Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 031830Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 031800Z NOV 25 – 031830Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad Axis (Donetsk Oblast): This axis remains the operational center of gravity.

• Pokrovsk: UAF reporting (ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS) confirms UAF (specifically GUR and ZSU) joint operations are ongoing to stabilize the defense, indicating active combat and containment efforts within the city's periphery. RF milblogger claims (Операция Z) have drastically escalated, now claiming to be "storming Myrnohrad, occupying house by house on the east and north." (ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT: RF claim of 'storming Myrnohrad' is likely an exaggeration of localized gains near Dymytrov/Pokrovsk suburbs, intended to amplify IO momentum. However, the intent to rapidly advance on Myrnohrad is confirmed.) (FACT - RF Milblogger Claim / MEDIUM CONFIDENCE on claim, HIGH on intent)
• Konstantinovka Threat: UAF military analysts (STERNENKO) are warning that Konstantinovka could face a situation similar to Pokrovsk soon, indicating UAF perception of RF momentum and pressure on the entire central Donetsk defensive arc. (FACT - UAF Analyst Assessment / HIGH CONFIDENCE on UAF perception)
• Kupyansk: RF MoD disseminated propaganda featuring a captured UAF serviceman claiming poor logistics and morale near Kupyansk. While unverified, this suggests RF intent to maintain pressure on the Kupyansk-Svatove axis to fix UAF northern reserves. (FACT - RF Propaganda / HIGH CONFIDENCE on RF intent to fix forces)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• UAF FPV footage (БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС) shows effective target acquisition and execution using thermal/EO systems against RF fortified positions, confirming the continued high efficacy of precision UAVs regardless of lighting conditions.
• Civilian Risk: Reports from Chernihiv Oblast confirm a Russian drone detonated during agricultural work, resulting in casualties. This highlights the widespread danger of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and delayed-action munitions in the deep rear.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Firepower: UAF 3rd Army Corps (watermark on FPV video) demonstrates effective local counter-fire and target destruction against RF dug-in positions, specifically against bunkers/shelters. (FACT - UAF Footage / HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• RF Deep Strike Vectors: UAF Air Force confirms continued UAV activity: Westbound from Eastern Zaporizhzhia and Southbound from South Kharkiv (vectoring toward Zmiiv). This confirms the ongoing, dispersed deep strike campaign reported in the previous period, targeting southern Kharkiv and likely central logistics/CI hubs. (FACT - UAF AF Alerts / HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• UAF IO/C2: President Zelenskyy's meeting with journalists focusing on energy, diplomacy, and the front indicates UAF command is prioritizing communication and managing expectations regarding the CI crisis and the Pokrovsk escalation.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Concentrated Assault (Pokrovsk): RF has achieved a concentration of force sufficient to transition from siege to urban assault.
• Effective Combined Arms Targeting: RF continues to neutralize UAF fortified positions effectively using combined fire—artillery, FAB/KAB (previous report), and tactical UAVs—to clear the path for assault infantry.
• Internal Coercion: Captured video of an RF commander threatening subordinates with execution highlights reliance on brutal internal discipline and coercion to maintain morale and prevent desertion, suggesting underlying endemic morale issues. (FACT - Internal RF Footage / HIGH CONFIDENCE)

Intentions:

1. Rapid Consolidation and Breakthrough (Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad): RF immediate intent is to leverage the Pokrovsk penetration into a strategic breakthrough by isolating or seizing Myrnohrad, as amplified by their IO.
2. Disrupt Central Logistics: RF deep strikes remain focused on disrupting logistics (Zmiiv vector, Poltava/Sumy strikes—Colonelcassad map) to prevent UAF reserve mobilization and supply to the Donetsk front.
3. IO Domination: RF seeks to amplify the perception of UAF collapse (Pokrovsk "cleaning," Kupyansk logistics failure) to undermine public and political support.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has successfully transitioned from gradual attrition to dynamic maneuver warfare in the Pokrovsk sector. The RF focus on disrupting UAF logistical movement is evidenced by the density of deep strikes observed in central and eastern Ukraine (Colonelcassad map). RF appears to be relying on rapid, overwhelming fires (FAB/drones, as noted by НгП раZVедка) to force UAF withdrawal, minimizing high-casualty urban close combat.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UAF successful SSO strikes on Luhansk Oblast POL/MTS depots (previous report) confirm RF sustainment lines are stressed. However, RF’s ability to conduct simultaneous deep strikes (Colonelcassad map shows strikes across 6+ oblasts) indicates sufficient missile/UAV stockpile and launch capacity remain intact.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is effectively coordinating a multi-axis strategic fire plan (deep strikes) with a localized, critical ground assault (Pokrovsk). The RF propaganda highlighting the internal "HUMINT" recruitment organization (Дневник Десантника) attempts to deflect UAF counter-intelligence successes (captured saboteur) by claiming UAF is recruiting RF citizens for sabotage. This is a characteristic hybrid C2 response.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is shifting to emergency defense of key urban anchors (Pokrovsk containment, Myrnohrad defense). The joint ZSU/GUR operation in Pokrovsk indicates high-value assets and specialized units are being committed to stabilize the situation. The success of UAF FPV teams (3rd Army Corps) in destroying RF fortified positions indicates high tactical proficiency and local initiative persist.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Confirmed successful FPV strikes against RF personnel and fortified positions (БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС footage).
• Successful deployment of specialized GUR assets to manage the immediate threat within Pokrovsk.

Setbacks:

• RF propaganda successfully amplified the narrative of UAF defensive collapse, especially by claiming actions against Myrnohrad.
• Confirmed civilian casualties in the deep rear due to RF drone activity (Chernihiv), highlighting the continued cost of stretched AD coverage.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint remains the Mobile AD/EW Gap in the central and northern axes (Kharkiv/Zmiiv, Zaporizhzhia vectors) to counter the continued dispersed UAV strikes. The commitment of GUR assets to Pokrovsk potentially constrains their availability for crucial deep-strike targeting or counter-sabotage operations in the rear.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Escalation: RF IO is aggressively escalating claims of success (Pokrovsk "cleansing," "storming Myrnohrad"), shifting the narrative from steady advance to imminent victory. This serves both to demoralize UAF and signal RF domestic confidence.
• Internal Discipline vs. External Cohesion: RF simultaneously releases footage showing extreme internal military coercion (commander threatening execution) while pushing external narratives of UAF logistical collapse (captured serviceman). This dissonance suggests a major effort to project strength outward while masking internal instability.
• Political Satire: The comparison of Zelenskyy to a "great field marshal" who "almost cleansed Pokrovsk" (Старше Эдды) is a key hybrid IO tactic using mockery to undermine UAF leadership, capitalizing directly on the critical situation in Pokrovsk.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is likely highly sensitive to news from Pokrovsk and the ongoing CI vulnerability. UAF messaging focusing on leadership engagement (Zelenskyy meeting with journalists) and active defense (GUR/ZSU operation) is crucial for morale maintenance, directly countering RF claims of collapse.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Poland's recognition that its security lies on the Ukrainian-Russian front (Оперативний ЗСУ) is a positive diplomatic signal, reaffirming continued Western support for UAF, despite tactical setbacks.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will maximize pressure on the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad axis while simultaneously distracting UAF AD command.

1. Myrnohrad Approach: RF ground forces will intensify attacks along the T-0504 route corridor (Dymytrov/Myrnohrad vicinity) to physically cut or threaten the UAF primary logistics line supporting the Pokrovsk defense.
2. CI Disruptive Strikes: RF UAVs/Shaheds will concentrate against high-value energy distribution nodes in the Poltava/Kharkiv/Zaporizhzhia transition zones, leveraging the multiple confirmed flight vectors to enforce maximum scheduled and unscheduled blackouts.
3. EW/C-UAS Shield: RF will deploy mobile EW systems heavily around Pokrovsk to disrupt UAF FPV/ISR operations (e.g., those shown by 3rd Army Corps), aiming to blind UAF defenders during critical close-quarters combat.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 72 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Myrnohrad Seizure/Isolation: RF armored spearheads, supported by close air support (KAB/FAB), bypass fixed defenses and seize key northern/eastern access points to Myrnohrad, forcing the abandonment of the Pokrovsk defense and jeopardizing the stability of the entire central Donetsk front.
2. Targeted C2 Elimination: Based on the successful deep strike capability and effective intelligence, RF launches a precision ballistic missile strike (Kinzhal/Iskander) targeting the identified C2 element coordinating the GUR/ZSU joint operation in the Pokrovsk area.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Fires Command (Pokrovsk): INITIATE HIGH-VOLUME COUNTER-BATTERY FIRE. Target RF artillery and MLRS units providing pre-assault fire support for the Pokrovsk push. Utilize the new tranche of Storm Shadow missiles (per previous recommendation) to strike RF logistical buildup or deep C2 nodes supporting the Pokrovsk axis to delay operational reinforcement. (CRITICAL PRIORITY)
2. AD Command (Multi-Axis Defense): DEPLOY MOBILE AD TO ZMIIV/POLTAVA CORRIDOR. Immediately reposition at least one battery of mobile AD (e.g., self-propelled gun system or NASAMS battery) to the threatened Central/South Kharkiv/Poltava corridor to counter the confirmed Zmiiv vector and protect key logistical hubs. (CRITICAL PRIORITY)
3. GUR/SSO Command (Pokrovsk): TASK GUR FOR COUNTER-SNIPER/RECONNAISSANCE-IN-FORCE. Exploit the joint operation within Pokrovsk to execute targeted raids against RF reconnaissance elements and forward observation posts, specifically targeting those feeding real-time targeting data for RF precision fires (UAV/Artillery). (HIGH PRIORITY)

//END SITREP//