TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)
DTG: 031200Z NOV 25
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
The strategic focus of RF ground operations remains irrevocably fixed on the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad Axis (Donetsk Oblast). Kinetic activity across the fronts is now overtly synchronized with a highly centralized Russian Information Operation (IO) campaign aimed at exploiting perceived UAF weakness in this sector.
- Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad Axis (Critical Ground Focus): Multiple reports from both Russian and Ukrainian sources (including ISW assessments) confirm RF Group of Forces "Vostok" is concentrating maximum effort on securing Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad. UAF forces are engaged in intense defensive attrition battles on the approaches, evidenced by reports of heavy RF casualties ("approaches... covered with Russian corpses"). (FACT - Multiple Sources/HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Rodynske (Near Pokrovsk): Heavy kinetic engagement confirmed in Rodynske. RF sources claim the use of heavy unguided ordnance ("chuguniy," slang for FAB/unguided bombs) within the town, justifying it by claiming UAF has "broken through" back into the area. This suggests intense urban or near-urban combat. (FACT - RF Milbloggers, UAS Video/MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Ground truth on breakthrough pending)
- Southern Axis (Orekhov Direction): Sustained RF indirect fire continues, specifically observed targeting UAF positions north of Mala Tokmachka (Zaporizhzhia Front). RF drone footage confirms effective suppression fire on UAF trench lines and defensive features, aimed at preventing maneuver or reserve deployment. (FACT - RF UAS Video/HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Deep Strike Operations (UAF): UAF confirmed an overnight drone attack on the Saratov Oil Refinery (NPZ), an object previously targeted in February, August, and October 2025. This confirms UAF intent and capability to maintain pressure on strategic RF energy infrastructure despite RF EW/AD efforts. (FACT - RF Milbloggers/HIGH CONFIDENCE)
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
Heavy fog was observed in RF logistics footage (Colonelcassad's supply video), likely hindering aerial ISR and low-level flight operations, which could temporarily complicate UAF counter-battery and RF close air support.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
- RF Posture: RF forces are employing heavy kinetic saturation (FAB-500 equivalent reported by MoD Russia, unguided bombs in Rodynske) to collapse UAF fixed positions and force localized tactical withdrawals, supporting the main effort on the Pokrovsk axis.
- UAF Posture (Strategic): UAF High Command (Gen. Lt. Hnatov) held a monthly comprehensive meeting focused on "developing the capabilities of the Ukrainian military in conditions of high-tech warfare." This signals continued prioritization of advanced EW, ISR, and counter-drone capabilities. (FACT - UAF General Staff/HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- UAF Posture (Air Defense): UAF Air Force reports active engagement with RF reconnaissance UAVs near Zaporizhzhia, Eastern Kharkiv region, and Western Donetsk region, and notes incoming aviation-based strike threats in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Synelnykove district) and UAVs on a SW course in Northern Chernihiv region. This indicates active, multi-axis RF ISR and preparatory strike sequencing. (FACT - UAF Air Force/HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
- Fire Superiority (Ivanopillya/Rodynske): RF is demonstrating localized fire superiority near Pokrovsk, effectively destroying UAF fixed fortifications (blindages) and utilizing heavy, destructive ordnance (FAB/unguided bombs) in urban settings to clear defenses rapidly. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Sustained Attrition: RF retains the logistical capacity to sustain high-volume artillery barrages (Mala Tokmachka) and heavy air support to maintain unrelenting pressure on key UAF defensive nodes. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Logistics Adaptability (NEW): RF volunteer groups (e.g., ZOV LNR) are successfully delivering high-volume technical fluids (likely maintenance-related supplies) to RF units, suggesting decentralized but effective logistical support for the Autumn-Winter Campaign 2025. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
Intentions:
- Achieve Tactical Decisiveness near Pokrovsk: The primary RF intent is to capitalize on previous attritional successes (Ivanopillya) and synchronized IO (Pokrovsk evacuation narrative) to force a critical operational collapse in the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad sector.
- Maintain Operational Deception: RF continues to use ISR across multiple fronts (Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk) to force UAF AD dispersal and mask the exact location and timing of the next large-scale kinetic deep strike.
- Exploit Information Vulnerability: RF political IO (Leopard tank trophy, general Western decline narratives) is intended to reduce partner resolve prior to major funding decisions.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
The synchronicity between the RF IO campaign focusing on Pokrovsk's "humanitarian crisis" and the massive kinetic effort targeting the city's approaches is a significant, high-level adaptation of hybrid warfare. It suggests close integration between strategic communication (Gerasimov/Surovikin Doctrine elements) and kinetic field operations.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
The documented volunteer effort to supply large volumes of technical fluids (fuel/maintenance) for the "Autumn-Winter Campaign 2025" suggests RF is preparing its vehicle fleets for sustained maneuver through poor weather and is successfully mitigating gaps in organic military logistics through decentralized volunteer networks.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 is highly effective in coordinating the Pokrovsk ground offensive with strategic IO. The successful use of heavy air-dropped munitions (FABs) requires effective target identification, precise mission planning, and communication between ground-based forward air controllers/reconnaissance and strike aircraft.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
UAF forces are under intense pressure but maintaining defensive integrity through effective counter-attrition (evidenced by reported high RF casualties near Pokrovsk) and high-level strategic planning (General Staff meeting on high-tech warfare). The UAF confirmed deep strike capability (Saratov NPZ attack) shows offensive capability is being maintained beyond the front line.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
Successes:
- Counter-IO on DPRK POWs (Anticipated): Exploitation of the captured DPRK personnel remains a critical, high-value intelligence success (from previous report).
- Strategic Interdiction: The confirmed strike on the Saratov NPZ continues the UAF campaign to degrade RF economic and military fuel supply capacity.
Setbacks:
- Intense Attrition in Pokrovsk: The sustained high-volume artillery and air strikes near Ivanopillya and Rodynske (Pokrovsk axis) pose an immediate risk of defensive line collapse.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
- Counter-Battery: Urgent need for increased counter-battery fires and ISR assets near Ivanopillya and Mala Tokmachka to suppress RF artillery destroying fixed UAF positions.
- Air Defense: Need to maintain high AD alert and resupply given the confirmed multi-axis RF ISR activity and aviation strike threats (Dnipropetrovsk).
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
- RF IO (Political Defeatism): RF channels (e.g., Kotionok) are focusing on Western political narratives, using Serbian publicists to push the idea that European elites are incapable and destined for conflict with Russia, aiming to sow strategic division.
- RF IO (Operational Justification): RF milbloggers are leveraging the perceived "desperate position" of UAF units near Pokrovsk (Воин DV) and justifying the use of heavy ordnance (Alex Parker Returns on Rodynske) by falsely claiming UAF counter-attacks, setting the narrative for severe collateral damage.
- UAF Counter-IO (Domestic): Regional UAF authorities (Zaporizhzhia Oblast) are actively running media literacy campaigns ("Tryangle"), indicating UAF leadership recognizes and is attempting to mitigate the widespread impact of RF disinformation on the domestic population. (FACT - UAF Local Gov/HIGH CONFIDENCE)
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
UAF morale remains tested by the relentless kinetic pressure on the Donetsk axis, but is supported by continued validation of UAF strategic effects (NPZ strikes) and positive diplomatic commentary (NATO Admiral on Putin's strategic defeat).
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
A NATO Admiral’s statement that the war is at a “stalemate” but that Putin has suffered a "strategic defeat" provides a critical, positive narrative counterpoint to the RF's “trophy IO” (Leopard tank) campaign from the previous day. This supports the UAF narrative of long-term strategic advantage despite short-term tactical difficulty. (FACT - Multiple Sources/HIGH CONFIDENCE)
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to achieve a localized tactical penetration along the Pokrovsk axis:
- Concentrated Air-Ground Assault: RF forces will use massive, concentrated air-dropped munitions (FABs) and artillery saturation against the immediate UAF rear and forward trenches near Rodynske and Ivanopillya, aiming to create a breach large enough for mechanized follow-on forces to exploit.
- Increased ISR/Pre-Strike Sequencing: RF UAV activity (confirmed near Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk) will intensify as RF attempts to fix UAF AD for the next phase of deep strike operations, possibly targeting UAF airbases or logistics nodes essential for supplying the Eastern Front.
- Focus on COTS/Logistics Interdiction: RF will likely increase counter-drone and SIGINT efforts to protect its vulnerable COTS communications (Starlink) and supply routes, following the confirmed successful UAF targeting in the previous period.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 72 Hours
(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF achieves operational exploitation of the Pokrovsk breach:
- Forced UAF Withdrawal: RF successfully employs heavy ordnance to break the UAF defensive line near Rodynske, forcing a rapid, disorganized UAF withdrawal toward Myrnohrad. This could expose significant UAF reserves or create a costly fighting retreat.
- Multi-Axis Deep Strike/AD Suppression: RF launches a combined arms strike (missiles, guided bombs, UAVs) that successfully degrades a critical regional UAF Air Defense sector (e.g., Dnipropetrovsk), enabling sustained, high-volume use of guided aerial bombs on forward UAF positions.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
| Timeframe | Event/Decision Point | Triggering Indicator |
|---|
| 0-24H | Pokrovsk Breach Counter-Attack: UAF J3 determines if the defensive line can hold or if mobile reserves must be committed to stabilize the Rodynske/Ivanopillya breach. | RF forces confirmed establishing fire control or fixed positions inside Rodynske or advancing beyond the primary trench line near Ivanopillya. |
| 24-48H | Deep Strike Posture: UAF AD must adjust posture based on confirmed RF aviation strike types and frequency near Dnipropetrovsk/Synelnykove. | Confirmation of RF use of specific high-value guided munitions (e.g., Kh-59, Kh-31) or sustained low-altitude bomber activity. |
| 48-72H | DPRK Exploitation Dissemination: GUR provides initial high-value intelligence on DPRK forces to UAF operational units and strategic partners. | GUR releases initial reports on DPRK TTPs, integration, and supply chains. |
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) |
|---|
| CRITICAL | RF Ground Penetration (Rodynske): Confirm the current Line of Contact (LOC) and extent of RF ground penetration, if any, into Rodynske, and identify the RF units responsible for the heavy kinetic saturation. | IMINT/UAS ISR: Continuous, high-resolution ISR over Rodynske and Ivanopillya to verify control of terrain and quantify the scale of RF forces committed to the assault. |
| HIGH | RF Air Threat Ordinance: Identify the specific type of aviation-based strike assets and munitions being prepared for use against Dnipropetrovsk/Synelnykove. | SIGINT/HUMINT: Focused collection on RF aviation C2 frequencies and forward staging areas for evidence of specific guided missile or glide bomb deployment. |
| HIGH | UAF Deep Strike Damage Assessment: Quantify the operational impact (e.g., refining capacity loss, delivery delays) of the Saratov NPZ strike on RF internal fuel supply and military logistics. | IMINT/OSINT: Satellite imagery over the Saratov NPZ and monitoring of RF internal fuel commodity prices and logistics rail traffic. |
7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
- J3/Fires (Donetsk Attrition Mitigation): IMMEDIATE COUNTER-BATTERY AND COUNTER-AIR: Task all available counter-battery radar and precision strike assets (HIMARS/ATACMS/MLRS) to suppress RF artillery and air support staging areas targeting Rodynske and Ivanopillya. Prioritize destruction of confirmed RF positions utilizing heavy unguided ordnance (FAB deployment sites/launch platforms). (CRITICAL PRIORITY)
- J2/GUR (DPRK Exploitation): EXPLOIT FOREIGN FIGHTER INTEL: Rapidly generate a tailored threat profile and defensive TTP document based on the DPRK POW debriefings (as recommended previously). Disseminate this intelligence package to all forward units, particularly on the Eastern Front, to immediately inform tactical engagement rules. (URGENT PRIORITY)
- J7/J2 (Strategic Counter-IO): AMPLIFY POSITIVE DIPLOMATIC NARRATIVE: Immediately incorporate the NATO Admiral's "strategic defeat" statement and the confirmed strategic effectiveness of UAF NPZ strikes into all official UAF messaging channels to counteract the persistent RF political IO (Leopard trophy, Western weakness). (HIGH PRIORITY)
//END SITREP//