Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE: LOGISTICS INTERDICTION AND STRATEGIC AD SUCCESS

DTG: 021735Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): MEDIUM. High confidence in Blue Force tactical successes (logistics strikes, AD shootdowns). Medium confidence in RF operational objectives following sustained deep strike failures and continuous attrition on the Pokrovsk axis.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational geometry remains characterized by persistent RF ground pressure in Donetsk and limited RF gains in the Zaporizhzhia sector, while the deep rear remains a primary target for RF kinetic strikes and a successful hunting ground for UAF deep-strike assets.

• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk Direction): RF continues to focus operational efforts on seizing the Pokrovsk area. RF sources claim ongoing operations, focusing on targeting UAF supply lines using light vehicles and communication nodes (Starlink). This is indicative of RF attempts to isolate forward UAF positions. UAF forces confirm successful counter-operations resulting in the destruction of RF personnel (Zelenskyy reference to results in Pokrovsk).
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Stepnohirsk): RF sources ("Два майора") claim ongoing bloody battles in Stepnohirsk, supported by artillery strikes targeting residential/urban areas, suggesting the settlement remains contested and RF is resorting to heavy, attritional fire to gain ground.
• Kharkiv Axis: RF sources ("Старше Эдды") confirm continued drone operations by GrV Sever, focused on finding and destroying concealed UAF armored vehicles and equipment.
• Deep Rear (Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast): Post-strike Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) confirms the severity of the recent RF UAV attack, resulting in fires at an industrial enterprise and confirmed civilian casualties (one fatality, three injured). This validates the continued RF intent to degrade industrial and logistics capacity.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change from previous reporting. Incoming rain and fog favor UAF defensive anti-infiltration tactics and may increase the utility of UAF ground-based FPV assets, while degrading RF air-based ISR.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Deep Strike Capacity (NEW): UAF has achieved significant tactical success in interdicting RF logistics. GUR MO and the 412th Separate UAV Systems Regiment ("NEMESIS") successfully destroyed multiple RF fuel tankers (ПАЛИВОЗАПРАВНИКИ) and armored fighting vehicles (ББМ) deep in the operational rear. This confirms UAF’s multi-domain capability (FPV/reconnaissance and strike) against high-value RF logistics.
• UAF Air Defense Reinforcement (CRITICAL): President Zelenskyy confirmed the arrival and integration of additional Patriot AD systems into UAF operations, fulfilling agreements with Germany. This significantly bolsters UAF High Value Asset (HVA) protection and deep rear defense capability, directly countering the RF MLCOA of saturating AD.
• RF Force Composition: Confirmation of an extremely young RF casualty (Kirill Kalinin, born 2006) by UAF OSINT suggests RF continues to draw upon the youngest available mobilized personnel, indicating manpower strain.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Persistent Logistics Targeting (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF retains the capability to execute massed UAV strikes against critical logistics nodes deep within Ukraine (Pavlohrad).
• Counter-Insurgency/Anti-Supply Operations (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): RF units, specifically those on the Pokrovsk axis (e.g., 'Strike Detachment Irishmen'), are proficient in utilizing FPV/ISR drones to aggressively interdict UAF light supply vehicles and critical communication infrastructure (Starlink terminals).

Intentions:

1. Disrupt Logistics/C2 (Primary Intent): Continue targeted strikes against UAF supply lines (Pokrovsk) and deep rear logistics/industrial centers (Pavlohrad) to maximize attrition and constrain UAF operational freedom.
2. Maintain Localized Pressure: Sustain high-intensity, bloody battles (Stepnohirsk, Ivanopillya) to prevent UAF from consolidating forces or initiating significant counter-offensives.
3. Neutralize Strategic AD Gain: Anticipate RF attempting a coordinated wave of kinetic attacks (UAVs/Missiles) in the next 72 hours, specifically testing the deployment locations and readiness of the newly confirmed Patriot systems.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Targeting of Starlink: Confirmed targeting of Starlink terminals in the Pokrovsk sector is a significant tactical adaptation by RF forces, indicating a shift toward immediate neutralization of high-speed UAF battlefield C2 and data transmission.
• Increased Use of FPV for Logistics Interdiction: RF is deploying small FPV drone teams far forward to actively hunt soft targets (light trucks, passenger cars) used for forward supply, complementing their deep kinetic strikes.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The documented destruction of multiple RF fuel tankers by UAF deep strike forces indicates a vulnerability in RF forward logistics lines. While RF retains the ability to use high-value assets (e.g., Tornado-S MLRS, previously reported), the sustained successful UAF interdiction of fuel and ammunition supplies suggests local RF units face sustainment difficulties, particularly on the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective enough to synchronize localized offensive actions (Pokrovsk) and to coordinate deep strike campaigns (Pavlohrad). However, the necessity of deploying ultra-low-quality personnel (e.g., 2006-born contract soldiers) suggests RF mobilization and replacement mechanisms are under significant strain, complicating C2 effectiveness over time.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is high, underscored by the continuous execution of complex, multi-unit deep-strike operations (GUR/412th Regiment logistics strikes) and the successful downing of RF ISR UAVs (1129th AD Regiment neutralizing the SM-18). The confirmation of increased Patriot systems is a critical boost to strategic defensive posture.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• CRITICAL Success (Strategic/Technological): Confirmed delivery and integration of additional Patriot systems. This is the most significant strategic development in the last 24 hours.
• CRITICAL Success (Logistics Interdiction): Successful targeting and destruction of multiple RF fuel tankers and IFVs by the GUR/412th Brigade, directly impacting RF operational sustainment.
• Setback (Deep Rear Vulnerability): The continued, successful targeting of Pavlohrad with massed UAV strikes confirms a persistent vulnerability that needs immediate and robust AD protection.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Counter-Drone/EW: Immediate requirement for high-power Electronic Warfare (EW) and localized counter-drone systems to protect forward C2 nodes, particularly against RF's increasing focus on targeting Starlink systems.
2. AD Integration: Rapid integration and deployment of the newly acquired Patriot systems to cover identified HVA gaps (e.g., Dnipropetrovsk Oblast/Pavlohrad).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO focuses on displaying tactical dominance ("Victory will be ours!" from 'Irishmen' unit) and justifying high-intensity attrition ("bloody battles in Stepnohirsk"). Notably, the RF media did not attempt to suppress or deny the Pavlohrad strike damage; rather, they amplified the destruction, confirming the intent is to demoralize. UAF counter-IO continues to focus on strategic support (Patriot acquisition) and highlighting RF manpower desperation (2006-born casualty).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale is reinforced by high-level confirmation of crucial foreign aid (Patriot systems) and localized operational successes (deep strikes). However, civilian casualties resulting from the Pavlohrad attack will test local resilience, necessitating proactive communication and support efforts.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

President Zelenskyy's public acknowledgment of the new Patriot systems and the implied involvement of Germany (Chancellor Merz) strengthens the narrative of sustained, high-level Western commitment. This positive development must be maintained in the face of RF's "trophy hardware" IO campaign (reported previously).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24-72 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will attempt to test the newly deployed Patriot AD systems by launching a coordinated, complex kinetic attack (Shahids/Missiles) against known/suspected AD positions or the HVA they are protecting (e.g., Kyiv, Dnipro, or logistics hubs). Ground forces will sustain the attritional grinding effort in Stepnohirsk and the Ivanopillya sector, coupled with intensified FPV reconnaissance and interdiction missions targeting UAF supply and communication nodes around Pokrovsk.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-72 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) A coordinated RF ground assault targeting a specific UAF command/logistics node (similar to the Starlink targeting reported) in the Pokrovsk or Kupyansk sectors, exploiting the poor visibility conditions (fog/rain). This MDCOA involves combined arms—heavy fire suppression (to isolate the target), EW jamming (to disrupt AD/ISR), and a rapid infiltration/assault by specialized or low-visibility units (potentially including Belarusian reconnaissance personnel reported previously) aiming for immediate tactical decapitation.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J3/JFS (Air Defense Integration - IMMEDIATE): ESTABLISH IMMEDIATE COUNTER-RECONNAISSANCE SCREEN AROUND NEW PATRIOT ASSETS. Allocate supplementary EW and reconnaissance drones to provide continuous surveillance and jamming coverage around the confirmed deployment areas of the new Patriot systems for the next 72 hours, anticipating RF counter-AD efforts (MLCOA).
2. J6/Frontline C2 (Pokrovsk Sector): IMPLEMENT C2 HARDENING PROTOCOL. Mandate immediate dispersion of forward C2 elements and implement strict radio silence/emission control (EMCON) protocols, supplementing communication with redundant systems to mitigate the confirmed RF threat against Starlink terminals and communication networks.
3. J3/GUR (Logistics Interdiction): MAINTAIN HIGH-INTENSITY DEEP STRIKE ON RF FUEL ASSETS. Given the confirmed success of the GUR/412th Brigade operation, allocate maximum FPV/strike drone resources to sustain the targeting of RF fuel tankers and vulnerable logistics columns in the operational rear. Prioritize known choke points and staging areas.

//END SITREP//