Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 040700Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 040600Z NOV 25 – 040700Z NOV 25 (Immediate Update) ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH (Strong confirmation of RF deep logistics damage and continued RF reconnaissance/strike patterns in Central Ukraine.)

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational focus remains the Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast) supported by RF deep strike and reconnaissance activity aimed at disrupting UAF logistics and C2 in Central and Northeastern Oblasts.

Updated Kinetic Activity (Immediate):

• RF Deep Rear (Bashkortostan): Confirmed explosion and partial collapse of the water purification workshop at the Sterlitamak Petrochemical Plant (02:43Z / 02:50Z). Local authorities reported a drone threat, suggesting a UAF deep strike (CRITICAL CONFIRMATION). (FACT/ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT)
• Kharkiv Oblast (Northeast): New groups of RF UAVs reported moving southeast (02:43Z). This is likely an attempt to probe UAF defenses or conduct reconnaissance preceding a strike, potentially targeting UAF repositioning or assembly areas. (FACT)
• Dnipropetrovsk Axis: RF reconnaissance UAV confirmed approaching Dnipro from the south (02:44Z), followed minutes later by an aviation strike threat warning in Synelnykivskyi district (02:57Z). This indicates active RF targeting of the logistics hub supporting the Pokrovsk defense. (FACT)
• Sumy/Poltava Axis: UAV reported moving from Southern Sumy Oblast toward Poltava (02:58Z). This aligns with the previous MDCOA targeting critical infrastructure in Central Ukraine. (FACT)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Night conditions continue to provide concealment for long-range UAV/drone operations, as evidenced by the high volume of activity in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Sumy. Low visibility favors deep reconnaissance and strike missions over manned aviation.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Strike Posture: RF has initiated synchronized reconnaissance and strike activity aimed at the immediate rear of the Pokrovsk axis (Dnipropetrovsk) and strategic targets further east (Poltava). The immediate air threat remains focused on kinetic interdiction rather than massed ballistic strikes.
• UAF Control Measures: Air defense assets are currently tasked to defend against multiple, dispersed UAV threats across three major axes (Kharkiv, Dnipro, Poltava). UAF must maintain high alert and prioritize defense of logistics and C2 in Dnipropetrovsk.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities: RF demonstrates robust, long-range UAV reconnaissance capability (confirmed over Dnipro and towards Poltava). The successful use of deep strike assets against critical industrial targets (Sterlitamak) highlights the continuing intelligence vulnerability of the RF deep rear, despite the declaration of drone danger.

Intentions (Immediate):

1. Isolate Pokrovsk: RF's core intent is to utilize reconnaissance and kinetic strikes (likely air-launched ordnance or UAVs) in Dnipropetrovsk to disrupt the flow of UAF reserves and supplies to the critical Donetsk front. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Strategic Denial: UAF deep strikes against the Sterlitamak Petrochemical Plant will require an RF retaliatory strike against a high-value UAF strategic target (e.g., C2, critical infrastructure) to maintain the escalation parity. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
3. Pressure North-East: UAV groups in Kharkiv aim to fix UAF air defense assets and potentially identify targets for future ground or aviation pressure in the northeastern sector. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The combination of a RF reconnaissance UAV over Dnipro followed immediately by a KAB strike warning (Synelnykivskyi R-N) suggests a streamlined sensor-to-shooter loop for RF tactical aviation targeting UAF forward logistics hubs. This is a critical adaptation that requires immediate counter-measures.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The confirmed damage at the Sterlitamak Petrochemical Plant (Bashkortostan), following the previous Kstovo incident, represents a significant operational success for UAF deep strike efforts. While the immediate impact on frontline fuel supply is low, the cumulative damage to Russia's refining capacity will complicate strategic sustainment and likely force shifts in national resource allocation, potentially impacting military fuel reserves in the medium term. (HIGH CONFIDENCE, MEDIUM TERM IMPACT)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in coordinating multi-domain strikes (reconnaissance, aviation, deep strikes) across geographically separated axes (Donetsk, Dnipro, Poltava).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is currently focused on high-alert AD readiness in Central and Northeastern Oblasts due to confirmed UAV and aviation threats. Frontline units in Pokrovsk must maintain readiness for the anticipated RF reinforcement and urban assault, while rear-area logistics must be protected.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Success: UAF deep strike capability is confirmed to be highly effective and persistent, with the Sterlitamak incident confirming the ability to reach high-value targets deep within RF territory. Success: Ukrainian defense industry continues to enhance domestic capabilities, with reports of new Ukrainian drones replacing DJI Mavic (02:40Z), signaling a positive trajectory in achieving UAS self-sufficiency. (FACT)

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The simultaneous UAV threats in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Poltava are stretching AD resources thin. There is an immediate requirement for increased mobile EW coverage along major logistics routes, particularly in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, to counter RF reconnaissance and strike attempts.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO (TASS, Colonelcassad) is attempting to manage information regarding internal incidents:

1. Distraction/Deflection: TASS focuses on a domestic legal case (Irina Rudnitskaya) (02:39Z) to divert attention from the simultaneous refinery incident.
2. Normalization of Damage: Local officials in Bashkortostan attributed the Sterlitamak incident to "causes being investigated" and noted only a "water purification workshop" was affected (02:43Z), minimizing the potential strategic impact of the petrochemical damage.
3. Reinforcement of Threat Narrative: Colonelcassad publishes a political cartoon (03:03Z), likely to maintain a perception of active confrontation and ideological struggle, deflecting from internal vulnerabilities.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Confirmation of the new domestic drone capability (RBC-Ukraine) provides a morale boost, demonstrating UAF resilience and technological adaptation. The ongoing, successful deep strike campaign into RF territory also positively reinforces UAF asymmetric power.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4-12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to exploit the reconnaissance data gathered in the last hour:

1. Synchronized Logistics Interdiction: RF will launch precision strikes (KABs/UAVs) against UAF logistics concentration points or identified moving convoys in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Synelnykivskyi district) based on the recently confirmed UAV reconnaissance.
2. Reinforcement of Pokrovsk: RF will utilize the cover of the continued deep strikes and the pressure on logistics to commit fresh reserves to expand their control within southern Pokrovsk.
3. UAV Hunting Campaign: UAF will launch AD/EW sweeps to clear the operational airspace over Poltava and Dnipropetrovsk, likely resulting in further kinetic engagements.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Adjusted) The MDCOA remains the synchronized disruption of Central Ukraine: RF launches a massed, multi-vector strike package (e.g., Shahed 136/131, supplemented by cruise missiles/S-300) against critical high-voltage transmission nodes or rail hubs in the Poltava and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts (the confirmed UAV routes). This synchronized effort aims to achieve widespread power disruption and severely degrade the railway network required to move reserves to the Pokrovsk Axis, forcing a tactical retreat or operational pause in UAF defense.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Air Defense Command (Central/Northeast): IMMEDIATE AIR DEFENSE RE-TASKING. Immediately task and prioritize AD assets to defend identified critical infrastructure (rail and power) along the confirmed UAV flight paths toward Poltava. Increase the density of mobile AD/SHORAD units in the Synelnykivskyi district of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to counter the observed streamlined RF sensor-to-shooter loop. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - IMMEDIATE)
2. J3/Logistics Command (Central): INITIATE LOGISTICS DISPERSAL AND BLACKOUT. Immediately implement temporary operational blackout and dispersal measures for all large vehicle concentrations and logistics hubs within the range of RF aviation strikes in Dnipropetrovsk, specifically Synelnykivskyi, until the immediate threat subsides. (CRITICAL PRIORITY)
3. J2/Tech Integration: ACCELERATE DOMESTIC DRONE DEPLOYMENT. Coordinate with industrial partners to expedite the deployment of the newly available Ukrainian-made surveillance and strike drones to increase local ISR coverage and reduce reliance on vulnerable commercial platforms, especially in high-threat sectors like Pokrovsk. (HIGH PRIORITY)

//END SITREP//