Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 040800Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 041300Z NOV 25 – 040800Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Pokrovsk remains the decisive point; RF deep strike capability validated by NiZHEGOROD attack.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The situation in the Pokrovsk Defensive Sector remains critical and highly kinetic. NEW verified footage confirms the 79th Separate Air Assault Brigade (79 OADSHBr) is now actively engaged in urban clearance operations alongside GUR MO Special Unit "Timur." The tactical shift to controlled demolition (TM-62 anti-tank mines) against entrenched RF positions is confirmed by both the 79th and GUR reporting.

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast): Fighting is intense, characterized by UAF close-quarters battle (CQC), demolition, and the confirmed capture of RF prisoners of war (POWs) by the 79th Brigade. UAF goal is to deny RF consolidation and break out.
• Deep Strike Targets (RF Rear): NEW confirmation from Nizhny Novgorod Oblast Governor Gleb Nikitin validates UAF deep strike operations, reporting an attack of 20 UAVs on the Kstovo district. This confirms that the complex was hit again, likely targeting the Nizhny Novgorod Refinery (NPS) and/or SIBUR-KSTovo.
• Black Sea/Odesa Area: RF reconnaissance activity is confirmed over the Black Sea near Odesa. UAF Air Force reports engagement of an enemy reconnaissance UAV. (FACT - PS ZSU)
• Kharkiv Axis: NEW warning issued for RF UAV movement towards Kharkiv from the north. (FACT - PS ZSU)
• Generalized Frontline Activity: General Staff reporting indicates sustained RF air support (airstrikes) across the entire arc, including Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka, and areas of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, indicating a broad effort to prevent UAF redeployment to Pokrovsk.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Weather remains clear, favoring RF massed UAS operations. NEW information confirms an environmental impact: RF sources report an oil spill in the Black Sea following the attack on the Tuapse oil terminal, highlighting the long-term ecological consequences of kinetic operations on coastal infrastructure.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: RF forces are employing entrenched infantry supported by sustained air strikes (KAB/unguided). The RF 110th Brigade is confirmed by RF propaganda (DNR People's Militia) to be active in the sector, claiming urban clearance operations.
• UAF: UAF has committed elements of the 79th OADSHBr and GUR MO to the direct defense of Pokrovsk. GUR is attempting to "punch a corridor" to allow additional forces into the city, confirming the complexity of the current urban engagement.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Sustained Deep Strike Penetration (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF demonstrated the capability to deploy at least 20 UAVs against strategic refinery targets deep within Russia (Kstovo/Nizhny Novgorod), confirming UAF capacity to degrade RF strategic resources despite high AD volume.
2. Flexible Urban Entrenchment (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF forces (including the 110th Brigade) are effectively using damaged urban structures in Pokrovsk for defensive positions, forcing UAF to rely on high-risk, close-quarters demolition and clearance tactics.
3. Black Sea ISR (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): Confirmation of an RF reconnaissance UAV near Odesa suggests continued intent to monitor logistics, port infrastructure, and potential UAF naval/drone activity in the area.

Intentions (Immediate - 0-12 hours):

1. Hold and Expand Pokrovsk Foothold: RF forces will continue to absorb UAF counter-attacks in Pokrovsk, relying on positional defense and urban structures to fix UAF elite forces.
2. Interdict Reserves: RF aviation will maintain a high tempo of airstrikes on key logistics nodes (Kostyantynivka, Druzhkivka) to disrupt the flow of UAF reserves toward the Pokrovsk axis.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• UAF Tactical Demolition Adoption: The shift by UAF units (79th, GUR) to using anti-tank mines (TM-62M) for house-by-house clearance is a necessary adaptation to RF urban entrenchment, highlighting the transition to desperate CQC tactics.
• Diversified Deep Strike Targeting (UAF): Confirmed targeting of both the Tuapse terminal (Black Sea coast) and the Nizhny Novgorod complex indicates UAF is pursuing a nationwide, multi-target denial strategy against RF energy exports and refining capacity.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UAF deep strike efforts continue to impact RF strategic logistics. The confirmed second attack on the Kstovo complex further degrades Russia's long-term ability to refine fuel and petrochemicals. The subsequent oil spill in Tuapse suggests successful interdiction of export infrastructure. This increases RF reliance on remaining refining capacity and railway throughput.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in coordinating both strategic deep strikes against UAF targets and complex urban operations in Pokrovsk. RF messaging heavily features unit propaganda (110th Brigade), suggesting a clear effort to bolster unit pride despite high attrition.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensive and highly resilient, characterized by the successful commitment of elite forces (GUR MO, 79th OADSHBr) to contain the urban breach in Pokrovsk. The confirmed use of specialized tactics (TM-62 demolition, prisoner capture) indicates high operational morale and effective adaptation to the immediate threat. Readiness remains high, but reserves are being heavily utilized in the Donetsk sector.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. Urban Counter-Penetration (Pokrovsk): 79th OADSHBr and GUR forces are actively engaging RF inside Pokrovsk, successfully capturing POWs and destroying entrenched positions.
2. Strategic Denial (Kstovo/Tuapse): Confirmed successful kinetic strike on the Kstovo region (20 UAVs) and environmental/infrastructure damage at the Tuapse terminal.
3. Internal Security: Previous reports noted the arrest of a saboteur, suggesting ongoing counter-intelligence success.

Setbacks:

1. Urban Attrition Rate: CQC engagement requires a high rate of attrition of elite UAF personnel and explosive resources.
2. Sustained RF Air Dominance: Continued RF air strikes across the Donbas sector maintain pressure and utilize cheap stand-off munitions (KABs) to inflict damage.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate requirement is Urban Demolition Munitions and Precision Fires. The successful CQC tactics necessitate a secure and sustained supply of anti-tank/demolition charges (e.g., TM-62M) and dedicated high-rate artillery/HIMARS support to suppress RF reinforcement corridors outside Pokrovsk.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO Focus (Pokrovsk and False Flag): RF channels (Mash na Donbasse, DNR People's Militia) are attempting to amplify tactical gains by showing footage of alleged UAF strikes on civilians carrying white flags (a clear false flag operation designed to undermine UAF legitimacy) and promoting the success of their own units (110th Brigade).
• RF Domestic IO: RF official channels continue to push "National Unity Day" propaganda, using historical imagery to link modern military actions with historical Russian victories.
• UAF IO Focus (Heroism and Transparency): UAF messaging (79th OADSHBr, GUR) is heavily focused on showcasing the bravery of special/elite units in Pokrovsk, providing near-real-time validation of counter-actions to maintain public trust.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF public morale remains bolstered by aggressive deep strikes and the visible commitment of elite forces to the crucial Pokrovsk defense. However, RF nationalist channels (Alex Parker Returns) are expressing acute pessimism and internal criticism regarding the military situation, drawing parallels to previous RF retreats (Sudzha), suggesting internal fragility within the pro-war ecosystem.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will prioritize consolidating control over seized urban areas in Pokrovsk to establish a strongpoint for further offensive action.

1. Deep Strike Retaliation: RF will likely retaliate for the Kstovo/Tuapse strikes with a concentrated missile/UAV attack (possibly Iskander or S-300) on UAF energy or defense industry targets in Central/Western Ukraine (Dnipro, Poltava, Odesa) within the next 24 hours.
2. Reinforcement of Pokrovsk Infantry: RF will utilize heavy indirect fires (Artillery, MLRS) to cover the insertion of tactical reserves (likely light infantry/VDV elements if available) to expand the perimeter within Pokrovsk, focusing on Myrnohrad's approaches.
3. Sustained Air Pressure on Logistics: RF aviation will continue high-volume KAB strikes across the Donbas, supported by reconnaissance UAVs (Odesa, Zaporizhzhia), to degrade UAF defensive preparation.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48-72 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF achieves a decisive tactical breakthrough under cover of a major AD-suppression effort.

• Coordinated Breakthrough and Isolation: RF executes a synchronized assault on UAF positions outside Pokrovsk (e.g., from the north or west), utilizing armor and motorized infantry, immediately following a complex, multi-axis deep strike on UAF C2 and AD systems. Success would allow RF forces to bypass Pokrovsk and directly threaten the operational rear of the Donetsk group, potentially isolating UAF forces in Myrnohrad and forcing a large-scale defensive collapse.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/JFSCC (Ground Operations): PRIORITIZE HIGH-VOLUME CQC RESUPPLY. Expedite the deployment of demolition charges (TM-62M or equivalent) and specialized urban FPV drones to the 79th OADSHBr and GUR MO in Pokrovsk. This is essential to minimize UAF close-range exposure and rapidly neutralize RF strongpoints. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - LOGISTICS/KINETIC ACTION)
2. J2/J3 (Air Defense/Fires): PRE-POSITION AD FOR RETALIATION. Move at least two mobile SHORAD batteries (e.g., Gepard/Avenger) to the Kharkiv urban area to counter the confirmed RF UAV vector from the north and protect critical infrastructure or C2 nodes there from the anticipated RF retaliation strike. (HIGH PRIORITY - FORCE PROTECTION)
3. J7/Information Warfare Command: COUNTER RF FALSE FLAG. Develop and immediately disseminate a clear counter-narrative and evidence package to counter the RF propaganda regarding alleged UAF strikes on civilians with white flags (Mash na Donbasse footage). Emphasize the long history of RF forces utilizing human shields and false surrender tactics. (HIGH PRIORITY - COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

//END SITREP//