Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 040600Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 040400Z NOV 25 – 040600Z NOV 25 (Immediate Update) ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM (New information on deep strikes and tactical drone use, but confirmation of deep strike effects pending.)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational geometry remains fixed on the Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast) as the main effort, with increased RF kinetic activity reported in the Sumy Oblast border region and continued UAF deep strike actions against RF strategic assets.

Updated Strike Status (Immediate):

• Donetsk Oblast: UAF Air Force confirms repeated launches of RF KABs towards Donetsk region targets (02:27Z). This directly supports the RF ground assault on Pokrovsk, focusing on suppressing UAF defensive positions and C2 nodes. (FACT)
• Sumy Oblast: RF Airborne Forces (VDV, specifically 56th Air Assault Regiment) are actively employing FPV-kamikaze drones against UAF auto transport and logistics in Sumy Oblast (02:05Z). This corroborates the previous assessment of increased RF pressure in the northeast. (FACT)
• Dnipropetrovsk/Central Ukraine: TASS claims RF forces "disrupted supply and delivery of manpower" in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (02:19Z), supported by FPV footage showing strikes on vehicles. This suggests RF is acting on the MDCOA identified previously, targeting UAF rear logistics to prevent reinforcement of Pokrovsk. (FACT/ANALYTICAL JUDGEMENT)
• RF Rear Area (Sterlitamak, Bashkortostan): Confirmed explosion and partial collapse of a workshop at the Sterlitamak Petrochemical Plant (02:33Z). This is the second confirmed strike/incident at a major Russian petrochemical facility within the last 4 hours (following Kstovo). (FACT)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Night conditions continue to favor low-level UAV and FPV drone operations, as evidenced by the high volume of FPV drone footage from both sides. Muddy conditions visible in the RF FPV footage (Sumy/Dnipropetrovsk) suggest off-road maneuverability is highly degraded, forcing logistics onto main routes, which makes them vulnerable to drone strikes.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Strike Posture: RF has shifted from coordinated ballistic strikes to focused tactical-level interdiction using FPV drones in the Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk axes, supporting the main ground effort in Donetsk via heavy KAB employment.
• UAF Control Measures: UAF must adapt to simultaneous tactical threats: urban defense (Pokrovsk), counter-FPV/SEAD (Sumy/Dnipropetrovsk), and continued BMD readiness (due to KAB activity).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities: RF demonstrates robust, localized FPV strike capability (VDV 56th Regiment confirmed in Sumy) for tactical interdiction. The persistent use of KABs highlights the continued ability of RF Air Forces to operate near the front lines with limited UAF air defense deterrence.

Intentions (Immediate):

1. Isolate Pokrovsk: RF's core intent is to utilize FPV interdiction in rear areas (Dnipropetrovsk) to slow or halt UAF reserve movement and logistics flow into Pokrovsk. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Achieve Air Superiority (Local): Continued saturation KAB use aims to degrade UAF defensive positions and C2 within Pokrovsk, preparing the ground for armored reinforcement. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3. Establish Northeastern Pressure: The deployment of VDV assets and FPV strikes in Sumy aims to fix UAF forces in the northeast, preventing their redeployment to the critical Donetsk axis. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift in the RF deep strike campaign from large, synchronized ballistic/cruise missile attacks to smaller, high-frequency, long-range FPV/UAV operations targeting tactical rear area logistics (Dnipropetrovsk) is a critical adaptation. This strategy is less resource-intensive than mass missile strikes and directly supports the Pokrovsk main effort by throttling UAF supplies.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The confirmed explosion/collapse at the Sterlitamak Petrochemical Plant (Bashkortostan) further complicates RF strategic POL supply, following the earlier Kstovo incident.

Analytical Judgement: While these strikes are geographically distant, two major petrochemical incidents in rapid succession indicate a successful, evolving UAF/RVC deep strike campaign targeting the industrial base. This will increase RF reliance on more distant storage and supply routes, placing immediate strain on rail/road transport for the Southern and Central Groups of Forces. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE, MEDIUM TERM IMPACT)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is demonstrating effective tactical synchronization between deep fires (KABs), information operations (TASS claims), and localized tactical units (VDV FPV teams) to support the Pokrovsk main effort.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture remains critical in Pokrovsk, necessitating immediate tactical response to RF penetration (as outlined in the previous report). Readiness for counter-FPV/C-UAS operations must be prioritized in the immediate rear (Dnipropetrovsk, Sumy).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Success: UAF deep strike campaign continues with high effectiveness, evidenced by the Sterlitamak incident, further degrading RF strategic energy capacity. Setback: Confirmed RF FPV activity disrupting UAF vehicle movement in Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy suggests vulnerabilities in rear-area logistics protection and C-UAS coverage.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint is the limited availability of mobile, short-range Air Defense (SHORAD) and Electronic Warfare (EW) assets required to counter the pervasive RF FPV threat in the logistics corridors leading to Pokrovsk.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO (TASS, Colonelcassad) is actively broadcasting kinetic successes:

1. Legitimization of Gains: Highlighting VDV FPV strikes in Sumy (02:05Z) to demonstrate offensive presence in the Northeast.
2. Disruption Narrative: TASS claims of "disrupted supply" in Dnipropetrovsk (02:19Z) aim to reinforce the narrative of UAF vulnerability and operational isolation of the Pokrovsk defense.
3. Distraction/Normalization: Reports of the US reconnaissance aircraft over the Black Sea (02:27Z) are used by RF media to redirect domestic focus toward NATO/US "provocation," away from the internal petrochemical incidents.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The confirmed deep strikes on two RF refineries (Kstovo and Sterlitamak) will boost Ukrainian public morale and reinforce confidence in UAF asymmetric capabilities. Conversely, the public confirmation of KAB and FPV strikes near front-line logistics hubs will maintain heightened anxiety.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 4-12 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will prioritize the tactical defeat of UAF logistics and C2 surrounding Pokrovsk:

1. Sustained KAB Barrage: RF tactical aviation will maintain high sortie rates to deliver KABs on confirmed UAF positions and fire support lines near Pokrovsk.
2. Focused FPV Interdiction: Continued, high-frequency FPV drone ambushes on UAF logistics convoys traveling north/east of Dnipro, targeting critical supply routes into the Donetsk sector (E50/T0420 routes).
3. Maneuver in Pokrovsk: RF forces inside Pokrovsk will attempt to clear adjacent city blocks and secure a firm operating base before attempting a rapid expansion of the penetration.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 12-24 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF launches a synchronized deep strike package (e.g., Kalibr/Shahed) against the primary UAF operational headquarters or a critical electrical grid node in the Dnipropetrovsk/Poltava region concurrent with the launch of the S-300 batteries from Sumy. This dual-pronged deep strike aims to overwhelm UAF AD, disrupt C2, and create a significant power outage crisis, providing cover for a massed RF mechanized push into central Pokrovsk.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Logistics Command (Central/Northeast): PRIORITIZE C-UAS PROTECTION FOR SUPPLY CONVOYS. Immediately implement convoy movement restrictions (night/low-visibility only) and deploy all available mobile SHORAD/EW systems (e.g., Bukovel-AD, dedicated jammers) along the E50/T0420 routes and other high-risk logistics corridors feeding Pokrovsk and Sumy. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - IMMEDIATE)
2. J3/Fires Coordination (Donetsk Sector): MAINTAIN POKROVSK COUNTER-ATTACK FOCUS. Maintain the tasking for the localized counter-attack (pre-040800Z NOV 25) to prevent RF entrenchment. Target priority must be RF C2 and fire support assets delivering KABs and MLRS fire in the Pokrovsk sector. (CRITICAL PRIORITY)
3. J2/SIGINT Command: INITIATE FPV HUNTING OPERATIONS. Task specialized EW teams to conduct active counter-FPV operations (jamming and direction finding) in the confirmed FPV engagement zones (Sumy border, Dnipropetrovsk logistics routes). Coordinate successful targeting data with rapid-response HIMARS/artillery units to neutralize FPV launch teams. (HIGH PRIORITY)

//END SITREP//