Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 041000Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 040900Z NOV 25 – 041000Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Focus remains on Pokrovsk urban defense and RF strategic denial strikes, with confirmed troop movements toward Poltava.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The primary decisive point remains the Pokrovsk Urban Sector (Donetsk Oblast). RF ground forces are heavily committed to capitalizing on their confirmed penetration. The operational rear is increasingly contested by RF deep strike assets, targeting energy infrastructure and resupply routes.

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast): INTENSIFIED CLOSE COMBAT. UAF channels (79th DShV, GUR-affiliated reports) confirm ongoing, intense close-quarters battle (CQB) and successful tactical counter-attacks using demolition/mines and dismounted action against entrenched RF elements in the city's southern quarter (FACT - UAF footage). RF sources (Podduubny, Operatsiya Z) confirm heavy fighting, claiming 10 UAF counter-attacks repelled in the northern/northwestern approaches of Krasnoarmiysk (Pokrovsk) (FACT - RF reports). This indicates UAF is actively fighting to break the encirclement narrative promoted by RF.
• Deep Strike Domain (UAF Rear): ACTIVE THREAT TO POLTAVA. UAF Air Force confirms multiple waves of Shahed UAVs transiting Dnipropetrovsk Oblast with a projected course toward Poltava Oblast (FACT - UAF Air Force alerts at 0910Z and 0917Z). Additionally, there is a confirmed launch of KAB glide bombs targeting Zaporizhzhia Oblast (FACT - UAF Air Force alert at 0930Z). This validates the MLCOA from the previous report concerning strategic denial strikes.
• Counter-Logistics Domain (Luhansk Oblast): UAF STRIKE CONFIRMATION. RF sources (ASTRA, Colonelcassad) confirm a successful UAF strike on Dovzhansk (Sverdlovsk), noting damage to a residential building and one civilian casualty, while acknowledging reports of a detonation at an alleged ammunition/supply depot (FACT - RF sources reporting damage and casualty). This confirms the tactical success reported in the previous daily update (strikes on POL/MTS depots).
• C2/Hybrid Domain (Kursk/Rear): PARTISAN ACTION. Ukrainian media reports (RBC-U) claim partisan group "Atesh" disabled an RF communication tower in Kursk (FACT - UAF report, LOW CONFIDENCE on actual degree of damage/C2 impact). If confirmed, this is a successful disruption of RF rear-area command networks.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The confirmed escalation of the energy crisis (FACT - Ukrenergo increased load restriction periods for Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast) is the most significant environmental factor. This directly impacts morale, civilian mobility, and the ability of military/industrial facilities in the rear to sustain operations as winter approaches.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: RF is concentrating kinetic effort on two main tasks: 1) Reinforcing and expanding the Pokrovsk penetration (utilizing FPV/demolition strikes confirmed by RF footage) and 2) Executing synchronized deep strikes (UAVs/KABs) against Central Ukrainian energy/logistics targets (Poltava/Zaporizhzhia axes). RF C2 is effectively propagating the narrative of UAF forces attempting to "break out of encirclement" in Pokrovsk.
• UAF: UAF forces, including elite units (79th DShV, GUR MO), are engaged in determined counter-attacks and CQB in Pokrovsk to deny RF consolidation. UAF AD is engaged in tracking multiple, ongoing UAV waves aimed at Central Ukraine.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Urban CQB (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF forces are demonstrating the capability to operate and conduct localized demolitions/fires within contested urban spaces (Pokrovsk), supported by UAV-guided fire.
2. Synchronized Deep Strike (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF maintains the ability to launch multi-vector deep strikes targeting energy infrastructure (Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava, Zaporizhzhia) simultaneously, stressing UAF AD and exploiting the energy crisis (Confirmed UAV movements).
3. IO Denial/Deception (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF channels are immediately denying responsibility for war crimes (Kruhliakivka FPV strike on civilians claimed as UAF "false flag") and amplifying the "encirclement" narrative in Pokrovsk to pressure UAF tactical C2.

Intentions (Immediate - 0-12 hours):

1. Fix and Isolate Pokrovsk Defenders: RF aims to prevent UAF C2 from stabilizing the Pokrovsk defense by maintaining relentless pressure and exploiting the IO environment to create panic.
2. Kinetic Interdiction of Central Logistics: RF intends to strike critical energy infrastructure in Poltava and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts to disrupt internal troop and materiel movement to the Donetsk front.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Deployment of Specialized UAVs: The confirmed engagement of the "Knyaz Vishchy Oleg" reconnaissance drone by the UAF 63rd Brigade suggests RF is deploying newer, specialized ISR assets to maintain domain awareness over critical frontline sectors (Donetsk).
• Immediate IO Counter-Attack: The rapid RF counter-narrative concerning the Kruhliakivka civilian deaths (blaming UAF) indicates pre-prepared messaging for anticipating or denying LOAC violations.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UAF counter-logistics strikes (Dovzhansk/Sverdlovsk) are confirmed to be hitting RF logistics nodes, forcing RF to absorb short-term supply pressure. However, the mass deployment of KABs and UAVs supporting the Pokrovsk push suggests that tactical logistics for fire support remain adequate, likely sourced from forward-deployed depots.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in synchronizing tactical ground operations (Pokrovsk) with strategic denial operations (Poltava/Zaporizhzhia deep strikes). The ability to manage the flow of different munitions (UAVs, KABs) across multiple distant axes suggests a mature, robust command structure.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensive-offensive, defined by holding the line in Pokrovsk while launching tactical counter-attacks and pursuing deep strikes on RF logistics. Readiness is high in frontline units (79th DShV, 63rd Brigade) demonstrated by successful tactical engagements (drone shoot-downs, CQB victories). Rear area readiness is challenged by the need to disperse AD assets to cover the renewed threat to Central Oblasts.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. Confirmed Tactical Counter-Strikes (Pokrovsk): UAF 79th DShV/SOF elements are successfully engaging and destroying RF elements in close quarters within Pokrovsk (FACT - UAF footage).
2. ISR Denial: UAF 63rd Brigade successfully engaged and identified the advanced RF reconnaissance drone "Knyaz Vishchy Oleg" (FACT).
3. Logistics Interdiction: Confirmed damage to RF logistics nodes in Dovzhansk (FACT - RF sources).

Setbacks:

1. Energy Crisis Escalation: Official updates confirm increased power restrictions in Kyiv/Kyiv Oblast, directly caused by RF strikes on critical infrastructure (FACT).
2. Confirmed KAB Strikes: KAB launch warning targeting Zaporizhzhia Oblast indicates continued RF dominance in the close air support domain (FACT).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate constraint is the allocation of AD interceptors and systems, which must now be urgently repositioned/activated in the Poltava/Zaporizhzhia axes to meet the confirmed incoming UAV waves. Urgent Requirement: High-volume, low-cost AD/C-UAS systems for rear area protection.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO Focus: Amplifying the narrative of UAF forces being "encircled" and "breaking out" of Krasnoarmiysk (Pokrovsk) to demoralize defenders. Immediate denial of the Kruhliakivka civilian deaths, claiming it was a UAF false flag. Celebrating "National Unity Day" to promote internal cohesion.
• UAF IO Focus: Highlighting the resilience and effectiveness of elite units (79th DShV CQB, 63rd Brigade drone shoot-down) to maintain domestic morale. Highlighting the cruelty of RF FPV strikes on civilians (Kruhliakivka) to maintain international support.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is severely strained by the simultaneous, critical urban battle in Pokrovsk and the worsening energy crisis in the strategic rear (Kyiv power restrictions). The evacuation footage from Myrnohrad (near Pokrovsk) highlights the extreme danger and fear among civilians near the front.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to destroy or severely disrupt Central Ukraine's energy capacity and fix UAF forces in Pokrovsk.

1. Kinetic Strike on Poltava/Zaporizhzhia Energy Nodes: RF will prioritize the incoming Shahed wave to strike confirmed energy and logistics targets (e.g., major transformer stations, rail yards) in Poltava and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts to maximize operational disruption ahead of winter.
2. Urban Fire Supremacy in Pokrovsk: RF ground forces will use concentrated mortar/artillery fire and FPV drones to pin down UAF counter-attacking elements (79th DShV, GUR) in Pokrovsk, focusing on suppressing known UAF C2 and medical evacuation points.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48-72 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF coordinates a decisive strike leveraging strategic reserves and massed air support.

• Feint and Deep Envelopment: RF initiates a tactical feint operation (likely along the Bakhmut or Avdiivka axes) to draw UAF reserves away from the Pokrovsk sector. Simultaneously, RF launches a massed KAB strike (50+ munitions) targeting the immediate western approaches to Pokrovsk (T-0515 highway) to achieve a rapid, deep penetration, severing UAF lines of communication and potentially isolating the main defending force.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/JFSCC (Air Defense): URGENT AD REPOSITIONING. Immediately prioritize the deployment of mobile Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) systems (e.g., Gepard, C-UAS teams) to protect critical energy infrastructure in Poltava and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. This must be executed within the next 4 hours to meet the confirmed incoming UAV waves. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - FORCE PROTECTION)
2. J2/GUR/SBU (Counter-Hybrid/IO): PROACTIVE DENIAL AND EXPLOITATION. Utilize the confirmed engagement of the "Knyaz Vishchy Oleg" drone as proof of UAF technological superiority and tactical effectiveness. Simultaneously, release verified information on the Kruhliakivka LOAC violation to preempt and counteract RF denial/false flag claims. (HIGH PRIORITY - IO/INT)
3. J3/Fires Command: MAXIMIZE COUNTER-FIRE ON POKROVSK REINFORCEMENTS. Given the RF commitment to urban penetration, dedicate persistent artillery and FPV fires to the identified reinforcement and logistics routes leading into the southern quarters of Pokrovsk (e.g., southern road approaches, known RF staging areas). (HIGH PRIORITY - FIRE SUPPORT)

//END SITREP//