Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 041300Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 041230Z NOV 25 – 041300Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (High certainty on RF continued ground assault focus on Pokrovsk and UAF successful counter-C2 strikes. Medium certainty on RF tactical intent following Pokrovsk breaches.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The situation remains critical on the Pokrovsk axis, where RF forces are consolidating penetrations into the urban area. Dobropillya remains the immediate operational fallback line and key terrain for UAF defense.

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast): CRITICAL URBAN CONFLICT. DeepState and UAF combat footage confirm RF tactical advances within Pokrovsk and adjacent sectors (Borivska Andriivka, Karpivske, Kozatske). UAF forces (e.g., 2nd OZSP NGU Omega) are engaged in close-quarters combat inside Pokrovsk. This confirms the tactical situation has escalated to high-intensity urban warfare. RF milbloggers (Colonelcassad) are actively downplaying maximalist IO claims (e.g., "10,000 UAF troops trapped"), indicating a necessary correction of expectations following sustained UAF resistance.
• Seversky Axis: RF sources ("Dnevnik Desantnika") report ongoing activity, including map overlays showing contested areas and implied RF operations near Seversk. This suggests RF maintains localized pressure on secondary axes to fix UAF reserves.
• Deep Strike Domain (Avdiivka/Luhansk): UAF COUNTER-C2 STRIKES. UAF GUR reported successful FPV strikes (FP-2 drones) on the Russian drone unit C2/dislocation point ("Rubikon") in occupied Avdiivka. This is a significant development, demonstrating UAF’s continued ability to execute precise, intelligence-led C2/EW targeting. Conversely, Luhansk city is reported by RF sources (Rybar) to be without power, possibly due to previous UAF deep strikes against infrastructure.
• Internal Security Domain: Reports of a successful UAF FPV strike (100th OMBR Voron) on RF personnel utilizing an ATV near the Toretsk direction counter the previously noted RF attempt to introduce light, mobile logistics/reconnaissance assets (ATVs) onto the battlefield.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No major change. Ground operations remain feasible but are highly localized and intensely urban on the main front. The persistent use of FPV drones (UAF GUR, 100th OMBR) suggests optimal conditions for low-altitude UAV operations are prevailing. The potential infrastructure damage in Luhansk (power loss) could impact RF rear-area command/sustainment capabilities.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: Committed heavily to the Pokrovsk urban assault, utilizing infantry and supporting fires in close combat. RF is maintaining operational-level C2 despite UAF targeting of specific tactical C2 nodes (Rubikon in Avdiivka). RF is clearly focused on achieving a breakthrough before UAF can fully establish the Dobropillya defensive perimeter.
• UAF: Executing active defense, utilizing specialized units (Azov NGU 1st Corps, Omega NGU 2nd OZSP) to anchor the defense along the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya arc. UAF continues to demonstrate effective multi-domain coordination by countering ground advances while simultaneously executing highly effective deep and tactical strikes (SSO POL strikes, GUR C2 strikes).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Urban Penetration (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Confirmed ability to infiltrate and establish footholds within Pokrovsk city quarters, demonstrating sustained pressure and willingness to engage in costly close-quarters combat.
2. Flexible Information Operations (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF demonstrates adaptive IO by actively correcting maximalist claims ("10,000 trapped") to maintain internal credibility, while still promoting the strategic narrative of inevitable victory (Day of National Unity messaging, cultural content).

Intentions (Immediate - 0-12 hours):

1. Isolate Pokrovsk Defenses: RF will attempt to expand the established penetration points in Pokrovsk to cut off key lines of communication (LOCs) within the city, aiming for operational isolation of remaining UAF pockets.
2. Counter UAF FPV/EW Superiority: RF forces will likely increase their own EW and C-UAS efforts following the successful GUR strike on the Rubikon C2 node in Avdiivka. This unit, specialized in drone operations, is a high-value loss.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• RF IO Self-Correction: The explicit public debunking of "10,000 trapped" narrative by milbloggers is a shift from previous tactics, suggesting centralized control over IO intended to preserve long-term trust in military reporting.
• UAF Counter-Mobility (Observed RF vulnerability): The successful destruction of RF personnel on an ATV near Toretsk validates UAF’s FPV superiority and demonstrates the vulnerability of RF's attempts to introduce light mobility assets without adequate C-UAS cover.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The UAF deep strikes on POL/MTS in Luhansk (Previous Report) and the reported power loss in Luhansk (Rybar) are highly likely to inflict friction on RF logistics supporting the Pokrovsk axis, particularly concerning fuel, ammunition, and rear-area C2. However, the ground assault tempo has not yet diminished, indicating sufficient forward stockpiles.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

UAF C2 remains robust, demonstrated by the President's public visit to the Azov CP on the critical Dobropillya line, serving as a powerful C2 signal. RF C2 is under kinetic threat (GUR strike on Rubikon) but is effective enough to maintain coordination of the primary ground effort in Pokrovsk and secondary efforts on the Seversky axis.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are in a high-readiness defensive posture, specifically focused on delaying RF advances in Pokrovsk and preparing the main defense line at Dobropillya. The deployment and confirmed activity of elite units (Azov/Omega NGU) signal the high importance of the current defense. UAF continues offensive operations in the deep strike domain, leveraging new assets (Storm Shadow, FPV-2) effectively.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. C2 Disruption (Avdiivka): GUR's successful strike on the Russian "Rubikon" drone unit C2/dislocation point is a significant kinetic and intelligence victory, degrading RF C-UAS/EW capability and denying an enemy asset in a critical sector.
2. Deep Morale Boost: Zelenskyy's highly visible meeting with the 1st Azov Corps CP on the Dobropillya direction serves as a critical morale and strategic signaling success, confirming the priority of the defense line to both domestic and international audiences.
3. Tactical Counter-Mobility (Toretsk): The successful FPV strike on the RF ATV negates a localized RF attempt at rapid reconnaissance/logistics.

Setbacks:

1. Urban Penetration: Confirmed RF tactical advances within Pokrovsk quarters mean UAF units are now fighting in highly disadvantageous urban terrain, exposing them to greater casualties and logistical strain.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint remains the need for integrated Air Defense to counter the KAB threat on the front line and the persistent LM/UAV threat in the operational rear. The new tranche of Storm Shadow missiles (Previous Report) should be immediately integrated into the targeting cycle (J2/J3) to maximize deep strike effects against RF logistics and air infrastructure.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO: Primarily focused on consolidating domestic support via cultural unity narratives (Day of National Unity messaging, cultural videos from Volga region) while simultaneously broadcasting tactical "successes" (Pokrovsk penetration, claims of UAF civil-military atrocities near Kupyansk, labeled "FAKE" by Russian sources). The deliberate dampening of overly aggressive claims (Colonelcassad on the "10,000" encirclement) is a sophisticated attempt to maintain believability.
• UAF IO: Focuses on resilience, leadership visibility (Zelenskyy at Azov CP), and kinetic success (GUR/SSO strikes). UAF General Staff (ZSU) is actively promoting contract service for younger demographics (18-24), signaling confidence in sustained manpower.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is actively managed and reinforced by high-level visits and published successes against key RF targets. Russian domestic sentiment is being appealed to via historical and nationalistic themes (Day of National Unity).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Confirmed major macro-financial support from the EU (€1.8 billion) and continued kinetic support (Storm Shadow delivery) provides strong strategic indicators of sustained Western commitment, counteracting RF IO efforts to portray allied fracturing.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will capitalize on its current urban penetration in Pokrovsk, focusing on clearing routes and establishing secure forward C2 positions while preparing the final push toward Dobropillya.

1. Isolation of Pokrovsk LOCs: RF mechanized infantry, supported by massed artillery and sustained KAB strikes, will attempt to achieve localized encirclement of key UAF defensive points within Pokrovsk, particularly targeting the main exfiltration routes leading west toward Dobropillya.
2. Enhanced Counter-UAS/EW Efforts: Following the loss of the Rubikon C2, RF will urgently redeploy mobile EW assets (e.g., Krasukha-4 or Leer-3 systems) closer to the Pokrovsk penetration zone to neutralize UAF FPV and reconnaissance drone superiority.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48-72 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF achieves a decisive tactical breakthrough west of Pokrovsk before Dobropillya defenses are fully integrated, enabling operational exploitation.

• Flanking Maneuver and Dobropillya Encirclement: RF utilizes massed KAB coverage to suppress UAF fire support bases, while reserve elements (potentially including mobile light infantry/recon) bypass the main UAF defense in Dobropillya via northern or southern wooded/less defended sectors, aiming to fix UAF forces in place and threaten the line of communications back to Kramatorsk. This would severely undermine UAF’s ability to defend the central Donbas.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/JFSCC (C2 Targeting): IMMEDIATE FOLLOW-ON STRIKES. Capitalize on the vulnerability exposed by the Rubikon strike. Task GUR/SSO with continuous FPV/precision reconnaissance-strike missions targeting RF tactical C2 nodes, drone repair/storage facilities, and newly identified EW/C-UAS emitters in the immediate and deep operational area (e.g., occupied Avdiivka, Yasynuvata). (CRITICAL PRIORITY - C2 DEGRADATION)
2. J3/J4 (Logistics & Dobropillya Defense): CONSOLIDATE DOBROPILLYA FIRE SUPPORT. Urgently move and pre-position all available long-range artillery and MRLS systems to cover the key approach sectors into Dobropillya, ensuring overlapping fields of fire and hardened defensive positions. Focus fire planning on known RF assembly areas south and east of Pokrovsk. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - MLCOA/MDCOA MITIGATION)
3. G3/G2 (Counter-Hybrid): REINFORCE REAR AREA VULNERABILITY. Given the RF intent to utilize light, mobile reconnaissance (ATVs) and the success of UAF FPV defense near Toretsk, task tactical FPV units to actively patrol and deny key road/track networks leading into the Dobropillya perimeter. Utilize newly delivered Storm Shadow targeting against RF high-value C2/logistics nodes confirmed to be supporting the Pokrovsk main effort. (HIGH PRIORITY - FORCE PROTECTION/OPERATIONAL DEPTH)

//END SITREP//