Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - TACTICAL FOCUS: RF DEEP STRIKE CAMPAIGN AND POKROVSK IO

DTG: 022203Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH regarding RF Kinzhal/Iskander strike capability; MEDIUM regarding the tactical efficacy of the UAF helicopter insertion attempt (per RF IO).

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational environment is currently characterized by an intensified RF multi-domain deep strike campaign against strategic rear assets, coinciding with sustained attritional ground combat and escalating information warfare.

• Strategic Rear (Air Defense Stress): The RF conducted a multi-wave launch of MiG-31K-borne Kh-47M2 Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles, initiating a nation-wide air alert. Targets were primarily directed toward the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Zhytomyr Oblasts, with repeated targeting of the Starokostiantyniv (Starokon) area confirmed by tracking data. Local reports indicate explosions in Zhytomyr Oblast, suggesting strike success or interception effectiveness. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmiisk): Ground attrition continues, with the UAF 28th Separate Mechanized Brigade ('Knights of the Winter Campaign') confirmed to be conducting high-tempo counter-attrition operations, utilizing UAV/FPV strikes against RF infantry ('Піхота'), armored vehicles (BBM), and fortifications ('Укриття піхоти'). This localized UAF combat effectiveness provides a kinetic counterpoint to the RF's pervasive IO narrative (Pokrovsk loss). RF sources are exploiting alleged UAF tactical failures, specifically claiming a failed Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) helicopter insertion attempt near Krasnoarmiisk (Pokrovsk area). (HIGH CONFIDENCE in UAF attrition success, LOW CONFIDENCE in RF-claimed GUR failure)
• UAV Warfare (Contested Airspace): RF sources confirmed the successful downing of a fixed-wing UAF reconnaissance UAV, likely via EW or short-range AD, reinforcing the contested nature of the tactical air domain and the continued RF focus on attriting UAF ISR assets. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant changes in localized weather, though clear skies are assumed conducive to the RF's high-altitude MiG-31K operations. The confirmed deep strike campaign suggests RF intent to strike regardless of immediate weather constraints.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Posture: Highly aggressive in the deep strike domain (Kinzhal multi-wave attacks) and persistent in the information domain (Pokrovsk loss narrative, GUR failure amplification). Ground forces remain focused on attrition, targeting UAF fortifications and personnel.
• UAF Posture: High AD alert status across the country. Tactical units (28th OMBR) maintain active defensive operations using UAVs to inflict maximum personnel and materiel costs on advancing RF forces.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Hypersonic Strike: RF maintains the immediate capability to launch synchronized, multi-missile Kinzhal strikes, designed to overwhelm UAF air defense (AD) in critical areas (e.g., C2 nodes, airbases, strategic reserves).
• IO Exploitation: RF rapidly pivots to exploit and amplify alleged UAF tactical failures (GUR insertion) or politically sensitive statements (Deynega's Pokrovsk assessment) to damage UAF morale and command credibility.

Intentions:

1. Degrade UAF Strategic Assets: The primary intent of the Kinzhal strikes is likely to suppress or destroy high-value military infrastructure (airbases, large logistical depots) and test UAF AD response capabilities prior to a potential larger wave of strikes.
2. Pressure Pokrovsk: RF will continue attritional advances, relying on IO to destabilize UAF defenses, hoping to trigger a localized collapse or politically mandated withdrawal.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift to multi-missile Kinzhal attacks (three confirmed launches in quick succession) suggests a tactical adaptation to enhance penetration probability against key targets like Starokon (HIGH CONFIDENCE). This indicates RF C2 is attempting to maximize the destructive output of its limited strategic strike assets.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The sustained use of advanced Kinzhal missiles suggests RF still prioritizes the expenditure of high-end strategic ordnance for political and military effect, despite reported sanctions and logistical strains on conventional munition production.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 demonstrated synchronized control over strategic aviation assets (MiG-31K launches) and rapid, coordinated IO response (GUR/Pokrovsk narrative). This suggests effective top-down control in the strategic and cognitive domains.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is high, as evidenced by the immediate, nation-wide air alert following the MiG-31K launch. The 28th OMBR demonstrates high combat readiness and effective adaptation in drone warfare, successfully maintaining pressure on RF ground elements in critical sectors.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS (Attrition): The 28th OMBR video compilation confirms continued success in localized attrition against RF manpower and materiel, slowing momentum in contested areas.
• SETBACK (Information Exposure): The public commentary regarding Pokrovsk and the RF amplification of the alleged GUR tactical failure are significant cognitive setbacks requiring immediate counter-action.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Air Defense Allocation: Urgent requirement to re-evaluate AD placement and readiness, especially around high-value targets consistently targeted by Kinzhal (e.g., Starokon, C2 centers).
2. Information Response Capability: Requirement for dedicated, rapid-response J7/GUR teams capable of fielding verified tactical success stories (like 28th OMBR operations) to counter hostile IO within hours.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• Dual-Vector Attack: RF is executing a coordinated IO strategy:
  • Strategic Discouragement: Amplifying the "Pokrovsk lost" narrative (Deynega quote) to create strategic panic and doubt in UAF leadership.
  • Tactical Discredit: Targeting specific UAF units (GUR) by alleging failed, "illiterate" tactical operations (Krasnoarmiisk/Pokrovsk area helicopter insertion).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The successful anti-personnel and anti-materiel operations by units like the 28th OMBR are essential for countering the strategic defeatism promoted by the RF and internal commentary. However, the repeated and unpredictable Kinzhal attacks raise public anxiety across the entire nation.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The RF claim of a UAF reconnaissance UAV sortie temporarily disrupting Bremen Airport in Germany suggests an attempt to generate friction between NATO partners and distract from the RF’s own escalations (Kinzhal strikes, IO). This remains a low-level, but persistent, IO vector.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will execute a follow-on deep strike wave within 24 hours, likely utilizing a mix of Kinzhal, Iskander, and possibly Shahed UAVs to attempt to capitalize on perceived UAF AD vulnerabilities or post-strike damage assessment. The targets will remain high-value strategic assets and airfields. On the ground, RF forces will use the IO narrative advantage to sustain frontal pressure near Pokrovsk and Ivanopillya, seeking to break or bypass the 28th OMBR and adjacent defensive lines.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF executes a strategic kinetic and cyber synchronization: A Kinzhal strike successfully penetrates AD and destroys a critical UAF strategic C2 node or air defense asset (e.g., Patriot battery). Simultaneously, RF cyber operations temporarily degrade essential UAF communication or ISR networks, creating a window for a large-scale mechanized push in the Pokrovsk sector, resulting in a significant operational breakthrough that threatens Myrnohrad.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Air Command (Air Defense): MAXIMIZE AD REDUNDANCY NEAR HIGH-VALUE TARGETS. Immediately implement dispersal and maximum readiness status for all available medium- and long-range AD systems (e.g., Patriot, NASAMS) around identified high-repeat targets, specifically Starokostiantyniv and vital Kyiv/Zhytomyr C2 nodes, anticipating a follow-on strike.
2. J7/Strategic Communications (Counter-IO): SYNCHRONIZE TACTICAL SUCCESS WITH STRATEGIC NARRATIVE. Immediately integrate and amplify the successful combat footage and casualty figures from the 28th OMBR with official UAF statements to demonstrate high combat readiness and counter the RF's Pokrovsk defeatism narrative and the alleged GUR failure.
3. J3/Tactical Command (Donetsk): MAINTAIN HIGH ATTRITION RATE IN POKROVSK SECTOR. Ensure continuous FPV and indirect fire support is provided to the 28th OMBR and neighboring units to exploit their current counter-attrition success against RF personnel and equipment, thus imposing maximum cost on RF advances toward Pokrovsk.

//END SITREP//