Situation Report

TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 031200Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad Axis remains the primary RF kinetic focus, with continued heavy use of guided aerial munitions.

• Pokrovsk Axis (Rodynske/Ivanopillya): RF military bloggers continue to emphasize the success of using FABs to target UAF positions in Rodynske, coupled with rhetoric designed to demoralize UAF forces by claiming they are being "driven into Rodynske, under FABs." This confirms the coordinated use of precision airpower to achieve tactical collapse. RF sources also claim UAF groups are surrendering near Kupiansk after being encircled, though this is unconfirmed. (FACT - RF Milbloggers/MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
• Eastern Border Zone (Sumy/Kharkiv): RF sources document "clearing operations" by special forces (code name "Anvar") in forested areas along the state border in Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts (specifically Yastrebshchyna and Volchanskiye Khutora). This activity suggests persistent, low-level RF reconnaissance and limited cross-border probing aimed at maintaining an area of safety or establishing forward observation/strike posts. (FACT - RF Milbloggers/HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Southern Axis (Zaporizhzhia): An RF reconnaissance UAV was detected and targeted in the western part of Zaporizhzhia Oblast moving north. A separate RF attack on Zaporizhzhia resulted in 3 civilian casualties. (FACT - UAF Air Force, Local Gov/HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Deep Strike Operations (UAF): UAF General Staff officially confirmed successful strikes on the Saratov Oil Refinery (NPZ), specifically hitting the ELOU AVT-6 oil refining complex. This is reported to be the 6th attack on this specific facility since early 2025. (FACT - UAF General Staff, ASTRA/HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Deep Strike Operations (RF): A threat of ballistic missile usage concluded, followed by a new threat: RF tactical aviation launched guided aerial bombs (KAB/FAB) toward Donetsk Oblast. (FACT - UAF Air Force/HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

RF reporting from the Sumy/Kharkiv border zone explicitly mentions muddy conditions ("Rasputitsa") and fog ("Tuman"). This indicates ground movement conditions are severely hampered in the border regions, favoring dismounted infantry, light vehicles, or aerial ISR/strike platforms (drones).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Posture: RF forces maintain high-tempo ground pressure on the Pokrovsk axis, leveraging air superiority and kinetic attrition. Concurrently, they are sustaining border security/incursion operations (Sumy/Kharkiv) and deep strike campaigns (Sarativ NPZ counter-strike).
• UAF Posture (Strategic Deep Defense): UAF General Staff continues to emphasize the professional capabilities of the Engineering Troops, reinforcing the strategic commitment to defense-in-depth. UAF deep strike capability remains operational and effective, as evidenced by the repeated successful targeting of the Saratov NPZ.
• UAF Posture (Air Defense): The ballistic missile threat was called off, indicating successful defensive measures or a change in RF targeting priority. However, new threats from guided air-dropped bombs (KAB/FAB) on Donetsk and new UAV activity in Sumy and Kharkiv require immediate AD resource allocation.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Sustained Air-Ground Interdiction: RF VKS maintains the capacity for continuous, high-volume launches of guided aerial bombs (KAB/FAB) against fixed UAF defensive positions, particularly around Pokrovsk. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Deep Target Protection Failure: RF Anti-Air Defense (AD) remains demonstrably incapable of consistently protecting critical strategic infrastructure (NPZs) against UAF drone strike capabilities, even after multiple previous attacks. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Internal Security Attrition: RF internal security and morale are degrading, evidenced by confirmed reports of severe infighting between former "Wagner" and "Akhmat" (Kadyrovite) personnel in rear areas (Barnual). This suggests friction between irregular and regular forces is accelerating. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

Intentions:

1. Achieve Breakthrough via Attrition: RF intent is to use sustained KAB/FAB strikes to maximize attrition in the Pokrovsk direction, forcing a rapid, disorganized UAF withdrawal.
2. Discredit UAF Leadership: RF IO is actively leveraging comments from former UAF officials (e.g., ex-Deputy Minister Deynega) to amplify narratives of "front failure" and "collapse of defense" in Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad.
3. Maintain Pressure on Border Zones: Low-level infiltration and reconnaissance in Sumy/Kharkiv aim to fix UAF forces to the border, preventing their redeployment to the critical Donetsk front.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift from a general ballistic threat (which concluded) to a specific re-launch of guided aerial bombs on Donetsk suggests RF VKS is immediately capitalizing on favorable conditions or shifting targeting priorities back to the primary ground effort in Donetsk after a brief period of deep strike activity.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The repeated successful strikes on the Saratov NPZ confirm an ongoing vulnerability in RF fuel and refining capabilities, which directly impacts front-line logistics. However, the continuous supply of KAB/FAB systems and Shaheds indicates RF production/supply of kinetic assets remains robust.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains capable of coordinating complex deep strikes (Saratov) and simultaneous localized air support (Donetsk, Sumy/Kharkiv border).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is focused on deep defense construction and maintenance, supported by the Engineering Corps. The offensive deep strike capability (Sarativ NPZ) remains highly effective, providing strategic leverage. Tactical commanders must maintain vigilance against RF attempts to exploit KAB/FAB strikes by immediately pushing ground forces into damaged sectors.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Strategic Interdiction: Confirmed damage to the Saratov NPZ (ELOU AVT-6 complex) is a significant and repeated success, increasing long-term pressure on RF energy and military logistics.
• AD Evasion/Defense: Successful management of the recent ballistic threat without major reported damage.

Setbacks:

• Kinetic Exposure: UAF forces in the Pokrovsk axis are suffering heavy kinetic attrition due to guided air-dropped bombs.
• Civilian Casualties: RF strikes resulted in 3 civilian injuries in Zaporizhzhia.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The priority remains the rapid deployment of effective counter-battery and counter-air-support ISR to identify and neutralize the platforms launching the highly effective KAB/FAB systems impacting the Donetsk front.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO (Political Defeatism): RF channels are intensely amplifying claims of UAF failure at Pokrovsk, particularly using commentary from former Ukrainian officials to lend credibility to the collapse narrative. INTENT: To undermine trust in UAF military command and encourage political pressure for ceasefires.
• RF IO (Internal Friction): RF channels are inadvertently confirming significant internal friction (Wagner vs. Akhmat knife attack in Barnual). While potentially useful for UAF IO, the primary RF goal in broadcasting this may be to use it as a deflection or to showcase the harsh justice within the RF system.
• UAF IO (Strategic Resilience): UAF IO is correctly focusing on demonstrating strategic reach (Saratov NPZ strike confirmation) and institutional stability (Engineering Corps, anti-corruption efforts in Kharkiv).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is likely bolstered by the success of the deep strike campaign but is under strain from the high intensity of fighting and KAB/FAB attrition on the front line, which RF IO attempts to capitalize upon.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF reports highlighting high-level diplomatic ties with China (Mishustin meeting) aim to signal continued geopolitical leverage and resilience against Western sanctions. Separately, the political IO surrounding former US President Trump's foreign policy claims is of concern only as it relates to potential changes in future US support continuity.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to intensify the operational tempo in Donetsk:

1. Concentrated KAB/FAB Attack: RF VKS will prioritize continuous air strikes using guided bombs against the UAF defensive layer directly covering Pokrovsk, focusing on settlements like Rodynske and Ivanopillya, aiming to create a breach point for ground units.
2. Escalated Border Probing: RF special forces/reconnaissance units will increase localized probing attacks in the Sumy/Kharkiv border zones, utilizing the current poor visibility and muddy terrain (Rasputitsa) to their advantage, forcing UAF to divert resources to static defense.
3. Counter-Deep Strike AD Shift: RF AD will attempt to increase coverage around key strategic targets like the Saratov NPZ, potentially through redeployment of high-value systems (S-400/Pantsir).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 72 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF achieves an operational exploitation:

1. Rapid Operational Encirclement: A successful, sustained KAB/FAB strike sequence causes a localized collapse of UAF defenses (e.g., near Ivanopillya), allowing RF mechanized units to rapidly penetrate the gap and bypass established defenses, threatening key UAF logistics nodes supporting Pokrovsk.
2. Targeted C2 Attack: RF utilizes its limited, high-speed ballistic assets (Iskander/KN-23) to strike previously identified UAF Command and Control (C2) nodes in the Donetsk operational rear area, capitalizing on UAF attention being fixed on the KAB/FAB threat at the front.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/J7 (Counter-Propaganda): IMMEDIATE COUNTER-IO FOR POKROVSK: Task J7 to preemptively neutralize the RF narrative of "front failure" by proactively issuing detailed, verifiable reports emphasizing UAF strategic defensive depth (Engineering Troops) and the strategic success of deep strikes (Saratov NPZ). Directly address and debunk RF amplification of former official commentary. (URGENT PRIORITY)
2. J3/J4 (Kinetic Defense): REDUCE KAB/FAB VULNERABILITY: Instruct frontline units in the Pokrovsk axis to immediately adopt dispersed/mobile defensive positions and minimize reliance on exposed fixed fortifications (blindages). Integrate specialized signals (EW/AD) teams closer to the front to disrupt the targeting coordinates of incoming guided bombs. (CRITICAL PRIORITY)
3. J3/Fires (Deep Interdiction): SUSTAIN NPZ STRIKE TEMPO: Following confirmed damage to Saratov NPZ, task GUR/SBU strike assets to immediately target adjacent or ancillary infrastructure at the same complex, or initiate strikes against the next-highest value RF NPZ target to maximize fuel supply disruption before RF can implement effective damage control or AD redeployment. (HIGH PRIORITY)

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