Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 041200Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 041200Z NOV 25 – 041230Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (High certainty on RF deep strike intentions and persistent IO focused on Pokrovsk and UAF morale. Medium certainty on RF logistics readiness near Pokrovsk.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Pokrovsk axis remains the decisive point for the RF main effort. RF is attempting to synchronize ground pressure with a persistent deep strike campaign and a maximized Information Operation (IO) effort.

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast): CRITICAL URBAN CONFLICT. RF sources (НгП раZVедка) are attempting to temper initial maximalist claims (like the "85% control" previously reported) by stating that the figure of "10,000 UAF troops trapped in the Pokrovsk agglomeration" is an exaggeration, though they assert real successes exist. This indicates RF is managing internal IO expectations but confirming heavy urban pressure. UAF President Zelenskyy’s visit to the Command Post (CP) of the 1st Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine "Azov" defending the Dobropillya direction (FACT - Zelenskiy Official) confirms the criticality of the line immediately west of Pokrovsk, establishing Dobropillya as the next key terrain feature in the RF operational path.
• Deep Strike Domain (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia/Poltava): PERSISTENT UAV THREAT. Air Force reporting confirms continued RF use of Loitering Munitions (LMs/BPLA) heading west over Eastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Petropavlivka and Shakhtarske regions), then turning toward Donetsk Oblast (FACT - Air Force). This confirms the immediate logistical/AD threat to UAF operational reserves flowing to the Pokrovsk front. Furthermore, UAF sources report Russia used a record number of KABs (Guided Aerial Bombs) in October (RBC-Ukraine), confirming that RF air superiority in the immediate contact zone remains the primary kinetic threat supporting ground advances.
• Zaporizhzhia Axis: RF sources (Воин DV) claim successful UAV operations to disrupt UAF internet/C4ISR capabilities on the Zaporizhzhia direction (FACT - RF video footage showing strike). This suggests continued hybrid operations focused on paralyzing UAF tactical communication networks, likely targeting Starlink terminals or local repeaters.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant changes. Continued RF focus on KABs suggests dependence on favorable flight conditions and unsuppressed RF air assets.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: High combat tempo centered on Pokrovsk, supported by record KAB usage and continued LM deep strikes. RF logistics are preparing for continued forward movement (evidenced by the collection of ATVs onto military transport vehicles, Colonelcassad). RF IO is highly focused on promoting national unity and celebrating tactical gains (Day of National Unity messaging).
• UAF: Executing stressed, active defense in the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya arc. High-level leadership engagement (Zelenskyy's visit) is actively used to boost morale and validate the importance of the Dobropillya defense line. UAF forces are working to mitigate persistent RF C4ISR interdiction efforts on the southern flank (Zaporizhzhia).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Air Dominance and Precision Strike (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Confirmed record use of KABs in October demonstrates an overwhelming RF capability to degrade UAF defensive positions rapidly through mass guided munitions.
2. Adaptive Tactical Logistics (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): The collection of ATVs/quad bikes onto military transport (Colonelcassad) suggests RF is preparing light, mobile logistics/reconnaissance assets for rapid movement or exploitation over difficult terrain immediately following a breakthrough or withdrawal near Pokrovsk.

Intentions (Immediate - 0-12 hours):

1. Intensify Pokrovsk Pressure: RF will attempt to push through the urban centers, relying on KAB saturation fire and sustained pressure to break the UAF defense structure before UAF can fully consolidate the Dobropillya line.
2. Disrupt Critical Supply Routes: RF LMs currently flying over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast are intended to strike logistics hubs or rail lines feeding the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya axis, synchronizing the deep strike to maximize the tactical effect of the ground assault.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Counter-UAS/C4ISR Tactics: RF forces are actively sharing instructional videos on how to counter UAF FPV drones (Филолог в засаде) and are publicly advertising successful C4ISR interdiction strikes (Воин DV, Zaporizhzhia). This indicates a systemic RF adaptation effort to mitigate UAF's FPV asymmetry and enhance their own EW/C-UAS capacity.
• IO Self-Correction: RF military bloggers are actively pushing back against maximalist, unsubstantiated claims (10,000 trapped UAF troops), suggesting a centralized effort to maintain credibility among domestic audiences following potential disappointments or exaggerations regarding the Pokrovsk capture timeline.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain resilient, as evidenced by continued materiel movement (ATV collection) and high production/stockpiles of KABs and Geran-2 LMs. UAF deep strikes (reported in the previous period) likely cause friction but have not stopped the main flow of materiel to the Donetsk front.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in coordinating multi-domain operations (KAB strikes, LM deep strikes, ground assault). UAF C2 demonstrates resilience and high morale, validated by the open display of the President meeting with key combat units (Azov CP, Dobropillya direction).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is shifting from urban defense in Pokrovsk to establishing a robust secondary defense line centered on the Dobropillya axis. The acknowledged public visit by Zelenskyy to the Azov CP in the Dobropillya direction signals a high priority for holding this line. Readiness remains high among professional units, particularly in the Dobropillya sector.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. High-Level Morale Signal (Dobropillya): The Presidential visit reinforces command intent and serves as a powerful message of commitment to the defense of the Dobropillya line, directly countering RF IO narratives of UAF collapse.
2. Sustained Defense in Pokrovsk: Despite confirmed penetration (Previous Report), UAF forces have maintained resistance, forcing RF milbloggers to walk back maximalist claims of encirclement.

Setbacks:

1. Escalated Air Threat: Record KAB usage presents a significant challenge to fixed defensive positions and requires constant adaptation in force disposition and dispersion.
2. Confirmed C4ISR Interdiction: RF strikes claimed against UAF internet/comms on the Zaporizhzhia axis (Воин DV) suggest a sustained operational friction point for UAF C2.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The critical constraint remains adequate fixed and mobile Air Defense to counter both the KAB threat on the immediate front and the high-volume Geran-2/LM strikes targeting rear area logistics (Dnipropetrovsk). International macro-financial support (over €1.8 billion from the EU, Operatyvnyi ZSU) secures long-term economic stability but does not address immediate kinetic resource requirements.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO Focus: RF aims to project overwhelming force and inevitable victory, centered on three narratives: (1) Collapse Narrative: Ex-Rada deputy commentary claiming "Pokrovsk is finished, Myrnohrad is encircled" (Операция Z) to degrade UAF morale; (2) National Cohesion: Using the Day of National Unity (Nov 4) to promote domestic support and unity behind the military effort; (3) External Critique: Amplifying news of potential political shifts in partner nations (Czech coalition critiquing Ukraine support) to signal waning international backing.
• UAF IO Focus: UAF counter-messaging focuses on Leadership Presence (Zelenskyy’s visit to Azov CP), Military Effectiveness (extraditions, institutional integrity messaging), and Civilian Resilience (Zaporizhzhia ODA's AI course for business, Kryvyi Rih infrastructure improvements).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is actively sustained by leadership visits to the front. RF domestic IO is being challenged by reports of internal socio-economic issues (Moscow news on fraud, Chelyabinsk crime, ASTA reports on feminist protests, Previous Report), suggesting the unity narrative is fragile beneath the surface.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Confirmed macro-financial support from the EU (€1.8 billion) provides a strong indicator of sustained economic backing. RF attempts to highlight shifts in allied politics (Czechia) are intended to create doubt but do not yet represent a significant change in military aid flows.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to convert confirmed gains in Pokrovsk into tactical momentum against the established defensive line.

1. Focused Assault on Dobropillya Approaches: RF forces will utilize concentrated KAB strikes (leveraging record October usage) against UAF positions and fire support assets defending the immediate approaches to Dobropillya, following the likely capture or isolation of Pokrovsk center.
2. LM Saturation of Rail/Road Junctions: The observed LM flight paths over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast will result in a targeted strike wave against one or more critical rail/road junctions or forward operating sites (FOS) between Pavlohrad and Pokrovsk to choke off the flow of UAF reserves and sustainment.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48-72 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF achieves rapid breakthrough near Pokrovsk and initiates deep penetration toward the Western Donbas.

• Seizure of Myrnohrad and Deep Penetration: Utilizing light, mobile assets (ATVs, recon units) supported by intense KAB coverage, RF bypasses prepared defenses around Myrnohrad (or encircles it per IO claims) and exploits the operational depth, aiming for the Kramatorsk-Sloviansk supply corridor. This would force a major UAF operational redeployment under fire.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/JFSCC (Air Defense - C-UAS): IMMEDIATE AD INTERCEPTION. The confirmed active LM wave over Dnipropetrovsk requires the immediate allocation of mobile AD (Gepard, SA-13) and Electronic Warfare (EW) assets to establish a temporary protective bubble around key logistics points (rail hubs) in the Pavlohrad-Synelnykove area to prevent disruption of the Pokrovsk resupply effort. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - FORCE PROTECTION)
2. J3/Fires (Dobropillya Support): KAB MITIGATION AND COUNTER-FIRE. Prioritize all available counter-battery and long-range precision fires (HIMARS, MRLS) to target RF airbases and forward operating locations within effective range of the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya axis (e.g., in occupied Luhansk/Donetsk) responsible for launching KAB-equipped aircraft. Simultaneously, task engineers to rapidly construct anti-fragmentation and overhead protection for key C2 and assembly areas in the Dobropillya sector. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - MDCOA MITIGATION)
3. J2/CI (Hybrid Warfare Mitigation): C4ISR NETWORK HARDENING. Implement enhanced physical security measures and EW protocols around confirmed communication hubs (Starlink repeaters, main fiber lines) on the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk axes to counter RF’s stated intention and capability for C4ISR interdiction. (HIGH PRIORITY - OPERATIONAL CONTINUITY)

//END SITREP//