Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 041200Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 041130Z NOV 25 – 041200Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (High certainty on RF deep strike capability escalation and persistent IO focus on Pokrovsk. Medium certainty on RF logistics interdiction by UAF FPV teams near Pokrovsk.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The situation remains dominated by the RF main effort to seize Pokrovsk and simultaneous RF deep strike campaigns targeting UAF logistics and infrastructure.

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast): CRITICAL URBAN PRESSURE/IO AMPLIFICATION. RF sources (Colonelcassad, Bild military analyst Röpcke—cited by UAF sources) continue to amplify the claim of 85% RF control of Pokrovsk (ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT - This figure is highly contestable but serves as the primary RF IO narrative). NEW UAF FPV footage targeting RF logistics near Pokrovsk confirms UAF efforts to interdict RF supply lines (Kotsnews video caption: "This is what enemy logistics look like near Pokrovsk"). The confirmed destruction of an RF MLRS-equipped vehicle (or similar) by UAF FPV suggests successful counter-mobility operations are degrading RF fire support on the approaches.
• Deep Strike Domain (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia): ESCALATED RF LOITERING MUNITION USE. RF sources claim a "powerful strike" against a UAF object in Pokrovske, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Operational Z message). This, combined with an Air Force alert regarding a UAV north of Zaporizhzhia moving west (AFU message), confirms RF's sustained, high-volume strategic strike campaign. FACT: RF sources claim to have launched four times more Geran-2 UAVs in 2025 than in 2024 (Sky News, cited by Operational Z). This indicates a significant increase in RF’s ability to conduct long-range kinetic strikes, increasing the risk to UAF rear-area logistics.
• Southern Axis (Kakhovka Reservoir/Black Sea): UAF ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE. UAF GUR SSO units (Bratstvo) successfully cleared a "gray zone" on islands/exposed bed of the former Kakhovka Reservoir (FACT - GUR video). This small-unit success confirms UAF initiative in controlling key terrain features along the Dnipro line. Additionally, a confirmed SBU strike on the Tuapse port terminal resulted in an oil spill in the Black Sea (FACT - BBC cited by Tsaplienko), demonstrating UAF's continued ability to impose costs on RF economic and military infrastructure in the Black Sea region.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant changes. The impact of the SBU strike on Tuapse (oil spill) presents a new environmental/economic factor but does not immediately impact kinetic ground operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: Heavily focused on prosecuting the Pokrovsk fight, backed by a persistent deep strike campaign against UAF rear logistics (Dnipropetrovsk strikes, high Geran production/use). RF IO is synchronized to maximize the perception of success (85% control). RF is simultaneously advertising efforts to build military reserve capacity within Russia (Mobilization news).
• UAF: Executing active defense in Pokrovsk supported by aggressive FPV counter-mobility operations against RF supply/fire support. UAF is maintaining asymmetric pressure through deep strikes (Tuapse) and small-unit raids (Kakhovka GUR). UAF is actively addressing the humanitarian consequences of RF strikes (Dnipropetrovsk ODA reporting on attack consequences in Synelnykivshchyna).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Mass Loitering Munition Production (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Confirmed four-fold increase in Geran-2 use over the previous year demonstrates RF's ability to maintain high-volume, cost-effective, long-range strikes, posing a systematic threat to UAF AD capacity and rear logistics.
2. Adaptive Counter-Mobility (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF claims of utilizing UAVs to observe and display restraint towards civilians (TASS video) are highly suspect IO but suggest RF forces are integrating tactical ISR (drones) for real-time target identification and potentially for war crimes documentation/denial.

Intentions (Immediate - 0-12 hours):

1. Force UAF Withdrawal from Pokrovsk (Primary): RF will continue to use overwhelming fire support and synchronized IO to break UAF resistance and force a defensive collapse or orderly withdrawal from Pokrovsk.
2. Degrade UAF Logistics Resilience: RF will utilize the high-volume Geran-2 capability to strike previously untouched/less protected targets in central Ukraine (e.g., Dnipropetrovsk) to slow the flow of reserves and materiel to the Donetsk front.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Targeting of Civilians under White Flag (CRITICAL): UAF Prosecutor General and RBC-Ukraine report that RF forces struck two civilians with a drone in Kharkiv Oblast while they carried a white flag (FACT - UAF reports, investigation initiated). This, if verified, highlights extreme RF disregard for the Law of Armed Conflict and may indicate an adaptation to counter perceived UAF use of civilians/flags to mask movement.
• Tactical FPV Counter-C4ISR: UAF FPV teams are showing competence in targeting RF C4ISR assets, specifically the reported targeting of a STARLINK terminal near Pokrovsk (Kotsnews video analysis). This directly counters RF’s tactical communication advantage.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UAF deep strikes (Luhansk, Tuapse port) impose significant friction on RF strategic sustainment. However, RF's domestic mobilization and reserve recruitment efforts (Ministry of Defense reserve campaign) suggest confidence in long-term manpower sustainment, while high Geran production addresses short-term kinetic needs.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in synchronizing the kinetic operation (Pokrovsk assault, deep strikes on Dnipropetrovsk) with a massive IO campaign focused on the "85% control" narrative and domestic unity messaging (Day of National Unity).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is generally stable defensively, although under maximum stress in Pokrovsk. Readiness is high in highly mobile and specialized units, particularly FPV/UAS teams (evidenced by successful strikes on RF logistics and MLRS near Pokrovsk) and GUR SSO (Kakhovka raid).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. High-Value FPV Interdiction (Pokrovsk): Successful FPV strike on an RF MLRS-equipped vehicle and targeting of a STARLINK terminal near Pokrovsk (Kotsnews video).
2. Strategic Denial (Tuapse): SBU strike on Tuapse port terminal successfully disrupted RF energy exports and caused environmental damage (BBC/Tsaplienko report).
3. Riverine Dominance (Kakhovka): GUR SSO clearing operation on Kakhovka islands maintains tactical initiative along the Dnipro River Line.

Setbacks:

1. Deep Rear Infrastructure Strike: Confirmed RF strike on Mykolaivska Hromada, Synelnykivshchyna (Dnipropetrovsk ODA), confirming RF success in hitting rear area civilian/logistics infrastructure.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint is Air Defense Capacity versus the escalating volume of Geran-2 attacks. The confirmed four-fold increase in RF loitering munition use necessitates urgent allocation of short-to-medium range AD systems to protect critical logistics and population centers (Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia) currently under confirmed threat.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO Focus: Two main pillars: (1) Maximalist Tactical Gains: Continuous promotion of the "85% Pokrovsk control" narrative, amplified by respected Western sources (Röpcke) to create an illusion of inevitability and break UAF resolve. (2) National Unity/Mobilization: Synchronization of the operation with the "Day of National Unity" (Basurin, Mobilization news) and advertising reserve recruitment to signal long-term commitment and domestic support.
• UAF IO Focus: Focus on Military Effectiveness and Civilian Resilience: Highlighting successful asymmetric strikes (Tuapse), GUR heroism (Kakhovka), and the continued functioning of essential services (Railway Day messaging). Counter-messaging emphasizes RF war crimes (Kharkiv white flag incident) to maintain international moral high ground.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic sentiment is focused on resilience in the face of deep strikes (Dnipropetrovsk ODA cleanup). UAF morale is boosted by targeted asymmetric successes (Tuapse, Kakhovka). RF domestic sentiment is being targeted by internal protest messaging (Astra report on feminist protests during National Unity Day), suggesting fracturing unity despite government IO efforts.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to exploit the psychological and kinetic effect of the Pokrovsk fight and high-volume Geran strikes.

1. Pokrovsk Terminal Assault: RF will commit final reserves to clear remaining UAF pockets in Pokrovsk, focusing on consolidating the urban center to declare full control within 12-24 hours.
2. Coordinated Deep Strike: Following the confirmed UAV activity north of Zaporizhzhia and the strike on Dnipropetrovsk, RF is highly likely to launch another wave of Geran-2/missile strikes targeting major logistics hubs or energy infrastructure in Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48-72 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF achieves full stabilization in Pokrovsk and initiates rapid, localized armored exploitation.

• Breakout Toward Myrnohrad/Selydove: RF ground forces, utilizing the gap created by Pokrovsk’s loss, launch mobile columns westward. The immediate goal is to bypass or overrun the forward screening elements of the next UAF defensive line (near Myrnohrad) and seize ground to establish favorable fire positions for artillery/KABs against the next major urban concentration. This would critically compress UAF operational depth.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/JFSCC (AD/C-UAS): IMMEDIATE AD RE-TASKING. Given the critical Geran-2 escalation (four-fold increase) and confirmed strikes on Dnipropetrovsk, immediately re-task mobile short-range AD systems (e.g., Gepard, Avenger, MANPADS teams) to provide point defense for high-value logistics and C2 nodes in the Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Poltava regions. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - STRATEGIC ADAPTATION)
2. J3/Fires (Pokrovsk Flanks): COUNTER-EXPLOITATION FIRE PLAN. Based on successful FPV strikes on RF logistics/MLRS near Pokrovsk, task all available precision fire assets (HIMARS, MRLS) to maintain a continuous, dynamic interdiction mission against confirmed RF vehicular and tracked movement immediately west of Pokrovsk, focusing on routes toward Selydove and Myrnohrad. (HIGH PRIORITY - MDCOA MITIGATION)
3. J2/GUR (War Crimes Documentation): VERIFY HARIKIV INCIDENT. Urgently dedicate resources to forensically verify the reported RF drone strike against civilians carrying a white flag in Kharkiv Oblast. If confirmed, this intelligence must be immediately disseminated to international bodies (ICC, UN) and utilized in UAF IO to undermine RF claims of moral superiority and counter their 'We do not fight civilians' narratives. (HIGH PRIORITY - LEGAL AND COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

//END SITREP//