Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - TACTICAL UPDATE: STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE INTERDICTION AND EW ADAPTATION

DTG: 021900Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. High confidence in the sustained effectiveness of UAF deep strike operations against Russian Federation (RF) logistical and energy targets. Medium confidence in the immediate tactical impact of new RF tank anti-drone countermeasures.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational geometry is defined by continuous attrition along the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) in Donetsk Oblast (Pokrovsk, Ivanopillya), coupled with a sustained deep interdiction campaign by UAF in the occupied territories and the RF rear.

• Deep Strike Zone (Donetsk/Dnipro Oblasts): Confirmed successful strikes by UAF (SBU/1st Separate SBU Center) on the Shakhtarsk Oil Depot and multiple key electrical substations in Luhansk Oblast (CyberBoroshno geolocation, Operatyvnyi ZSU). Furthermore, impacts, likely from Geran UAVs, were confirmed in Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, resulting in massive smoke plumes from damaged industrial infrastructure (Colonelcassad, Dvamyora). This confirms continuous, mutual deep strike operations targeting strategic infrastructure.
• Donetsk Axis (Ivanopillya/Pokrovsk): High-intensity positional warfare continues. Previous reports of RF success against UAF fortifications near Ivanopillya remain concerning. UAF President Zelenskyy emphasized the seriousness of the battle for Pokrovsk and denied RF claims of seizing Kupyansk (Operation Z source).
• Air Domain: Tactical aviation activity by RF is high on the North-Eastern axis (Sumy Oblast), utilizing Guided Aerial Bombs (GABs/UMPKs). UAF Air Force confirms continued threat from Shahed/Geran UAVs, particularly noted over Sumy Oblast, moving southwest.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Nighttime visibility continues to facilitate deep strike operations for both sides. The current use of GABs requires clear weather for accurate terminal guidance, suggesting localized periods of good visibility during daylight hours on the Eastern axis.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Forces (Air Defense): Despite the confirmed effectiveness of newly deployed Patriot systems against ballistic threats (previous SITREP), the need for scheduled power restrictions (Ukrenergo) indicates that RF deep strikes on energy infrastructure (substations, Pavlohrad industrial target) are successfully degrading national energy resilience.
• RF Forces (Technological Adaptation): RF units are showcasing enhanced defensive measures. Photos confirm the deployment of T-80BVM tanks equipped with:
  • Massive anti-drone protection (slat/wire cage armor).
  • Mine trawls (indicating expected high-density UAF minefields).
  • Electronic Warfare (EW) systems (likely targeting FPV/recon drones).
  • (Tsaplienko source). This signifies a direct, observable adaptation to UAF FPV and drone superiority.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Sustained Attrition: RF maintains capacity for high-volume kinetic strikes (artillery, GABs) to systematically destroy UAF fixed defenses (Ivanopillya).
• Deep Strike Counter-Interdiction: RF is successfully employing Geran/Shahed UAVs against UAF logistics and industrial targets (Pavlohrad).
• Technological Counter-Adaptation (NEW): RF has institutionalized drone countermeasures (massive slat/cage armor, EW suites) on frontline Main Battle Tanks (MBTs), indicating a dedicated effort to reduce drone-related losses.

Intentions:

1. Degrade UAF Logistical Resilience: Continue the systematic targeting of energy infrastructure (substations, industrial hubs, fuel depots) to force electricity consumption limits and impede military supply chain continuity.
2. Mitigate Drone Threat: Deploy technologically adapted armored vehicles to reduce the devastating impact of UAF FPV and loitering munitions, thereby preserving high-value assets for planned offensives.
3. Maintain Pressure on Critical Sectors: Sustain concentrated kinetic pressure on key defensive nodes (Pokrovsk, Ivanopillya) to prevent UAF from consolidating forces or launching counterattacks.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Armor Protection Focus (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The comprehensive up-armoring of T-80BVM tanks with heavy EW and specialized slat armor is a critical tactical adaptation, moving beyond simple "cope cages" to integrated counter-drone systems. This requires UAF FPV operators to adjust attack vectors and munition types.
• Drone Deployment Shift (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): Increased RF tactical aviation activity and GAB launches on the Sumy axis suggests an effort to pin down UAF AD assets further north, potentially clearing the air for subsequent drone waves or ground operations elsewhere.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UAF deep strikes on the Shakhtarsk oil depot and Luhansk substations directly constrain RF fuel and power supply to forward operating units in the Donbas. However, RF is compensating for UAF logistical successes by striking UAF energy and industrial targets (Pavlohrad). This suggests a mutual logistical degradation strategy is now dominant.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains robust enough to coordinate multi-domain strikes (GABs, UAVs, ground assault). The deployment of standardized, heavily modified MBTs (T-80BVMs) indicates central C2 direction and standardization regarding technological adaptation.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF maintains strong offensive posture in the deep strike domain (SBU confirmed successes). Defensive readiness is challenged by the need for power consumption limits, affecting civilian support and potentially military infrastructure resilience.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS (Strategic Interdiction): Confirmed, repeated successful targeting of RF energy (substations) and fuel (Shakhtarsk depot) logistics, directly impeding RF warfighting capacity.
• SETBACK (Energy Resilience): Ukrenergo’s announcement of future power restrictions confirms that RF counter-interdiction strikes are succeeding in degrading UAF national grid capacity.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Counter-EW and Counter-Armor TTPs: Immediate requirement for updated Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) for FPV/loitering munition operators to defeat the new RF EW and anti-drone armor configurations on MBTs. This may require kinetic solutions (e.g., top attack, shaped charges) or EW/Jamming solutions (e.g., anti-EW jamming).
2. Energy Infrastructure Hardening: Increased need for distributed, mobile, and hardened power generation assets to mitigate the impact of RF strikes on fixed substations.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO: The RF MoD continues to promote the high effectiveness of its UAV/FPV operators (MoD Russia source), aiming to counter the pervasive narrative of UAF drone superiority. RF sources (Dvamyora, Colonelcassad) are actively amplifying BDA from strikes on Pavlohrad to signal reciprocity in infrastructure targeting.
• UAF Counter-IO: UAF channels are successfully leveraging SBU/GUR successes against RF logistics (Shakhtarsk, substations) to boost morale and demonstrate strategic reach.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF deep strike successes (Shakhtarsk) are morale boosters. However, the announcement of continued scheduled power outages (Ukrenergo) will inevitably cause public frustration and could be exploited by RF IO to undermine governmental effectiveness.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF state media (Kotsnews) briefly highlighted US nuclear testing plans, possibly intended to distract from the core conflict and reinforce a global conflict narrative. The previous SITREP's focus on positive geopolitical shifts (German budget, Turkish oil purchases) remains a strategic advantage.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 48-72 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF ground forces will intensify the use of EW-protected and heavily armored MBTs (T-80BVM variant) in localized thrusts on the Donetsk axis (Ivanopillya/Pokrovsk). This is intended to test the ability of UAF FPV units to counter these adaptations. Simultaneously, RF deep strike efforts will continue focusing on secondary UAF energy distribution nodes and industrial hubs to maximize the strain on the national grid before winter.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 48-72 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt a coordinated, multi-axis armored thrust leveraging the newly protected T-80BVMs in a high-density, integrated combined arms maneuver near a vulnerable point on the FEBA (e.g., Ivanopillya). The combined effect of improved armor/EW and concentrated artillery fire (which proved effective against UAF fixed positions) could achieve a localized operational breakthrough, requiring UAF to commit strategic reserves.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Fires (Immediate Tactical Response): SHIFT FPV TTP PRIORITY. Issue an immediate directive to FPV/UAS units to prioritize attacks on the RF’s EW/C2 support vehicles accompanying the new T-80BVMs. If direct FPV hits on the protected MBTs are ineffective, the focus must shift to side/rear armor or to the vehicle’s tracks/mobility systems, utilizing dual-charge or shaped-charge munitions where available.
2. J2/TECHINT (Critical Technology Exploitation): PRIORITIZE EW SYSTEM INTERDICTION. Task GUR technical exploitation teams to rapidly develop and field counter-EW jamming or spoofing solutions targeting the most likely operating frequencies of the new RF tank-mounted EW suites, aiming to degrade their effectiveness before mass engagement.
3. J4/Infrastructure (Strategic Resilience): DECENTRALIZE ENERGY ASSETS. Expedite the deployment of mobile and semi-mobile power generation and transmission assets to critical military installations and command centers. Coordinate closely with Ukrenergo to reinforce critical substation components that have not yet been struck but share characteristics with the recently targeted Luhansk substations.

//END SITREP//