INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC UPDATE: INTENSIFICATION OF DEEP STRIKES AND LYMAN PRESSURE
DTG: 022030Z NOV 25
ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM. Confidence is HIGH regarding the RF's intent to sustain deep strike operations and HIGH regarding the strategic shift of diplomatic support to Ukraine. Confidence is MEDIUM regarding the precise extent of RF control in Stavky.
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
The operational picture is defined by heightened deep strike activity against critical infrastructure and sustained ground pressure on the northern Donetsk flank.
- Lyman Axis (Donetsk North): RF sources (Colonelcassad) claim significant tactical gains, specifically asserting that RF forces have advanced and "liberated half" of the settlement of Stavky. This directly corroborates the previous assessment of escalating pressure on the Krasny Lyman supply axis. (HIGH CONFIDENCE in RF intent, MEDIUM CONFIDENCE in claimed control)
- Deep Strike Operations (Central/Eastern Ukraine):
- Pavlohrad (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast): Confirmed major fire following a successful RF Geran-2 (Shahed) strike on an industrial target, likely a factory or critical supply depot.
- Lebedyn Community (Sumy Oblast): Confirmed RF missile strike on a village.
- Shakhtarsk (Donetsk Oblast, RF-controlled): Potential UAF counter-strike, with unconfirmed reports of a strike on a fuel depot, indicating continued UAF deep strike capability against RF logistics.
- Air Traffic: Air Force ZSU confirms continued movement of RF UAVs from Sumy Oblast toward Poltava Oblast, signaling further planned deep strikes against Central/Eastern infrastructure.
- Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Center): UAF 155th Separate Mechanized Brigade (OMBr) is executing effective FPV drone strikes against RF positions and personnel hiding in built-up areas on the outskirts of Pokrovsk, demonstrating successful localized attrition. RF sources (НгП раZVедка) are reporting UAF preparation for a counter-thrust near Rodynske, suggesting UAF forces are maintaining offensive capacity despite the attritional fight.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
The confirmed successful deep strikes (Geran-2 in Pavlohrad) indicate favorable flight conditions for low-altitude UAVs. The onset of November and colder weather will increase the reliance on thermal imaging (a known UAF strength) and will heighten the impact of power disruptions on civilian infrastructure and logistical hubs (confirmed blackouts in Kyiv/Kyiv Oblast/Dnipropetrovsk).
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
- RF Deep Strike Posture: RF is prioritizing the degradation of Ukrainian industry and electrical supply, utilizing both long-range missiles and Geran UAVs in coordinated waves. This sustains the pressure that necessitates scheduled blackouts in major urban centers.
- UAF Deep Strike Posture: UAF maintains operational freedom to strike high-value, deep RF logistical nodes (e.g., Shakhtarsk fuel depot), validating the effectiveness of long-range interdiction assets.
- UAF Counter-Offensive Readiness: The reported concentration and preparation for a counter-attack near Rodynske (Pokrovsk axis) suggests UAF reserves are being deployed to stabilize the key objectives west of Avdiivka.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
Capabilities:
- Sustained Deep Strike Penetration: Demonstrated ability to bypass or overwhelm UAF AD in key areas (Pavlohrad strike, Sumy launches) to successfully hit high-value industrial and energy targets.
- Localized Breakthrough Power: RF forces retain the momentum to seize and hold ground in tactically significant areas like Stavky.
- Uncontrolled Ordnance Risk: Confirmed failure of a large Russian bomb (1.5-ton FAB/KAB variant) to detonate as intended, highlighting risk of collateral damage/friendly fire, and potential for unexploded ordnance.
Intentions:
- Exploit Lyman Axis: Solidify control over Stavky and push toward Krasny Lyman to force a major UAF defensive commitment and potentially sever a critical supply route.
- Degrade Ukrainian Military-Industrial Capacity: Use deep strikes to hit factories and logistical hubs (Pavlohrad) to inhibit UAF force regeneration and material support.
- Intensify Hybrid Pressure on NATO: RF IO efforts (previous Leopard trophy display, continued militaristic propaganda via channels like Dvora Mayora) are aimed at maintaining external pressure on partner resolve.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
- Focus on Industrial Targets: The successful strike on Pavlohrad reinforces the shift toward industrial sites rather than solely focusing on pure energy generation/distribution, reflecting an intent to damage UAF war-making capacity.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
RF deep strike capability is sustained, indicated by the volume of UAV and missile launches. UAF must continue to target RF fuel and ammunition depots (potential Shakhtarsk strike) to disrupt RF forward-area logistics, which are critical for the advances on the Lyman axis.
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 remains effective in coordinating complex, multi-axis deep strike operations (UAVs moving from Sumy to Poltava, confirmed strikes in Pavlohrad). The concentration of effort on the Lyman axis is centrally directed, signaling a high-level operational objective.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
UAF readiness is evidenced by the effective use of FPV drones for attrition (155th OMBr near Pokrovsk) and the readiness for counter-attack operations (near Rodynske). The strategic posture is further strengthened by external diplomatic shifts.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
- SUCCESS (Tactical Attrition): UAF FPV units continue to inflict heavy localized casualties on RF forces near Pokrovsk.
- SUCCESS (Strategic Arms Acquisition): Serbian President Vucic’s willingness to sell ammunition to European countries, even if intended for transfer to Ukraine, represents a significant positive shift, potentially opening a new high-volume supply vector for Soviet-caliber ammunition. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- SETBACK (Deep Strike Damage): The successful Geran strike on the Pavlohrad enterprise represents a localized failure of UAF point defense and a successful targeting effort by the RF.
- SETBACK (Lyman Axis): Confirmed reports of RF advances and control in Stavky necessitate an immediate and focused response to prevent further destabilization of the Krasny Lyman sector.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
- Air Defense Reallocation: Urgent review of AD asset allocation to protect critical industrial sites (like Pavlohrad) that are now high-priority RF targets.
- Ammunition Supply Strategy: J4/J8 must immediately initiate contact and planning with European partners to operationalize the new Serbian ammunition supply opportunity.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
- RF Ground Claims: RF channels (Colonelcassad) are amplifying localized gains (Stavky) to boost internal morale and signal continued offensive capacity.
- UAF Counter-IO Opportunity: The confirmed opening of the Serbian ammunition supply line is a major geopolitical win for Ukraine that directly counters the RF narrative of NATO fatigue and aid drying up.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
The sustained deep strikes leading to planned blackouts (Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk) negatively affect civilian morale and economic activity. However, strategic diplomatic victories (Serbia, Czech recruitment drive) provide strong countervailing positive morale boosters.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
- Serbia Shift (CRITICAL): President Vucic’s public statement of willingness to sell ammunition to the EU for onward transfer to Ukraine is a major geopolitical shift that undermines the RF's efforts to isolate Ukraine diplomatically and materially. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Czech Defense Buildup: The Czech plan to increase army recruitment signals hardening resolve among NATO eastern flank members in response to the RF threat.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 48-72 Hours
(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to exploit tactical success on the Lyman Axis by pushing immediately south or southwest from Stavky toward the supply lines servicing Krasny Lyman. This ground effort will be synchronized with continued, high-volume deep strike operations using the confirmed UAV flight paths (Sumy/Poltava) and likely ballistic/cruise missiles to maximize damage to the electrical grid and remaining industrial targets, further necessitating emergency power management (blackouts).
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48-72 Hours
(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF forces, having established a foothold in Stavky and leveraging effective attrition in the Ivanopillya sector (per previous report), execute a rapid, multi-pronged armored thrust in the Lyman sector, combined with an intense, concentrated air-delivered glide bomb (KAB) campaign against key UAF defensive strongpoints. This could achieve the operational objective of encircling or forcing a tactical retreat from Krasny Lyman, compromising the entire northern Donetsk defensive line.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
| Timeframe | Event/Decision Point | Triggering Indicator |
|---|
| 0-12H (Immediate) | Emergency Air Defense Mission Review: J3 must re-evaluate AD deployment to ensure maximum protection for critical industrial targets near the current front lines (e.g., Pavlohrad area). | Confirmation of RF intent to prioritize industrial targets via further successful strikes. |
| 12-24H | Lyman Counter-Attack Initiative: UAF forces must commit localized counter-attack or heavy fire support to neutralize RF control of Stavky and stabilize the critical supply route. | Confirmed RF consolidation or construction of fire bases within Stavky. |
| 24-48H | Ammunition Supply Negotiation: J4 must finalize high-level agreements with EU partners to establish the logistics chain for Serbian-origin ammunition. | Confirmation of first-order procurement agreements by EU partners. |
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) |
|---|
| CRITICAL | RF Control Extent in Stavky: Precise delimitation of current RF held territory within Stavky and assessment of RF force commitment and readiness for further offensive action. | IMINT/UAV ISR: High-resolution imagery of Stavky to confirm RF troop density and fortifications. |
| HIGH | RF Deep Strike Target Prioritization: Detailed intelligence on the specific industrial and military facilities targeted by the Pavlohrad strike, and the current RF target list. | TECHINT/HUMINT: Post-strike analysis and exploitation of captured RF planning documents or communications. |
| MEDIUM | UAF Counter-Attack Readiness (Rodynske): Status of force generation, readiness level, and specific objective for the planned UAF counter-thrust near Rodynske (Pokrovsk axis). | Internal J3/J5 Reporting: Confirmation of timelines and deployment of reinforcing units. |
7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
- J3/Air Defense (Immediate AD Adjustment): REPRIORITIZE INDUSTRIAL AD. Immediately adjust air defense coverage (especially mobile systems like Gepard/Avenger) to create overlapping protective zones over key, non-replicated industrial facilities (e.g., arms repair depots, high-volume production facilities) now confirmed as high-priority RF targets.
- J4/J8 (Strategic Ammunition Acquisition): ACTIVATE NEW SUPPLY VECTOR. Task the diplomatic and logistical commands to immediately engage European partners to quantify and secure the maximum volume of ammunition available through the newly opened Serbian channel. Prioritize 152mm and 122mm artillery stocks.
- J3/Ground Forces (Lyman Counter-Action): CONDUCT FAILED ATTACK SIMULATION. If direct counter-attack on Stavky is not immediately feasible, task reserves to conduct a series of spoiling attacks and heavy interdiction fires against RF reinforcement lines leading into Stavky to deny consolidation and force RF overcommitment of resources.
//END SITREP//
