Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - TACTICAL UPDATE: BALLISTIC THREAT AND DEEP STRIKE CONTINUITY

DTG: 021803Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. High confidence in kinetic activity (ballistic threat, UAF deep strikes, frontline FPV use). Medium confidence in RF operational intent regarding the timing and target array of the renewed ballistic threat.

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational environment is defined by three converging factors: persistent, high-intensity kinetic pressure on the Donetsk axis (Pokrovsk/Konstantinovka), continuous UAF deep strike operations against RF strategic infrastructure, and a renewed, immediate ballistic threat to Kyiv and central/northeastern regions.

• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk/Konstantinovka): RF ground forces (specifically 39th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, 'Kaira' detachment) are sustaining aggressive FPV-led attacks targeting UAF personnel and positions on the Pokrovsk direction. RF sources (Pushilin) claim ongoing battles within the urban area of Konstantinovka, indicating RF efforts to expand their localized gains from Ivanopillya (reported previously) westward toward key logistics nodes.
• Northern Border (Kursk/Sloboda): UAF Border Guard units (RUBpAK ‘Aquila’) confirm successful offensive FPV/UAV operations targeting RF shelters and communication antennae in the Kursk and Northern-Sloboda directions, indicating UAF capacity for localized cross-border interdiction and maintenance of pressure on RF border forces.
• Deep Rear (Donetsk Oblast, RF): Unconfirmed reports of drone attacks on an oil depot in occupied Shakhtarsk (Donetsk Oblast) and confirmed SBU strikes on key substations near Alchevsk (reported by SBU 14th Separate Center) demonstrate the continuous, high-priority UAF campaign to degrade RF energy and logistics infrastructure in the occupied rear.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant change. Poor visibility from ground fog/rain (reported previously) favors low-altitude FPV and drone infiltration, a factor utilized by both UAF (SBU strikes, Border Guard strikes) and RF (39th Brigade FPV footage).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Air Defense (CRITICAL ALERT): Multiple high-priority alerts confirmed the threat of ballistic missile employment from the North-East direction, targeting Kyiv and central oblasts (Kyiv, Zaporizhzhia, etc.). This necessitates immediate activation of high-alert AD postures, particularly for newly deployed Patriot systems (reported previously).
• RF Air and Missile Forces: The activation of the ballistic threat signal indicates RF has committed high-value short-range ballistic missiles (likely Iskander or possibly KN-23/Kinzhal variants) from pre-positioned launch sites.
• RF Frontier Posture (Baltic/Northern Flank): The sighting of an FSB Border Guard Service vessel displaying a Wagner PMC flag on the Narva River (Estonian border) is a deliberate, low-level provocation intended to test NATO/EU response thresholds and reinforce the image of RF irregular forces.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Ballistic Attack (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF retains the immediate capability to launch synchronized ballistic missile attacks against UAF HVAs and C2 centers (confirmed by the current threat alert).
• Localized Offensive Attrition: RF units are effective in using FPV reconnaissance and strike assets (39th Brigade) to conduct personnel-level attrition and exploit localized weaknesses, particularly in dense terrain around Pokrovsk.
• Information Operations (CRITICAL): RF is fully capable of launching complex, multi-layered IO campaigns, simultaneously attacking Western resolve (Leopard display, reported previously) and bolstering domestic morale (Siberia/Finland poll, St. Petersburg parade).

Intentions:

1. Overwhelm Strategic AD (Primary Kinetic Intent): Execute the confirmed ballistic strikes to test the readiness and location of newly integrated Patriot systems and disrupt UAF C2/logistics in key hubs.
2. Propaganda and Demoralization: Use tactical successes (reported destruction of UAF blindages at Ivanopillya; claims of Konstaninovka entry) and strategic IO (Leopard, Siberia poll) to undermine UAF public and international support.
3. Achieve Localized Breakthrough: Sustain high kinetic pressure in the Pokrovsk/Konstantinovka sector to force a UAF withdrawal and claim a decisive localized victory (as amplified by Colonelcassad).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Increased Ballistic Targeting (Re-Emergence): The immediate threat to Kyiv signals a renewed high-value, high-risk strike phase, potentially in response to UAF deep strikes (Shakhtarsk, Alchevsk).
• Hybrid/Provocative Display (Northern Flank): The use of the Wagner flag on an FSB vessel is a hybrid-domain tactic—military presence coupled with an irregular symbol—designed to cause political friction without triggering a direct military response from NATO.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UAF deep strikes (SBU strikes on substations, drone attack on Shakhtarsk oil depot) are systematically degrading RF energy and logistics capacity in the occupied territories. This constant pressure likely compounds the previously reported vulnerabilities in RF forward fuel supply lines.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains capable of synchronizing complex, multi-domain operations, including immediate deep ballistic strikes and persistent frontline FPV operations. However, the use of highly provocative symbols (Wagner flag) on a state vessel suggests decentralized command allowance for tactical-level political signaling.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is offensively oriented in the deep rear (SBU 14th Center, GUR operations) and defensively focused on the FEBA. The immediate response to the ballistic threat indicates rapid alert protocols are in effect. UAF forces are successfully maintaining localized offensive momentum (3rd Assault Brigade, reported previously) and conducting effective cross-border interdiction (Aquila/Border Guard units).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• CRITICAL Success (Deep Strike): SBU 14th Separate Center confirmed successful strikes on key substations near Alchevsk, directly degrading RF warfighting capability in the occupied rear.
• Tactical Success (Northern Interdiction): Border Guard UAV units successfully destroyed RF shelters and antennae on the Kursk/Sloboda directions, securing critical border sectors and disrupting RF ISR/C2.
• Setback (Kinetic Threat): The confirmed immediate threat of ballistic missiles to Kyiv/central regions represents a critical kinetic vulnerability requiring immediate mitigation.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Ballistic AD Ammunition: Immediate replenishment status check on interceptor stocks (especially Patriot and NASAMS) following the anticipated expenditure from the current ballistic threat alert.
2. Counter-Reconnaissance/ISR: Increased allocation of ISR assets to identify and locate RF ballistic missile launch positions (North/Northeast direction) to enable counter-strike if feasible.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO continues a multi-axis effort:

1. Exaggeration of Success: Amplification of claims regarding the collapse of the UAF Krasnoarmiysk (Pokrovsk) grouping and entry into Konstantinovka (Colonelcassad, Pushilin).
2. Internal Cohesion: Large-scale, state-sponsored patriotic mobilization (Young Guard parade in St. Petersburg).
3. Western Weakness (Targeting Finland): Disinformation suggesting Finland's economic dependence and advocating for Finnish citizens to seek work in Siberia, attempting to drive a wedge between NATO nations and diminish the perceived cost of RF aggression.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale is sustained by continuous news of UAF deep strikes (SBU, Shakhtarsk) and strategic gains (German funding, Turkish oil, reported previously). However, frequent ballistic alerts and confirmed civilian casualties (Pavlohrad fatality, reported previously) test the public's resilience, requiring transparent and confident communication from the UAF and local military administrations (KMVA).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The Serbian President Vucic’s claim of supplying ammunition to Europe for potential use in Ukraine, framed as an indirect aid channel, introduces complexity to the diplomatic environment but suggests a potentially expanding indirect supply chain for UAF materiel, despite Serbia’s non-aligned stance.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will execute the confirmed ballistic strike campaign against primary HVA targets (C2 centers, critical infrastructure, AD sites) in central Ukraine. Simultaneously, RF ground forces will sustain maximum kinetic pressure on the Pokrovsk axis, attempting to convert recent successful attrition (Ivanopillya blindages) into a tangible operational encirclement or forced withdrawal from key forward positions. RF IO will continue to amplify the 'Leopard trophy' and the 'Krasnoarmiysk collapse' narratives.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-48 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF utilizes the current high-alert phase (ballistic threat) to execute a coordinated electronic warfare (EW) surge against key UAF strategic AD and C2 nodes, particularly in the regions protected by the new Patriot systems. This MDCOA aims to blind the AD network, enabling follow-on precision strikes (e.g., using Kinzhal or cruise missiles) against high-value fixed targets (e.g., General Staff headquarters or newly identified logistics hubs) while UAF AD resources are focused on the initial ballistic threat vector.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/Air Force (AD Response - IMMEDIATE): MAINTAIN MAXIMUM AD READINESS AND EXECUTE HARD KILL PROTOCOLS. Prioritize allocation of high-performance interceptors (Patriot/NASAMS) to protect key C2 centers and strategic logistics nodes during the current ballistic threat phase. Immediately implement passive defense measures (sheltering, dispersal) for personnel and equipment.
2. J7/GUR (Information Warfare): ELEVATE COUNTER-IO PRIORITY. Immediately disseminate information regarding UAF successes and the hypocrisy of RF IO (e.g., contrasting the "Siberia for Finns" narrative with RF manpower strain). Ensure maximum media coverage of the successful SBU deep strikes to maintain internal morale momentum.
3. J3/Ground Forces (Donetsk Axis): COUNTER-ATTRITION FIRE SUPPORT. Immediately allocate responsive counter-battery fire and air support to units defending the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka axis to suppress aggressive RF FPV teams and prevent the consolidation of claimed gains.

//END SITREP//