Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 031600Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 031300Z NOV 25 – 031600Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The situation remains critical on the Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk).

• Pokrovsk Urban Defense (CRITICAL): RF forces are confirmed to be engaged in urban clearing operations in the southern quarters of Pokrovsk, with RF channels (Operatsiya Z) actively disseminating videos of civilian evacuations. This amplification suggests RF is consolidating its initial penetration and using the presence of civilians as both a shield and an IO asset. The specific area referenced as "Krasnoarmiysk" (likely Ocheretyne/Pokrovsk area) indicates RF is prioritizing the deep rear of the current UAF defensive line. (FACT - RF Propaganda Footage / HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Offensive Counter-Pressure: General Syrskyi confirms UAF advances near Dobropillya, intended to distract RF forces from the main effort at Pokrovsk. This counter-attack is geographically linked to the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis and aims to restore operational balance. (FACT - UAF GENSTAFF Report / HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Maritime Domain: UAF Naval Forces (VMS) confirmed a successful strike on the RF-occupied Syvash drilling platform, reportedly targeting an elite RF special operations unit (Spetsnaz). This signifies continued UAF capacity to strike high-value, remote RF assets in the Black Sea. (FACT - UAF VMS Report / HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No changes. Ground conditions remain muddy. RF forces are actively utilizing drone assets in challenging visibility conditions (documented RF video states "Poor visibility. Be careful in flight"). (ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT / MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Deployment: RF forces identified as "Otvazhnye" (Brave) are deployed for urban clearance in Pokrovsk. These are likely reinforced motorized rifle or assault infantry units.
• UAF Reserve Deployment: The confirmed commitment of forces for the counter-attack near Dobropillya indicates UAF is actively using mobile reserves to reduce pressure on Pokrovsk, rather than only reinforcing the immediate urban defense.
• Multi-Domain Threat: Active RF reconnaissance UAVs were reported near Odesa (Black Sea littoral) and Zaporizhzhia, immediately preceding/concurrent with a major ballistic threat alert from the Northeast (Bryansk region). This indicates a highly coordinated RF multi-domain intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike effort across multiple fronts. (FACT - Air Force Alerts / HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Urban Combat Sustainment: RF has demonstrated the capability to rapidly transition from penetration to urban clearance and consolidation, supported by effective IO.
• Targeting and Counter-C2: RF is actively targeting UAF Starlink communications equipment (confirmed via captured RF drone footage), indicating a highly valuable tactical priority to degrade UAF battlefield communications effectiveness.
• Persistent Ballistic/UAV Threat: RF maintains the capability for high-tempo ballistic strikes (Northern axis) and persistent, multi-axis reconnaissance/strike UAV operations (Odesa, Zaporizhzhia, Chernihiv).

Intentions:

1. Pokrovsk Envelopment: The primary RF intention is to secure and expand the foothold in Pokrovsk and defeat the UAF Dobropillya counter-attack.
2. Degrade UAF C2/ISR: RF will prioritize the destruction of UAF communications (Starlink) and ISR assets (UAVs) to create battlefield opacity for UAF commanders.
3. Cross-Border Sabotage/Strikes: RF is actively using the Bryansk/Belgorod axis for both deep strikes (ballistic threat) and cross-border drone incursions, likely targeting Ukrainian military or energy infrastructure near the border.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has successfully shifted significant attention and resources to the urban environment of Pokrovsk, prioritizing the seizure of key infrastructure over slow attrition. The active targeting and destruction of Starlink terminals confirm a high-priority adaptation to neutralize UAF tactical information advantage.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The UAF VMS strike on the Syvash platform, reportedly occupied by Spetsnaz, is an operational interdiction of a potential forward-operating base (FOB) or ISR post, complicating RF maritime security and hybrid warfare logistics in the Black Sea.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains robust, demonstrated by the simultaneous coordination of: 1) Urban assault in Pokrovsk, 2) Defense against the Dobropillya counter-attack, and 3) Multi-axis deep reconnaissance (UAVs in Odesa/Zaporizhzhia) and strike alerts (Ballistic threat).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture has shifted to active defense combined with operational counter-attack. The success of the VMS strike and the confirmed counter-attack near Dobropillya (GENSTAFF) demonstrate high readiness and the ability to execute complex multi-domain operations.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Offensive Maneuver: Confirmed UAF advances near Dobropillya, creating tactical pressure and forcing RF to divert attention from Pokrovsk.
• Deep Maritime Strike: Successful VMS strike on the Syvash platform, degrading an RF hybrid operations asset.

Setbacks:

• Urban Penetration: RF remains entrenched in southern Pokrovsk.
• C2 Interdiction: Documented RF success in targeting and destroying UAF Starlink terminals in the field (location undisclosed).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Enhanced Electronic Warfare (EW) and Counter-UAS (C-UAS) assets capable of protecting UAF C2 nodes (including Starlink) from RF drone reconnaissance and subsequent kinetic strikes. CONSTRAINT: The continuous requirement to fight on multiple fronts (Pokrovsk, Lyman-Kupiansk, Southern Front) constrains the amount of highly mobile, mechanized reserve forces available for decisive counter-attack operations in the critical Pokrovsk sector.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Tactical Legitimacy: RF channels (Operatsiya Z) are heavily using video footage of civilian evacuations from Pokrovsk, framing their operation as a liberation mission and amplifying the narrative of UAF failure and civilian suffering under UAF control.
• Belarusian IO (Low Credibility): Belarus continues to assert its readiness to deploy "peacekeepers" in Ukraine, a low-credibility statement intended primarily to generate diplomatic noise and affirm RF-Belarus alignment without altering the tactical reality.
• Internal Critique Amplification (Germany): Statements from German CDU leadership (Carsten Linnemann) suggesting Ukrainian refugees should be fighting are amplified by pro-Ukrainian channels. While not RF IO, this creates strategic friction within international support and generates internal debate on mobilization and societal burden.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF reporting of the VMS strike and the Dobropillya advance serves as a crucial morale boost, offsetting the severe negative impact of the Pokrovsk urban breach. However, concerns regarding military accountability (DTP incident with judge) and loss of combat personnel (photographer's death) continue to strain domestic sentiment. The coordination meeting for families of the 5th Assault Brigade (Coordination HQ) highlights ongoing internal challenges related to Prisoners of War (POW) and Missing in Action (MIA) cases.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The continued commitment of UAF forces to advanced deep strikes (Storm Shadow, VMS attack) demonstrates effective integration of previously delivered Western capabilities. The international focus shifts toward the US testing of ICBMs (TASS report), indicating geopolitical tensions remain high but slightly distract from the direct Ukraine conflict.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to neutralize UAF counter-pressure while consolidating urban gains.

1. Contain Dobropillya Counter-Attack: RF will rapidly redeploy or commit tactical reserves (likely artillery and mobile mechanized forces) to stop the UAF advance near Dobropillya and prevent any relief of the Pokrovsk garrison.
2. Targeted C2 Degradation: RF will significantly increase the tempo of dedicated electronic reconnaissance and kinetic strikes (FPV, Lancet, Artillery) aimed at identifying and destroying Starlink and other forward UAF communication nodes in the Pokrovsk-Dobropillya area.
3. Continued Deep Recon/Strike: A likely Shahed/UAV wave will target energy or logistics hubs in Central Ukraine (Poltava/Dnipropetrovsk) within the next 24 hours, following the observed reconnaissance patterns near Odesa and Zaporizhzhia.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 72 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

1. Urban Breakthrough and Western Thrust: RF achieves an operational breakthrough in central Pokrovsk, bypasses the remaining UAF urban defenses, and executes a rapid armored thrust westward toward Dymytrov/Myrnohrad, exploiting the confusion and isolating the Dobropillya counter-attacking forces from their main supply lines.
2. High-Altitude Ballistic Strike on Reserve Staging Area: RF launches a synchronized, high-payload ballistic missile (Iskander/KN-23) strike against a confirmed UAF DSHV assembly or staging area (e.g., Kramatorsk/Druzhkivka area), leveraging pre-strike ISR to inflict mass casualties and prevent the operational deployment of elite reserves.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J6 (C2 Defense): EJECT RF C2 HUNTERS: Deploy dedicated EW/C-UAS teams (Priority 1) to the 7th DSHV area of responsibility to actively defend against RF attempts to target Starlink terminals and forward C2 nodes. Implement immediate physical hardening (berms, overhead cover) and electronic emission control (EMCON) protocols around all forward C2 nodes. (CRITICAL PRIORITY)
2. J3 (Maneuver): SUSTAIN DOBROPILLYA PRESSURE: Ensure the UAF advance near Dobropillya is sufficiently resourced to maintain momentum for the next 48 hours, compelling RF to divert significant force elements from the Pokrovsk urban fight. This must be managed carefully to avoid overextension. (HIGH PRIORITY)
3. J2 (Targeting): PREPARE RETALIATORY DEEP STRIKE: Develop and validate a targeting package for the new Storm Shadow tranche focusing exclusively on a high-value RF Corps-level logistics hub (e.g., rail unloading point, large ammunition depot) servicing the Pokrovsk axis, as an immediate kinetic response to the urban penetration. (HIGH PRIORITY)

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