Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 031400Z NOV 25 REPORTING PERIOD: 031300Z NOV 25 – 031400Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational focus remains the critical urban fight in Pokrovsk (Donetsk Axis), synchronized with a high threat of deep strike targeting the UAF rear area (Kyiv, Poltava, Kharkiv).

• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad): RF forces are confirmed to be operating inside the city's southern quarters. UAF DShV (7th Corps) confirms successful counter-battery/FPV engagement against RF personnel in the Pokrovsk sector (RBC Ukraine, 13:40:21Z). This confirms UAF is actively contesting RF gains. RF sources release a tactical map showing limited advancement and contested areas around Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad, suggesting ongoing intense combat (Сливочный каприз, 13:34:02Z).
  • CRITICAL INFORMATION: UAF sources explicitly state that Defense Forces stopped RF forces north of Pokrovsk and prevented them from severing a critical road (RBC Ukraine, 13:40:20Z). This indicates the immediate threat of operational encirclement has been temporarily mitigated, though the fight in the south persists. (FACT - UAF DShV Footage & UAF Reporting / HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Deep Strike Threat (Central/Eastern Ukraine):
  • Kyiv (Ballistic Threat): Air alerts issued for Kyiv due to the threat of ballistic missile use from the North-East direction (Air Force, KMVA, 13:56:45Z, 13:58:16Z). (FACT - Air Force Alert / HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Kharkiv/Donetsk (FAB/KAB Threat): Confirmed launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) targeting Kharkiv and Donetsk Oblasts (Air Force, 13:51:02Z, 13:56:06Z). This indicates continued RF aerial superiority/standoff strike capability near the front lines. (FACT - Air Force Alert / HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Velykyi Burluk / Krasnolimansk Direction: RF map overlays suggest continued localized offensive pressure in both sectors, though no immediate RF breakthroughs are reported or confirmed by UAF sources. (ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT - RF IO maps / MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

UAV footage confirms deeply rutted, muddy unpaved roads in operational areas (БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС, 13:40:51Z), continuing to restrict heavy mechanized movement off-road, favoring infantry, light armor, and drone operations.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are successfully executing deep interdiction (Crimea, Luhansk in prior reports) and are actively holding and counter-attacking RF forces inside and on the periphery of Pokrovsk. The high tempo of deep strike alerts (Kyiv, Kharkiv) confirms RF is attempting to leverage multi-domain pressure to distract from the Pokrovsk main effort.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Ballistic/Guided Strike: RF retains the capability to execute rapid ballistic strikes targeting major administrative and military centers (Kyiv alert).
• Stand-Off Air Superiority: Persistent use of KAB/FAB against frontline and near-rear areas (Kharkiv, Donetsk) demonstrates RF's ability to operate aircraft outside the range of most UAF short-range AD systems.
• Information/Legitimacy Operations (IO): RF and proxy forces (DNR militia) are actively attempting to legitimize control in occupied territories through civic events (futsal tournament in DNR, 13:33:40Z), framing their presence as normalized governance.

Intentions:

1. Exploit Pokrovsk: Primary intent remains to destroy or dislodge UAF forces from Pokrovsk and secure the E50 corridor.
2. Disrupt UAF C2/Logistics: RF will utilize ballistic and cruise missile assets to target Kyiv and central Ukraine to disrupt decision-making and the flow of reserves to the Donetsk front.
3. Sustain Frontal Pressure: Continue probing and localized attacks in less active sectors (Krasnolimansk, Velykyi Burluk) to fix UAF reserves.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF forces continue to adapt to terrain conditions by integrating drone-dropped munitions into kinetic operations, exemplified by the successful drone engagement of a lone UAF soldier (Оперативний ЗСУ, 13:41:03Z).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF utilizes civilian fundraising appeals (Colonelcassad, 13:59:58Z) for specific operational units (10th Platoon, Southern Dnipropetrovsk direction), indicating continued reliance on non-state sources for operational sustainment and equipment gaps, particularly for specialized units like assault and reconnaissance.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains capable of coordinating complex ground assaults and deep strike packages simultaneously. However, the requirement for active fundraising at the platoon level suggests localized/unit-level C2 struggles to meet immediate logistical demands from centralized military supply lines.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF maintains active, layered defense. DShV units are successfully conducting FPV counter-attacks (7th Corps footage), and UAF AD readiness is high (Kyiv, Kharkiv alerts). The proactive communication of the threat (Air Force alerts) allows for civil defense measures.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Pokrovsk Containment: UAF successfully held the critical Northern approach to Pokrovsk, preventing the interdiction of the essential logistics route (RBC Ukraine, 13:40:20Z).
• Asymmetric Precision: Confirmed UAF drone strike neutralizing an enemy combatant operating individually (Оперативний ЗСУ, 13:41:03Z), demonstrating persistent tactical precision capability.

Setbacks:

• Ballistic Threat: The confirmed ballistic threat to Kyiv (KMVA, 13:56:45Z) poses an immediate risk to national C2 and critical infrastructure.
• Internal Security/Morale Threat: The widely publicized attack on a wounded serviceman in Kyiv (RBC Ukraine, 13:55:55Z), alongside previous reports of housing exploitation and captured saboteurs, creates a cumulative, serious internal security and morale risk.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Primary resource requirements remain AD interceptors, particularly against ballistic and KAB threats. A new administrative constraint is the need to rapidly address internal security and morale issues stemming from civilian hostility/profiteering toward servicemen, which degrades unit readiness and domestic support for the war effort.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Legitimacy IO (Domestic/Occupied Territories): RF sources promote images of normalized life and civic events (futsal tournaments) in occupied territories to portray stable Russian governance and minimize the impact of the war (Народная милиция ДНР, 13:33:40Z).
• RF Strategic IO (West Criticism): RF sources promote denial narratives regarding aggressive rhetoric from Western partners (Belgian Defense Minister denial, Операция Z, 13:37:06Z).
• UAF Counter-IO (Corruption/Welfare): Ukrainian sources are actively exposing domestic corruption (Prosecutor General Office returns funds taken by Kyiv officials, 14:00:09Z) and civil-military friction (attack on serviceman, 13:55:55Z). Impact: While necessary for accountability, high-profile reports of internal corruption and hostility toward soldiers risks reinforcing RF narratives of UAF internal weakness.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is polarized. Strategic AD success and deep strikes provide motivation, but the persistent internal security risks (corruption, attacks on servicemen) create distrust and friction between the military and civil society, posing a serious long-term threat to national cohesion.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT: Confirmation of the UK government decision to deliver additional Storm Shadow missiles to Ukraine is a major strategic boost, directly augmenting UAF's long-range precision strike capability against high-value RF targets (Hayabusa, 13:58:40Z). (FACT - Bloomberg/Hayabusa / HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will prioritize synchronized kinetic and psychological operations:

1. Concentrated Pokrovsk Assault: RF forces will consolidate and expand their presence in southern Pokrovsk, using artillery and KAB support to suppress UAF strongpoints. The main effort will be on expanding the internal perimeter and establishing fire control over the main lines of communication into the city.
2. Ballistic Retaliation Strikes: RF will execute retaliatory ballistic strikes against high-value targets (HVT) in central Ukraine (Kyiv, Poltava) in response to UAF deep strikes against Crimea and Luhansk logistics. Targeting will likely focus on energy infrastructure or known UAF C2/logistics hubs.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 72 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) Operational Breakthrough:

1. Isolation of Myrnohrad: RF succeeds in bypassing or overwhelming UAF defenses North/Northeast of Pokrovsk, leveraging mobility to seize a critical segment of the E50 highway linking Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, forcing a wide-scale operational retreat under heavy fire.
2. Destruction of Storm Shadow Infrastructure: RF utilizes high-confidence intelligence (possibly derived from the captured saboteur network) to successfully target the newly delivered Storm Shadow missiles or their associated launch/storage infrastructure via a precision strike, severely degrading UAF asymmetric deep strike capability.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J7 (AD/Force Protection): BALLISTIC INTERCEPT PRIORITY: Immediately prioritize layered AD systems (e.g., PATRIOT, NASAMS) to the Kyiv/Central Ukraine sectors, focusing on defending critical C2 nodes and infrastructure against the confirmed ballistic threat from the North-East. (CRITICAL PRIORITY)
2. J2/GUR (Deep Strike Planning): IMMEDIATE STORM SHADOW EMPLOYMENT: Rapidly finalize and execute strikes using the newly delivered Storm Shadow missiles against high-confidence RF HVTs identified through previous BDA (e.g., replacement AD systems in Crimea, major rail/POL depots in Luhansk/Rostov regions) to maximize the short-term window of RF vulnerability. (CRITICAL PRIORITY)
3. G5 (CIMIC) & SBU (Counter-Intelligence): MITIGATE INTERNAL MORALE RISK: Launch a public and highly visible SBU investigation and prosecution effort against individuals involved in the attack on the wounded serviceman in Kyiv, coupled with the previously recommended action on housing exploitation. This is essential to reassure UAF personnel of state and public support. (HIGH PRIORITY)

//END SITREP//