Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 031800Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 031735Z NOV 25 – 031800Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The situation on the Pokrovsk Axis continues to degrade, confirming the RF penetration reported in the previous period.

• Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmiiskoye) Axis: CRITICAL FACT: Pro-Russian military sources (Rybar, Colonelcassad, Operatsiya Z) are actively publishing tactical maps and combat footage claiming substantial RF progress ("Otvazhnye" attacking Pokrovsk) and showing successful strikes against UAF positions, including fortified shelters and armored vehicles. These maps (dated 3 NOV) specifically depict RF forces having taken control of key areas in the southern and eastern approaches to Pokrovsk and advancing near Dymytrov (Myrnohrad vicinity). This corroborates the earlier assessment of RF entrenchment inside the city limits. (FACT - Corroborated OSINT/RF Milblogger Reports / HIGH CONFIDENCE on RF gain, MEDIUM on exact boundary)
• Deep Rear Area Targeting (Dnipropetrovsk/Kharkiv): The RF MoD is publicly claiming successful engagement of UAF attack and reconnaissance UAVs in the Dnipropetrovsk region by the 90th Guards Tank Division AD teams, suggesting active counter-UAS operations coinciding with the earlier UAV alerts. (FACT - RF Official Report / MEDIUM CONFIDENCE on claim accuracy, HIGH on RF intent to maintain AD coverage)
  • New UAV Threats: UAF Air Force confirms multiple, concurrent UAV alerts: East/North Chernihiv (westbound); North Zaporizhzhia (NE-bound); NW Kharkiv (SE-bound, vectoring toward Vilshany/Peresichne). This indicates a highly dispersed, multi-axis drone strike campaign targeting northern and central logistics/infrastructure nodes. (FACT - UAF AF Alerts / HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Critical Infrastructure (CI) Status: Ukrenergo confirms that rolling blackouts (scheduled between 08:00–11:00 and 15:00–22:00 tomorrow) will be implemented across several regions. This is a direct consequence of sustained RF strikes on the energy grid and confirms ongoing vulnerability in the CI domain. (FACT - UAF Official Report / HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. The RF video showing successful strikes (Operatsiya Z) highlights the effective use of thermal/night vision for targeting UAF positions, confirming the continued importance of thermal/EO countermeasures, especially during low-light conditions.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Deployment (Pokrovsk): RF forces are leveraging precision UAV/FPV strikes against hardened UAF targets (shelters, armored vehicles) to support the urban assault (Operatsiya Z video). RF reporting emphasizes the role of the "Tsentr Group of Forces" in both ground assaults (Pokrovsk) and rear-area defense (Dnipropetrovsk AD), suggesting coordinated operational control across multiple axes.
• UAF Force Protection: Following the confirmed casualty event, UAF officials have announced that certain officials have been suspended regarding the military deaths in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. This is a positive step toward enforcing OPSEC and accountability. (FACT - UAF Official Report / HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• UAF Domestic Missile Production: President Zelenskyy announced the application of new domestic missiles, "Flamingo" and "Ruta," with mass production expected by year-end. This reinforces the strategic shift toward domestic strike capability. (FACT - UAF Official Report / HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Integrated Firepower: RF demonstrates strong integration of close-air support (KAB - previous report), precision artillery, and UAV/FPV strikes to overcome hardened UAF defensive positions (confirmed by Operatsiya Z footage of strikes on shelters/vehicles).
• Multi-Domain Deep Strike: Proven ability to conduct dispersed, simultaneous UAV/Shahed strike campaigns across multiple, non-contiguous oblasts (Chernihiv, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv alerts) aimed at stretching UAF air defenses and interdicting logistics.

Intentions:

1. Exploit Pokrovsk Penetration: RF immediate intent is to consolidate and expand the foothold in southern Pokrovsk to threaten the UAF defensive anchor at Myrnohrad.
2. Sustain Pressure on CI: Continued deep strikes are intended to force sustained, wide-area power restrictions (Ukrenergo report), degrading military industrial capacity and civilian morale.
3. Hybrid Mobilization/IO: RF continues to engage in hybrid warfare, confirmed by the ongoing scrutiny of foreign personnel recruitment (Indian protest report) and high-volume, domestic-focused IO (Alex Parker, TASS).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has successfully implemented a coordinated penetration of Pokrovsk, moving the primary threat from a slow attritional fight to a dynamic urban combat environment. The tactical maps published by RF sources suggest they are prioritizing the push toward Dymytrov (Myrnohrad) to threaten the critical T-0504 MOC.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The earlier UAF SSO strikes on Luhansk Oblast logistics nodes are forcing RF to adapt supply lines. The active use of localized AD (90th Guards Tank Div AD in Dnipropetrovsk) suggests RF is protecting immediate forward-deployed logistical assets necessary for the Pokrovsk assault.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, capable of coordinating the Pokrovsk ground assault with simultaneous, geographically separated UAV strikes in the central/northern rear. The public suspension of UAF officials regarding the Dnipropetrovsk strike suggests that RF targeting intelligence, possibly derived from OPSEC failure, is highly effective.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is defensively focused on containing the Pokrovsk breach. The announced suspension of personnel confirms a necessary internal process is underway to address critical OPSEC and Force Protection failures. The announcement of new domestic missile systems ("Flamingo," "Ruta") is strategically positive, signaling future offensive capability.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Implementation of accountability measures (official suspensions) following the Dnipropetrovsk casualty event, addressing a critical internal security/OPSEC vulnerability.
• Confirmation of domestic production of new missile systems.

Setbacks:

• Confirmed RF entrenchment inside Pokrovsk, escalating the tactical difficulty of the defense.
• The persistence of rolling blackouts confirms RF success in degrading national energy resilience.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Mobile AD/EW Assets. Immediate need to reposition mobile AD (e.g., Gepard, Avenger) to defend key energy infrastructure currently targeted by UAVs in Chernihiv/Kharkiv Oblasts, while maintaining core AD capacity protecting reserves flowing to Pokrovsk. CONSTRAINT: UAF faces a resource allocation conflict between protecting the Pokrovsk defensive line and defending vulnerable CI and logistics hubs across a vastly dispersed deep rear area.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Narrative (Internal Focus): RF IO is focusing on domestic political and cultural distractions (Alex Parker mocking Pugacheva, TASS reporting on figure skating injury) to maintain internal stability and distract from potential mobilization issues.
• RF Narrative (External/Battlefield): Heavy emphasis on showcasing tactical gains in Pokrovsk (Operatsiya Z maps/videos) to project momentum and demoralize UAF forces.
• UAF Messaging: Focuses on resilience, veteran support (Zelenskyy visiting Trinity Hub), and domestic defense production achievements, aiming to maintain high morale despite the CI and Pokrovsk challenges.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale is subject to conflicting pressures: pride in domestic production and veteran support versus anxiety caused by confirmed RF tactical gains at Pokrovsk and the return of scheduled power blackouts. The protest in India by families of RF-recruited foreigners is an external IO opportunity for UAF, highlighting RF reliance on foreign mercenaries. (Dempster-Shafer Belief: Psychological Impact: Morale Decline for Indian Families Affected by Conflict - 0.008417)

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The Indian protest regarding foreign recruitment into the RF military highlights a growing diplomatic and manpower vulnerability for Russia. UAF intelligence should exploit this narrative to increase international pressure on RF recruitment practices and expose manpower shortages.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to leverage their positional advantage inside Pokrovsk and the systemic disruption caused by deep strikes.

1. Feint and Thrust (Pokrovsk): RF forces will engage in a feint toward the north/center of Pokrovsk while concentrating main assault efforts to expand control toward Dymytrov (Myrnohrad vicinity), seeking to cut the T-0504 MOC.
2. Synchronized UAV Strike: RF will execute the confirmed UAV strikes (Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia vectors) against energy infrastructure (substations, distribution nodes) to maximize the scope of power outages (supporting the Ukrenergo blackout announcement).
3. Increased IO Activity: RF milbloggers will flood the information space with graphic imagery and maps detailing "liberated" Pokrovsk territory to force UAF operational disclosure and demoralize defenders.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 72 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Isolation of Myrnohrad: RF succeeds in bypassing or overwhelming UAF defenses in the immediate vicinity of Pokrovsk, cutting the MOC to Myrnohrad and placing the critical logistics hub under direct RF fire control. This would necessitate a major, costly UAF counter-offensive or a strategic withdrawal from the central Donetsk axis.
2. Kinetic Strike on Strategic C2/AD: Leveraging confirmed intelligence effectiveness (Dnipropetrovsk incident), RF executes a high-precision ballistic missile strike (Iskander/Kinzhals) against a newly identified UAF C2 node or a high-value AD system supporting the Pokrovsk axis, capitalizing on any observed OPSEC failure.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/AD Command (Multi-Axis Defense): RE-TASK AD FOR CI PROTECTION. Immediately reallocate and prioritize AD assets to protect critical energy infrastructure in the northern/central axes (Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Poltava) threatened by the current UAV surge. Accept increased tactical risk on the Pokrovsk front, which must be offset by immediate heavy artillery/MLRS response. (CRITICAL PRIORITY)
2. J3/SSO/GUR (Pokrovsk Response): INITIATE COUNTER-RECONNAISSANCE AND COUNTER-FIRE. Utilize newly delivered Storm Shadow missiles to strike identified RF forward field hospitals or high-level tactical C2 nodes (Brigade/Regiment level) supporting the Pokrovsk penetration, focusing on disrupting the immediate tactical chain of command. (CRITICAL PRIORITY)
3. J2/CI/Force Protection: ENFORCE ZERO-TOLERANCE OPSEC. Immediately issue a nationwide directive implementing highly restrictive communications and movement protocols for all large unit formations until the DBR investigation into the Dnipropetrovsk strike is resolved. Personnel responsible for the new protocols must be non-suspended officials. (HIGH PRIORITY)

//END SITREP//