Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 031735Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 031700Z NOV 25 – 031735Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Pokrovsk Axis remains the operational Schwerpunkt, with confirmed RF penetration into urban terrain.

• Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmiiskoye) Axis: CRITICAL FACT: UAF sources (ЦАПЛІЄНКО) confirm that UAF defensive forces have halted RF penetration in the northern sector of Pokrovsk, and are conducting urban clearance operations, suggesting the RF penetration mentioned in the daily report was contained or repelled in key areas. However, President Zelenskyy states that nearly one-third of all active engagements and 50% of RF Guided Aerial Bomb (KAB) usage are concentrated on this axis, confirming it is the primary RF effort. (FACT - UAF Official/Media Reports / HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Kupyansk Axis: UAF President Zelenskyy confirms that approximately 60 RF personnel remain in Kupyansk, and a full clearance operation is underway, indicating the city is not fully secured but that organized RF resistance is collapsing. (FACT - UAF Official Report / MEDIUM CONFIDENCE on exact RF numbers, HIGH on trend)
• Deep Rear Area Targeting (Dnipropetrovsk): The previously reported ballistic strike (1 Nov) in the Samarskyi district of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast has been officially confirmed by UAF sources (РБК-Україна, Оперативний ЗСУ) to have caused military and civilian casualties. This confirms the persistent RF intent to target vulnerable rear area logistical and personnel nodes. The State Bureau of Investigation (DBR) is actively investigating, reinforcing the suspicion of OPSEC failure. (FACT - Corroborated Strike Event / HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Deep Strike Threat (UAVs): UAF Air Force confirms continued UAV activity entering Dnipropetrovsk Oblast from the southeast, currently tracking toward Yuryivka (near Pavlohrad/Dnipro), indicating an imminent follow-on Shahed strike targeting central logistical hubs. (FACT - UAF AF Alerts / HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Conditions remain suitable for drone operations (both FPV and surveillance) and deep strike missile/KAB usage. The sustained high usage of KABs (50% of total RF usage) on the Pokrovsk Axis highlights the ongoing operational advantage of RF air superiority in that sector.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Deployment (Pokrovsk): RF forces (specifically the Aley Guard Motorized Rifle Brigade) are employing highly effective, targeted FPV drone attacks to destroy UAF personnel and light vehicles on the Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmiiskoye) direction, complementing the heavy use of KABs. RF sources claim this is "systemic work" to destroy UAF manpower.
• UAF Posture (Pokrovsk): UAF has committed additional forces to the defense of Myrnohrad (key C2/logistics hub West of Pokrovsk) and is actively engaging in urban clearance in Pokrovsk. This signifies a commitment to holding the defensive line forward of Myrnohrad.
• UAF Domestic Production: UAF President Zelenskyy announced a production target of 600-800 interceptor drones per day by the end of November, confirming a critical strategy shift toward prioritizing indigenous counter-UAS and domestic drone capability scaling. (FACT - UAF Official Report / HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Precision and Sustained Firepower: RF demonstrates a high capability for synchronized use of KABs and precision FPV strikes (Podoubny report) to break UAF defenses and personnel concentrations on the Pokrovsk Axis.
• Persistent Deep Strike: Proven ability to penetrate UAF AD and strike high-value rear targets (Samarskyi/Pavlohrad) using ballistic missiles (Iskander) and subsequent attack waves (Shahed/drones in Kramatorsk and Dnipropetrovsk alerts).

Intentions:

1. Maintain Operational Tempo on Pokrovsk: RF's immediate intent is to break the UAF defense at Pokrovsk through sustained, overwhelming fire (KAB/FPV) to force a general operational withdrawal.
2. Disrupt Reserve Flow: Continued deep strikes (UAV alert near Yuryivka) aim to interdict UAF reserves and logistical resupply routes required to reinforce the Pokrovsk defense.
3. Amplify International Division: RF IO (Alex Parker, TASS) is actively pushing narratives regarding declining Western support (Czech coalition) and the ongoing US shutdown threat to fracture UAF morale and international alignment.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The RF emphasis on synchronized KAB saturation and FPV strikes (50% of KAB usage, systemic FPV targeting) on the Pokrovsk Axis represents a refined tactical adaptation aimed at paralyzing UAF defenses before mechanized assault waves enter the urban terrain. This multi-domain pressure is highly effective.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UAF deep strikes (reported in the previous daily report) against RF POL and MTS depots in Luhansk Oblast will degrade RF sustainment, but this effect is often delayed. RF ground units on the Pokrovsk front continue to display effective, localized drone support, suggesting forward-deployed ammunition/fuel caches are still sufficient for current operations.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in synchronizing deep strikes and ground fire support. However, RF milbloggers are highly critical of RF military leadership, citing the Pokrovsk assault as relying on "infiltration by small groups" (Alex Parker), implicitly criticizing a lack of decisive, large-scale mechanized maneuver capability.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensively committed at Pokrovsk and actively clearing Kupyansk. The President's Brigade demonstrates effective counter-UAS capability (destroying an enemy quadcopter). Readiness remains high, but is severely challenged by the concentration of RF air and fire assets on the Pokrovsk front. The DBR investigation into the Dnipropetrovsk strike confirms critical failures in Force Protection/OPSEC are being addressed, but must lead to immediate, enforceable changes.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Successful halt of RF advance in the northern sector of Pokrovsk and initiation of clearance operations.
• Confirmed successful counter-UAS engagement by the President's Brigade.
• Strategic commitment to scaling domestic interceptor drone production (600-800/day).

Setbacks:

• Confirmed military and civilian casualties from the 1 Nov deep strike in Dnipropetrovsk, underscoring ongoing OPSEC vulnerability.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Rapid deployment of mobile SHORAD and EW systems capable of countering FPV drone swarms and providing limited protection against KAB guidance systems on the Pokrovsk Axis. CONSTRAINT: The Pokrovsk concentration is consuming an unsustainably high percentage of UAF available manpower and fires, potentially leaving other axes vulnerable if the situation deteriorates rapidly.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Narrative: Focuses intensely on amplifying the perceived decline in Western support (Czech anti-aid coalition, US shutdown threat), painting UAF leadership as delusional (mocking Zelenskyy's Kupyansk "clearance" claims), and showcasing tactical success (FPV strikes near Pokrovsk).
• UAF Messaging: Focuses on resilience, domestic industrial capacity (drone production goals), political accountability (DBR investigation), and counter-morale efforts (emphasizing the need for mental health support via DeepState).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is polarized. While news of increased domestic drone production is morale-boosting, the confirmed casualties from rear-area strikes (Dnipropetrovsk) and the critical situation at Pokrovsk raise public anxiety. The DBR investigation into military casualties is crucial for maintaining public trust in accountability.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The reported formation of a Czech coalition based on the principle of withholding aid to Ukraine (Alex Parker) and the ongoing US political instability (shutdown threat) introduce significant uncertainty regarding the immediate future of external materiel support. UAF diplomatic efforts must immediately engage relevant European capitals to assess the true impact of these political developments.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will prioritize the immediate collapse of the Pokrovsk urban defense.

1. Maximum Effort Fire Suppression: RF Air/Artillery will maintain the current tempo of KAB and heavy artillery strikes (50% of KAB usage) on Pokrovsk and immediate defensive positions to degrade UAF ability to maneuver or counter-attack.
2. Targeting Reserves: The active UAV threat toward Yuryivka (Dnipropetrovsk) will materialize into a Shahed strike on a logistics node (railway, POL depot) or a known troop concentration near the Dnipro River to disrupt the flow of reserves to Pokrovsk.
3. Limited Probing Attacks: Small RF infiltration/assault groups will probe weakened sectors on the Pokrovsk front to identify new points of penetration.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 72 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Operational Breach at Pokrovsk: RF commits a fresh Mechanized Reserve (possibly the units identified as a gap in the previous report) supported by saturation KAB strikes to fully breach the Pokrovsk defense, forcing a rapid, disorganized UAF withdrawal toward Myrnohrad, exposing the main line of communication (MOC) to Dnipropetrovsk.
2. Assassination/Decapitation Strike (Hybrid): Leveraging the confirmed success of deep targeting intelligence and the proven internal security vulnerability (captured saboteur), RF attempts a high-value kinetic strike (Ballistic Missile) or a dedicated sabotage operation against a high-level UAF/Government target (Minister, General Officer) in Kyiv or Dnipro, aiming to cause immediate C2 disruption and political chaos.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/AD Command (Pokrovsk): PRIORITIZE EW AND SHORAD DEPLOYMENT. Immediately reallocate and surge all available ground-based Electronic Warfare (EW) systems and mobile SHORAD units to create dense defensive umbrellas over the Myrnohrad-Pokrovsk MOC and assembly areas, specifically targeting the RF FPV/KAB guidance systems. (CRITICAL PRIORITY)
2. J3/SSO/J2 (Deep Strike Exploitation): EXPLOIT LOGISTICS DISRUPTION. Task the newly delivered Storm Shadow missiles to strike the deepest confirmed RF operational C2 node linked to the Pokrovsk direction (e.g., a Divisional HQ near Donetsk City or an identified railway hub near Makiivka), leveraging the logistical disruption caused by the earlier Luhansk strikes. (HIGH PRIORITY)
3. J3/GUR (Kupyansk Clearance): SECURE GAINS AND PREVENT RE-INFILTRATION. Ensure the Kupyansk clearance operation is supported by robust counter-infiltration assets (DRG hunting teams) to prevent the remaining 60 RF personnel from forming an organized resistance pocket or acting as reconnaissance for follow-on RF border attacks. (HIGH PRIORITY)

//END SITREP//