Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - TACTICAL FOCUS: RF GLIDE BOMB CAMPAIGN AND ATTRITION FIGHT ESCALATION

DTG: 022100Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. Confidence is HIGH regarding the RF's renewed focus on glide bomb (KAB) strikes against Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia, and HIGH regarding the operational effectiveness of UAF FPV and drone-mine laying capabilities.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture is currently defined by a spike in RF use of Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) against major urban centers near the front line and continuous, localized ground attrition in Donetsk.

• Kharkiv Axis: Multiple confirmed RF KAB strikes against the Industrial District of Kharkiv. This marks a continuation of the RF deep strike campaign, now utilizing air-delivered ordnance instead of solely UAV/missile saturation. The Air Force ZSU reported a KAB launch targeting Kharkiv earlier (20:07Z). (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Zaporizhzhia Axis: Confirmed launches of KABs by RF tactical aviation targeting Zaporizhzhia District (20:28Z and 20:31Z). This indicates an active air-delivered strike zone spanning from Kharkiv south to Zaporizhzhia. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Lyman Axis (Donetsk North): RF sources (Colonelcassad, Rybar) continue to claim and map gradual, localized advances, maintaining the pressure previously reported in the Stavky area. Claims of successful UAF FPV strikes against RF forces, including PTM-3 mine deployment via drone by the UAF 4th Guard Battalion 101, confirm the continued attrition fight and UAF adaptation to RF logistics movement. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE in claims, HIGH CONFIDENCE in UAF capability)
• Northern Border (Narva River/Estonia): Unconfirmed, but high-visibility report of a Russian Coast Guard vessel flying a non-standard flag (Wagner-style emblem) detected on the Narva River. This is a potential hybrid provocation event on the NATO border. (LOW CONFIDENCE in operational intent, HIGH CONFIDENCE in media report)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The confirmed KAB launches indicate continued favorable visual and flight conditions for RF fixed-wing tactical aircraft (Su-34/Su-35) operating at standoff ranges to deliver glide bombs. The deployment of FPV drones and drone-laid mines (PTM-3) confirms the effectiveness of low-altitude electronic warfare and drone operations, indicating continued opportunities for UAF small-unit tactics.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Air-Ground Synchronization: RF forces are actively synchronizing ground pressure with aerial bombardment, using KABs to degrade defensive infrastructure and military-industrial capacity in Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia, likely softening the ground for potential future thrusts or simply degrading UAF logistics/reserves.
• UAF Counter-Mobility (Drone Mining): UAF forces (4th Guard Battalion 101) are successfully integrating drone-based counter-mobility tactics (PTM-3 mine deployment) against RF staging areas, significantly increasing the risk to RF logistics and supply columns.
• RF Counter-UAS Adaptation: Imagery from Russian sources (RIA Novosti via Dvora Mayora) shows RF forces testing various protective cages/measures ("cope cages") on UAZ-452 'Bukhanka' logistical vehicles against FPV drones. This confirms RF recognition of the severe threat posed by UAF FPV saturation.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Sustained Glide Bomb Attacks: RF retains robust capability to conduct high-explosive stand-off attacks using KABs on front-line cities (Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia). This method is difficult for UAF AD to intercept and maximizes structural damage.
• Adaptive Counter-UAS: RF units are quickly adapting logistical vehicles with improvised protective measures, indicating a responsive effort to mitigate the FPV drone threat, which may temporarily reduce FPV effectiveness against specific targets.

Intentions:

1. Degrade Kharkiv/Zaporizhzhia Capacity: Continue the deep strike campaign with KABs to render critical infrastructure and industrial areas (Kharkiv Industrial District) unusable, forcing UAF to divert AD and repair resources.
2. Maintain Operational Deception: The alleged sighting of a vessel with irregular insignia near Estonia suggests continued RF willingness to employ hybrid, low-signature provocations against NATO members, testing alliance response thresholds.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Shift to KAB Dominance: The immediate surge in KAB use in the reporting period, following prior focus on Geran/Missile strikes, suggests RF air assets are being given higher priority or that missile inventories remain constrained, necessitating the use of the more cost-effective KABs.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The documentation of RF testing anti-drone measures on logistical vehicles highlights a major, sustained vulnerability in RF rear-area and forward logistics due to UAF FPV saturation. Successful UAF drone-mining operations (PTM-3 deployment) further threaten RF movement and sustainment along ground lines of communication (GLOCs).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in coordinating high-tempo tactical air strikes across multiple sectors (Kharkiv to Zaporizhzhia) while simultaneously applying ground pressure in Donetsk.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is characterized by a successful blend of high-tech attrition (FPV and drone mining) against RF ground elements and defensive vigilance against renewed RF aerial bombardment.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS (Drone Warfare Adaptation): UAF 4th Guard Battalion 101 demonstrated highly effective, innovative use of drones for both reconnaissance and counter-mobility (mine laying), confirming UAF retains a technological edge in the localized, attritional fight.
• SETBACK (KAB Vulnerability): The successful KAB strikes on Kharkiv Industrial District demonstrate an ongoing vulnerability to RF stand-off, high-payload strikes. UAF AD remains challenged by the flight profile of glide bombs.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Air Defense: Urgent need for robust AD assets, specifically systems capable of engaging low-flying tactical aircraft (Su-34/Su-35) or providing area defense against KAB delivery zones.
2. Counter-Mobility Assets: Increased resupply of PTM-3 mines and similar scatterable munitions to capitalize on the confirmed effectiveness of drone-based delivery against RF logistical targets.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• Hybrid Provocation Amplification: The Estonian-Narva River incident, if amplified by RF media, is a classic hybrid tactic designed to sow fear and distrust among NATO border states and divert international attention from the Donetsk ground fight.
• RF Narrative of Superiority: RF sources continue to publish claims of advancement (e.g., Lyman axis maps from Colonelcassad/Rybar) to maintain the narrative of inevitable victory.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The surge in KAB attacks on civilian/industrial centers (Kharkiv) will immediately depress local morale and heighten anxiety. UAF counter-propaganda must immediately capitalize on the confirmed tactical success of drone units and the strategic intelligence coup (DPRK POWs, previously reported) to sustain public confidence.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The alleged Narva River incident requires immediate diplomatic coordination with Estonia/NATO to ensure a measured, unified response that denies RF the desired escalation or distraction.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 48-72 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF tactical aviation will sustain the KAB bombardment campaign against fixed targets in the Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and possibly Sumy/Chernihiv regions, seeking to maximize kinetic damage before committing significant ground forces. RF ground forces will continue highly localized, attritional assaults in the Lyman and Pokrovsk sectors, attempting to fix UAF units in place while their rear area logistics are protected by improvised countermeasures against FPV drones.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48-72 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF executes a coordinated saturation attack utilizing UAVs, Missiles, and KABs simultaneously on a single high-value target set (e.g., a major regional electrical substation or strategic military depot) to achieve mission kill. On the ground, RF forces leverage their FPV-defended logistical convoys to mass material for a localized armored thrust in the Lyman direction, aiming to overwhelm exhausted UAF forward defenses near Stavky and establish a foothold for a larger breakthrough.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Air Defense (Immediate Threat Mitigation): DEPLOY MANPADS/VSHORAD TO KAB VULNERABLE ZONES. Immediately allocate highly mobile VSHORAD and MANPADS teams to cover the likely stand-off launch zones for RF tactical aircraft operating against Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia, aiming to disrupt the launch platforms before KAB deployment.
2. J4/J9 (Counter-Mobility Supply): INCREASE DRONE MINE STOCKS. Task J4 to prioritize the acquisition and delivery of anti-tank and anti-personnel scatterable mines (PTM-3 or equivalent) to frontline drone units confirmed to be successfully deploying them against RF logistics.
3. J2/GUR (Exploitation Priority): ACCELERATE DPRK POW INTEL DISSEMINATION. As previously recommended, expedite the exploitation of captured DPRK personnel to gain intelligence on RF force integration and deployment of foreign fighters, using the intelligence as immediate strategic counter-IO to overshadow RF ground claims.

//END SITREP//