Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 031600Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 031400Z NOV 25 – 031600Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The situation remains dynamic, dominated by RF deep strike activity and continued intense urban fighting on the Donetsk Axis.

• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk/Dymytrov): Confirmed RF operational focus remains Pokrovsk. RF sources (MoD Russia) claim successful "mopping up" of 24 buildings in the northern, eastern, and southeastern parts of Dymytrov (known to UAF as Myrnohrad's vicinity/neighboring settlement). This claim, if accurate, indicates RF forces are attempting to secure the flanks and northern approaches to Pokrovsk. (ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT - RF MoD Claim / MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) UAF FPV footage (STERNENKO) confirms intense combat and successful UAF drone strikes neutralizing RF motorized groups/vehicles on the open ground approaches to Pokrovsk.
• Deep Strike Threat (Central/Eastern Ukraine): The ballistic missile threat to Kyiv has ceased, with KMVA and Air Force confirming the "all clear." However, a NEW threat emerged with confirmed launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) targeting Sumy Oblast. This indicates RF is extending its Stand-Off Air Superiority threat Northward. (FACT - Air Force Alert / HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Operational Rear (Crimea): UAF GUR confirms highly effective, asymmetric deep strikes overnight (1-2 NOV 25) targeting RF air defense assets in occupied Crimea, specifically claiming the destruction of an S-400 Engagement Radar (92N6E), damage to a P-18 "Terek" radar, and a hit on S-400 autonomous power supply equipment. This is a significant degradation of RF integrated air defense (IADS) in Crimea. (FACT - GUR Confirmation Footage / HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Muddy conditions continue to restrict heavy mechanized off-road movement. Solar activity (TASS report of M-class flare) is noted but currently assessed as having LOW immediate impact on tactical radio or GPS reliability.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF defensive posture is strong, characterized by effective deep strikes against RF AD/logistics (Crimea) and localized FPV dominance on the Pokrovsk approaches. The UAF General Staff (as of 16:00Z) reports continued defensive stability across major axes, confirming UAF is holding the line despite the intense fighting around Pokrovsk.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Integrated Strike Capacity: RF demonstrated the ability to conduct synchronized deep strikes (Ballistic to Kyiv, KAB to Kharkiv/Sumy), forcing UAF to dilute AD assets.
• Urban Maneuver: RF 5th Separate Guards Motorised Rifle Brigade's claimed success in Dymytrov/Myrnohrad vicinity suggests retained capability for localized, small-unit urban clearing operations.

Intentions:

1. Exploit Crimea AD Gaps (NEW): RF must now prioritize the rapid deployment of replacement AD assets or reposition existing systems within Crimea to cover the critical gap created by the destruction of the S-400 Engagement Radar.
2. Pressure Pokrovsk Flanks: RF will attempt to secure Dymytrov/Myrnohrad to the north/northeast of Pokrovsk to control key roads and establish firing positions for eventual operational encirclement.
3. Halt UAF Asymmetric Advantage: RF will intensify EW/C-UAS efforts on the Pokrovsk axis to counter the demonstrated effectiveness of UAF FPV units.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF forces continue to leverage superior air-launched standoff munitions (KAB) and are now extending these strikes to new areas (Sumy Oblast), increasing the area that UAF AD must cover.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The confirmed successful GUR strike on the S-400 complex components in Crimea will degrade RF air defense sustainment. The cumulative effects of UAF deep strikes on POL/MTS depots (Luhansk) and AD systems (Crimea) are significantly increasing the RF logistical burden, forcing longer supply lines and greater vulnerability.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains intact to coordinate complex multi-domain operations. However, the successful targeting of the S-400 engagement radar indicates that UAF intelligence and deep strike coordination are successfully exploiting RF C2 vulnerabilities at the theater level.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is generally stable, successfully intercepting or weathering the immediate ballistic threat to Kyiv. The highly effective GUR strike on Crimea confirms high readiness and capability in the deep strike domain.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• CRITICAL AD SYSTEM DEGRADATION: Confirmed destruction of the S-400 92N6E Engagement Radar and damage to a P-18 radar in Crimea is a major operational success, creating an exploitable gap in RF IADS coverage.
• FPV Dominance: Continued successful deployment of FPV drones in the Pokrovsk sector confirms UAF retains the tactical initiative in the close-in fight against RF motorized/light armor.

Setbacks:

• Internal Security (Morale): An investigation is needed into the claimed tragedy within the 35th Marine Brigade (БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС report) regarding casualties from a reported unsecured assembly/concentration point. If confirmed, this represents a severe, preventable operational security (OPSEC) failure and a serious morale setback. (FACT - High Profile Allegation / CRITICAL INVESTIGATION REQUIREMENT)
• Endurance/Rotation Stress: An informal report (DeepState) mentions a unit being on positions for 165 days without rotation, indicating severe personnel endurance stress on certain frontline units. (ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT - Informal Report / MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate requirement is for ISR assets to monitor the newly created AD gap in Crimea for subsequent targeting opportunities. A critical constraint is the operational tempo and the cumulative stress on frontline personnel due to lack of rotation.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF External IO (US Politics): RF sources (Операция Z) are actively framing potential future US sanctions (TASS/Bloomberg quote regarding Trump sanctions) as detrimental to global stability, attempting to drive a wedge between US political factions and Western allies on economic policy.
• RF Tactical IO: RF MoD claims regarding "mopping up" in Dymytrov are intended to project tactical momentum and reinforce the narrative of control over key settlements near Pokrovsk.
• UAF Internal IO (OPSEC/Accountability): The high-profile reporting on the 35th Brigade tragedy and corruption issues (KMVA) demonstrates a commitment to transparency but creates a temporary dip in public morale and provides RF IO with material to use against UAF leadership.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is mixed. While deep strike successes (Crimea) provide a significant boost, the alleged large-scale, preventable casualty event in the 35th Brigade represents a deep negative shock requiring immediate, transparent investigation and accountability to mitigate widespread distrust.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The previously confirmed Storm Shadow delivery (Bloomberg) remains the most critical positive diplomatic development, bolstering long-range strike capability. Administrative changes to EU border rules (RBC-Ukraine) are noted but hold LOW military significance.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will focus on consolidating tactical gains while attempting to neutralize UAF deep strike advantages:

1. Pokrovsk Envelopment Attempt: RF will increase pressure on the Dymytrov/Myrnohrad flank (North/Northeast of Pokrovsk), aiming to push UAF units back and place the E50 corridor under sustained artillery fire control.
2. AD System Repositioning: RF will rapidly redeploy reserve AD assets, likely including S-300V4 or older S-400 components, to fill the coverage gaps created in Crimea. This movement will be a high-value targeting opportunity.
3. KAB Saturation: RF will sustain or increase the tempo of KAB strikes against Kharkiv and Sumy Oblasts to destroy industrial/military repair facilities and suppress AD systems further north.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 72 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

1. Targeted C2 Interdiction: RF employs a concentrated strike package (ballistic and cruise missiles) against a confirmed or suspected UAF operational headquarters (Brigade/Corps level) near the Pokrovsk front, exploiting real-time intelligence from captured saboteur networks or compromised communications.
2. Exploitation of OPSEC Failure: RF utilizes the alleged 35th Marine Brigade tragedy in a massive, coordinated IO campaign designed to severely degrade UAF combat morale and sow widespread distrust between UAF leadership and frontline troops, potentially triggering civil unrest or refusal to deploy.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J2/GUR (Deep Strike Targeting): EXPLOIT CRIMEAN AD GAP: Immediately dedicate the new Storm Shadow tranche toward neutralizing identified RF AD replacement systems and associated C2 nodes during their movement or initial setup phase in Crimea. Focus on the most advanced systems (e.g., S-300V4 or replacement S-400). (CRITICAL PRIORITY)
2. J7/MOD (OPSEC and Accountability): IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION AND STATEMENT: The Ministry of Defence must immediately launch a high-level, transparent investigation into the alleged 35th Brigade tragedy. Simultaneously, release a public statement confirming the investigation and reiterating the prohibition of open-air personnel assembly in range of RF long-range fires to neutralize the severe morale risk. (CRITICAL PRIORITY - Morale)
3. J3 (Force Protection/AD): SHIFT KAB FOCUS NORTH: Reposition mobile short-to-medium range AD assets (e.g., GEPARD, NASAMS) to provide enhanced coverage for critical infrastructure and military repair hubs in Sumy and Northern Kharkiv Oblasts to counter the expanding KAB threat footprint. (HIGH PRIORITY)

//END SITREP//