Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 040900Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 040600Z NOV 25 – 040900Z NOV 25 (Immediate Update) ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH (Confidence high regarding Pokrovsk C2 and logistics interdiction; medium on overall sustainability of UAF counter-action.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational axis remains critically focused on the Pokrovsk Defensive Sector (Donetsk Oblast). The battle has transitioned from perimeter fighting to intense close-quarters combat and C2/logistics interdiction.

• Pokrovsk City (Critical Terrain): RF forces are confirmed to be entrenched in the southern quarters (Previous Reports). NEW information from the Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) indicates UAF forces (likely Special Operations/Intelligence elements) executed a successful ground corridor penetration and subsequent link-up operation to reinforce internal defenders. This is a critical counter-action aimed at sustaining the urban defense. (FACT - HUR/TsAPLIENKO)
• Deep Rear Targets (Strategic Infrastructure): UAF deep strike capability remains active and effective. NEW reporting suggests petrochemical plants (Bashkiria) and Nizhny Novgorod Refinery (Nizhny Novgorod) have suspended operations following recent "democratic drone" attacks, confirming sustained pressure on RF strategic logistics and refining capacity. (FACT - TsAPLIENKO/OSINT)
• Air-Ground Synchronization: RF forces are employing heavy Combined Arms Munitions (KAB) strikes targeting Donetsk Oblast, supporting the Pokrovsk ground effort. RF propaganda concurrently claims successful drone strikes against UAF UAV C2 points near Pokrovsk. (FACT - PS ZSU/OPERATSIYA Z)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant weather factors are currently impeding ground or air operations. However, the use of KABs and high-altitude UAVs suggests RF is maximizing clear air conditions for targeting, particularly around Pokrovsk. Solar activity (M3.5 flare) is noted but current impact on COMINT/SIGINT operations is assessed as LOW.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: RF doctrine is shifting toward a highly coordinated infiltration method ("просачивание") utilizing small, reinforced infantry and special purpose units (SpN) to bypass fortified UAF positions, focusing first on disrupting UAF supply lines (MTO) and then expanding the breach. This method is confirmed on the Pokrovsk axis (2nd Combined Arms Army) and Kupiansk axis (6th Combined Arms Army). RF is prioritizing counter-UAV hunting units (e.g., CPBS "Rubicon") to suppress UAF tactical ISR advantage. (FACT - Zvizdets Mangust Analysis)
• UAF: UAF is actively pursuing counter-infiltration and reinforcement operations in Pokrovsk, as evidenced by the HUR link-up operation. UAF General Staff daily reports confirm continued active defense across all axes (Kupiansk, Lyman, Kramatorsk, Pokrovsk).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

1. Infiltration Warfare Doctrine (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF has formalized and dedicated resources (SpN, small infantry groups) to the "filtration" or "prosačivaniye" method, designed to penetrate UAF operational depth and disrupt logistics before main force commitment.
2. Dedicated Counter-UAS/ISR (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The explicit creation of specialized units for "hunting Ukrainian drone operators" demonstrates a systemic RF effort to regain tactical air/ISR parity, prioritizing the destruction of UAF C2/UAV links.
3. Sustained KAB Saturation (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF maintains the ability to deliver continuous KAB strikes on the Donetsk axis, a crucial enabler for ground assaults.

Intentions (Immediate - 0-12 hours):

1. Isolate Pokrovsk Logistics: RF C2 units (2nd CAA) will intensify efforts to interdict UAF logistics (MTO) feeding Pokrovsk defenders, using infiltration tactics and focused artillery/UAV strikes (as claimed by "Operatsiya Z" near Pokrovsk C2 nodes).
2. Propaganda Focus Shift: Maintain high-volume IO celebrating "National Unity Day" and promoting tactical "victories" (Pokrovsk C2 strikes), while ignoring UAF deep strike successes (Bashkiria/Nizhny Novgorod).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Doctrine Formalization: The shift to "prosačivaniye" as a tactical doctrine, emphasizing supply disruption and SpN pre-positioning, represents a key adaptation intended to bypass static UAF defenses without costly massed frontal assaults.
• Targeting Priority: Explicit prioritization of UAF UAV/drone C2 operators as high-value kinetic targets (per RF analysis of "Rubicon" unit activities).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UAF deep strikes (Previous Reports: Kstovo, Dovzhansk; NEW: Bashkiria, Nizhny Novgorod) are causing demonstrable strategic disruption to RF POL/Refining capacity, forcing operational suspensions. However, RF ground forces retain sufficient supply for continued low-level infiltration and high-intensity localized assault (Pokrovsk).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in synchronizing IO, deep strikes, and highly complex ground maneuvers (infiltration) across multiple axes (Kupiansk, Pokrovsk). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is HIGH in the deep strike domain, with confirmed successful interdiction of major RF POL/Refining targets. Tactical readiness in Pokrovsk remains critical but resilient, supported by the NEW successful HUR ground corridor and reinforcement operation, which bolsters the urban defense against immediate collapse.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. Pokrovsk Reinforcement (CRITICAL SUCCESS): The HUR-led airborne/ground corridor operation in Pokrovsk is a significant success, countering the RF narrative of encirclement and providing immediate relief to defenders.
2. Strategic Logistics Interdiction: Confirmed operational suspensions at major RF petrochemical/refining sites demonstrate sustained UAF ability to degrade RF strategic sustainment.

Setbacks:

1. Targeted C2/UAV Threat: RF's specific targeting of UAF UAV C2 points near Pokrovsk (RF claim of "Molniya" strikes) highlights the successful identification of a critical UAF capability.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Immediate requirements focus on neutralizing RF counter-UAS and SpN infiltration teams. UAF must rapidly establish counter-infiltration patrols and secure rear areas, as RF doctrine specifically prioritizes MTO (supply line) disruption.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO Focus: RF state media and milbloggers are aggressively pushing the "National Unity Day" narrative (TASS, Voin DV, Colonelcassad), interspersing it with claims of tactical success (Pokrovsk C2 destruction) and Soviet nostalgia (Dnevnik Desantnika). This strategy aims to distract the domestic population from strategic losses and legitimize the conflict.
• UAF Counter-Narrative: UAF reporting (HUR, Tsaplienko) is effectively utilizing the confirmed strategic deep strikes (refinery fires) and the tactical success of the Pokrovsk reinforcement operation to counter the RF momentum narrative.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is buoyed by visible strategic kinetic successes and the crucial tactical relief provided by the HUR operation in Pokrovsk. RF morale is artificially maintained by the synchronized state holiday messaging and historical revisionism.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to neutralize the success of the UAF reinforcement operation in Pokrovsk.

1. Concentrated KAB/Infiltration Push: RF will employ a surge of KAB/glide bomb strikes targeting the identified link-up/corridor area in Pokrovsk to interdict the newly established UAF supply route. Simultaneous SpN/DRG operations will focus on deep logistics points west of Pokrovsk to realize the "MTO disruption" phase of their infiltration doctrine.
2. Counter-UAV Sweep: RF specialized counter-UAS units will intensify active sweeps, supported by EW, to locate and destroy UAF drone C2 positions across the Donetsk axis, aiming to blind UAF fire correction and tactical ISR.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF achieves a decisive logistical interdiction.

• Massed Deep Strike on Rail Hubs: RF shifts the target profile of its next missile/UAV wave from area targets (Dnipropetrovsk Hromada) to a crucial western rail hub (e.g., Kramatorsk or Myrhorod), successfully cutting the main arterial flow of UAF reinforcement and materiel to the entire Donetsk operational area. This would exploit the perceived shift in AD resources to protect central targets (Poltava/Kharkiv).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Fires Command (Pokrovsk Axis): COUNTER-INFILTRATION FIRES AND OPSEC. Immediately implement a Time-Sensitive Targeting (TST) protocol for all RF small-unit communications signatures identified west of the Pokrovsk penetration. Direct UAF forces to increase immediate perimeter security and implement stringent EMCON measures for all UAV C2/operator positions to mitigate the confirmed RF counter-UAS targeting priority. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - FORCE PROTECTION)
2. J2/GUR (Pokrovsk Sector): PROTECT THE CORRIDOR. Dedicated ISR (UAVs, SIGINT) must provide continuous, low-altitude coverage of the newly established reinforcement corridor into Pokrovsk to prevent RF SpN/DRG interdiction operations (MLCOA Step 1). All captured RF personnel must be immediately exploited for information on "prosačivaniye" logistics/C2. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - ISR PROTECTION)
3. J7/Information Warfare Command: AMPLIFY HUR SUCCESS. Capitalize immediately on the confirmed success of the HUR reinforcement operation in Pokrovsk. Disseminate messaging internally and internationally to counter RF claims of encirclement and boost the morale of frontline defenders. (HIGH PRIORITY - COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

//END SITREP//