Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - DTG: 022330Z NOV 25

ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM-HIGH. High confidence in current air domain status; Medium confidence in RF's immediate intent following the deep strike stand-down.

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational environment remains defined by a transition from a high-intensity RF deep strike campaign to a renewed focus on multi-axis UAV saturation and persistent cognitive pressure.

• Air Domain (Deep Strike Stand-down): The nation-wide threat associated with the MiG-31K-borne Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles has been officially stood down by the UAF Air Force Command (AFU). This cessation of the high-end strike campaign marks a temporary de-escalation in the strategic kinetic domain, potentially for RF Damage Assessment (DA) or missile replenishment. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Air Domain (UAV Saturation): Immediately following the MiG-31K stand-down, RF initiated a new wave of Shahed-type UAVs ("Mopeds"). Tracking confirms groups moving north-west from the Beryslav district, Kherson Oblast, and another group positioned east of Boryspil, moving south-west. This rapid transition indicates RF intent to maintain pressure on UAF AD and likely target critical infrastructure in the central/southern regions. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk IO): RF military information sources (e.g., Colonelcassad) continue to amplify the narrative of tactical success, specifically stating, "In fact, we have practically lost Pokrovsk." This is a sustained effort to cement the cognitive victory, regardless of the true tactical status of the defensive line. (HIGH CONFIDENCE in RF IO push; LOW CONFIDENCE in tactical reality)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant changes. Clear conditions remain conducive for both RF and UAF long-range ISR/Strike UAV operations, particularly for the observed Shahed wave.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Posture: Transitioning from high-end strategic attack to persistent, low-cost UAV harassment. Ground forces continue to focus kinetic efforts on UAF fortifications near Ivanopillya and maintain high IO output to demoralize defenders (Pokrovsk).
• UAF Posture: High readiness status for AD against UAV threats. C2 nodes (Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia) are confirming the stand-down of the Kinzhal threat while maintaining vigilance against drone penetration.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Asymmetric Strike: RF retains high capacity for massed Shahed launches, exploiting gaps created by high-tempo Kinzhal operations.
• Sustained IO: RF can instantaneously pivot its information assets to reinforce strategic narratives (Pokrovsk loss, Western aid futility, DPRK counter-disinformation).

Intentions:

1. Test and Degrade AD (UAVs): Utilize Shahed UAVs to exploit AD stress caused by the previous Kinzhal wave, forcing the expenditure of high-value AD interceptors and locating vulnerable infrastructure.
2. Solidify Cognitive Victory: Continue aggressive IO to force the perception, both internally (RF) and externally (UAF/Partners), that Pokrovsk is lost, potentially forcing UAF to divert scarce reserves.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The immediate shift from the use of Kinzhal (highest-end strategic asset) to massed Shahed UAVs (lowest-end attritional asset) is a confirmed RF multi-domain operational rhythm. This tactic is designed to maximize operational tempo and constantly stress UAF AD by oscillating between overwhelming force (Kinzhal) and sustained attrition (Shahed). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The use of Shaheds confirms RF intent to sustain kinetic pressure using low-cost, expendable systems, conserving the more limited inventory of Kinzhal/Iskander missiles for future high-impact strikes.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 demonstrated effective synchronization in pivoting between the strategic aviation stand-down (MiG-31K) and the initiation of the UAV wave (Shahed). This reflects effective, coordinated, and rapid decision-making across the different domains of warfare. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF AD units are demonstrating resilience and flexibility, rapidly adapting from the hypersonic threat to the slower, low-flying UAV threat. Tactical units (e.g., 3rd Separate Assault Brigade) are maintaining localized offensive and clearing momentum, despite sustained RF attritional pressure (Ivanopillya).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS (Strategic): Confirmed capture of DPRK personnel and positive shifts in partner support (Germany, Turkey) provide strong counter-narratives to RF IO.
• CHALLENGE (Tactical Defense): The continued, successful RF targeting of fixed fortifications near Ivanopillya indicates a vulnerability that must be addressed immediately to prevent localized tactical failure.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Primary constraint shifts to low-altitude AD munitions and mobile air defense systems (e.g., Gepard, SHORAD) to effectively counter the incoming Shahed wave without expending limited high-end surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF continues a highly effective, coordinated IO campaign:

1. Defeatism (Pokrovsk): Sustained military blogger narratives attempting to preemptively declare the loss of Pokrovsk to degrade UAF political and military resolve.
2. Socio-Economic Normalization (TASS): Simultaneous RF domestic messaging (TASS report on rising social payments) attempts to project an image of internal stability and economic resilience, contrasting sharply with the war situation in Ukraine.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The repeated oscillation between high-alert (Kinzhal) and persistent night harassment (Shahed) creates a state of chronic stress for the civilian population. UAF C2 must ensure effective, rapid communication (e.g., AFU alerts) to maintain public trust.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The strategic IO push by the RF regarding the "Leopard trophy" (confirmed in previous reports) aims to neutralize the recent positive geopolitical shifts (German defense budget, Turkish oil procurement). UAF counter-IO must be deployed immediately.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to saturate key central and southern oblasts with UAVs, targeting energy, logistics, and military infrastructure (e.g., fuel depots, transformer substations). On the ground, attritional pressure will intensify near Ivanopillya, utilizing the current fire superiority advantage to collapse fixed UAF defenses and gain localized ground. IO will remain focused on Pokrovsk and DPRK POW counter-disinformation.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF conducts a surprise multi-missile strike (Iskander/KN-23) from pre-positioned systems within 12-24 hours. The target will be a high-value C2 node or military-industrial complex facility that was previously assessed as damaged during the Kinzhal wave but which RF ISR determined was still operational. This strike would be synchronized with a concentrated mechanized assault in the Pokrovsk sector to exploit the disruption.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Air Command (Counter-UAV): IMMEDIATE SHORAD REDEPLOYMENT. Direct mobile short-range air defense systems (e.g., anti-aircraft guns, MANPADS, and Gepard systems) to augment defenses in the areas threatened by the current Shahed wave (Kherson/Boryspil vectors). Prioritize the protection of key industrial or logistics centers.
2. J3/Fires Command (Ivanopillya): EXECUTE PRIORITY COUNTER-BATTERY STRIKES. Allocate high-precision munitions to immediately strike confirmed RF artillery positions responsible for the sustained destruction of UAF fortifications in the Ivanopillya sector to stabilize the defensive line and reduce personnel losses.
3. J7/Strategic Communications (Global): LAUNCH COUNTER-IO CAMPAIGN (DPRK/PARTNER SUCCESS). Task strategic communications units to immediately pivot the information space, using the confirmed DPRK POW capture and positive partner support developments (Germany/Turkey) to neutralize the RF's Pokrovsk defeatism narrative and the "trophy hardware" IO.

//END SITREP//