrastructure (energy, logistics, C2) in central or eastern Ukraine (e.g., Poltava/Dnipro) to capitalize on the sustained high UAV production/launch rate.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Explicit Logistics Targeting: RF IO publicly articulates the strategic importance of the Pokrovsk supply route to Huliaipole (Colonelcassad), suggesting RF is making a conscious effort to focus kinetic pressure on this specific LOC, potentially indicating a future operational objective in the southern Zaporizhzhia front.
• Increased Use of Non-Kinetic Strikes: RF IO continues to attempt to undermine UAF C2 integrity by amplifying domestic governance issues (e.g., the dissolution of the TCC distribution point in Kyiv, reported by Russian sources), seeking to erode public trust in military administration.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UAF deep strikes (Previous Daily Report: POL and MTS depots in Luhansk) likely impose friction on RF sustainment. However, the sustained pace of the Pokrovsk assault and the high volume of Shahed launches indicate RF maintains robust forward stockpiles and industrial production capacity to support current operational tempo.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in coordinating complex urban assaults supported by tactical aviation. The public display of awards for combat personnel (MoD Russia, 55th MRB) serves as both an internal morale-builder and a signaling mechanism confirming centralized operational control.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensive-critical in Donetsk, with a strategic focus on resilience. UAF command has taken concrete steps to address hybrid threats by strengthening C2 resilience through new telecommunications legislation (Rada), directly mitigating the operational impact of potential future blackout campaigns (blackout-resistant C2/telecoms).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. C2 Resilience Planning (Strategic): Legislative action to protect C2/telecommunications during blackouts is a vital strategic success, hardening UAF's ability to prosecute multi-domain operations despite RF deep strike attempts.
2. Counter-Intelligence Success: The capture of the "Azov" infiltrator (Previous Daily Report) mitigates an immediate internal security threat.

Setbacks:

1. Sustained KAB Pressure: UAF forces in Pokrovsk are enduring massive air-delivered ordnance, creating high operational friction and increasing the risk of structural collapse in urban defenses.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The critical constraint remains integrated Air Defense capacity to counter the KAB threat in the Donetsk and Kharkiv operational areas and the persistent Shahed threat to the rear. The recently confirmed Storm Shadow delivery must be leveraged against KAB launch/logistics bases (e.g., airfields, specialized munition depots).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO Focus: Momentum and Demoralization: RF channels are focusing on kinetic gains (Pokrovsk penetration, KAB strikes) and amplifying strategic capabilities (fourfold increase in Shahed usage) to promote a narrative of RF momentum. Concurrently, they amplify domestic UAF governance issues (TCC dissolution) to sow discord and undermine UAF administrative legitimacy.
• UAF IO Focus: Resilience and International Alignment: UAF IO emphasizes strategic progress (EU Commission report confirms readiness to open key clusters 1, 2, and 6), signaling long-term institutional stability and continued Western integration despite the battlefield pressure.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is supported by tangible political progress (EU alignment) and proactive governance on resilience issues (telecoms law). RF IO attempts to capitalize on domestic discontent regarding social issues (TCC reports, economic hardship reported by Butusov Plus) to erode morale from the inside.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Sustained Western Support (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The EU Commission report confirming Ukraine’s progress toward opening key accession clusters is a significant strategic signal of unwavering long-term political and economic support.
• Kinetic Constraint (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Germany continues to exclude the transfer of Taurus cruise missiles (TASS), maintaining a critical capability gap for UAF deep strike operations, though mitigated somewhat by the new Storm Shadow tranche.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to intensify both ground and deep strikes, leveraging KABs for close support and Shaheds for operational interdiction.

1. Maximum Effort Urban Clearance: RF assault groups will leverage KAB-induced destruction in Pokrovsk to execute high-casualty urban clearance operations, aiming to secure the main eastern and southern entry points and isolate the UAF Huliaipole supply LOC.
2. Coordinated UAV Strike Wave: RF will launch a concentrated Shahed strike wave (utilizing the confirmed high inventory) targeting Eastern/Central Ukraine's energy grid, potentially focusing on substations near Dnipropetrovsk or Poltava, to disrupt the flow of military reserves toward the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya axis.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48-72 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF achieves localized operational surprise by combining ground maneuver with electronic warfare and kinetic suppression.

• Operational Breakthrough via C2 Denial: RF successfully redeploys mobile EW assets (as predicted in the previous report) to blind UAF tactical C2 in the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya area. Simultaneously, RF reserve elements execute a rapid, focused armored push on a less-defended sector west of Pokrovsk (e.g., bypassing Myrnohrad via a northern route), aiming to achieve operational depth and threaten the main UAF rear area C2 nodes, forcing a disorderly UAF operational withdrawal from the entire Pokrovsk salient.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/JFSCC (Deep Strike Interdiction): TASK STORMS SHADOW AGAINST KAB LAUNCH LOGISTICS. Immediately task J2/J3 to create and execute targeting packages utilizing the new tranche of Storm Shadow missiles against confirmed RF forward airfields and associated logistics supporting KAB operations (CRITICAL CRITICAL - KAB MITIGATION).
2. G2/G3 (C2 Resilience): IMPLEMENT RADA TELECOM LAW PROVISIONS. Immediately task technical and engineering corps to implement the provisions of the new telecommunications law to harden key UAF military C2 nodes and reserve assembly areas against power grid failures, mitigating the impact of the predicted Shahed strike wave (MLCOA). (HIGH PRIORITY - C2 PROTECTION)
3. J3 (Air Defense Allocation): RE-TASK AD TO EASTERN KHARKIV/DONETSK: Reallocate available mobile medium-range Air Defense assets (e.g., IRIS-T, NASAMS) to provide layered defense around key reinforcement/logistic hubs in Eastern Kharkiv and near Dobropillya to counter KAB/UAV threats, providing cover for incoming UAF reserves. (HIGH PRIORITY - FORCE PROTECTION)

//END SITREP//