Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE: FOCUSED ATTRITION AND MULTI-DOMAIN COUNTER-ATTACK

DTG: 021430Z NOV 25 ANALYST CONFIDENCE (Overall): HIGH. Confidence is high regarding tactical engagements on the Pokrovsk axis and the ongoing multi-domain attrition against RF strategic assets.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational focus remains on the Pokrovsk Axis in Donetsk Oblast, where UAF forces are executing a high-intensity, localized defense supported by heavy FPV drone attrition against RF personnel and light vehicles.

• Pokrovsk Axis (Rodynske): Confirmed high casualty rates among RF assault groups ("Katsap Shturmers") near Rodynske. UAF 155th Separate Mechanized Brigade (Anna Kyivska) is actively employing FPV drones to inflict losses and stall the RF advance. This validates the UAF commitment to holding this key operational area.
• Deep Strike Operations (RF Rear): UAF General Staff confirmation of strikes on the Tuapse oil terminal validates the sustained campaign against RF strategic energy infrastructure, creating tangible economic and logistical pressure far from the Front Line of Contact (FLOC).
• Kharkiv Suburbs: Confirmed explosions in the suburbs of Kharkiv following warnings of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs). This confirms the sustained RF use of stand-off munitions to degrade infrastructure and UAF positions.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant changes. Continued favorable conditions for high-tempo UAV/UAS operations, as evidenced by the high volume of FPV drone strikes reported by the 155th Brigade and the RF claim of downing a UAF reconnaissance UAV.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Forces (Pokrovsk): The 155th Separate Mechanized Brigade is highly engaged, utilizing advanced FPV tactics to counter RF frontal assaults. The effectiveness of these strikes suggests UAF forces have effective localized fire control and target acquisition.
• RF Forces (Air/UAV): RF forces continue their high-volume campaign of KAB strikes against Kharkiv and actively attempt to interdict UAF reconnaissance and strike drones (claimed downing of an 'Army of Drones' UAV).
• Strategic Deployment (RF): The reported launch of the special-purpose submarine Khabarovsk (Project 09851) at Severodvinsk, designed to carry the Poseidon nuclear-powered torpedo, is a strategic, long-term development with no immediate tactical impact, but it serves as a persistent political tool in the strategic domain.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities:

• Effective Attrition Warfare (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF maintains the capability to sustain high-intensity, casualty-intensive assault operations (documented losses at Rodynske) to achieve localized breakthroughs, supported by superior artillery and air power (KABs).
• Targeted IO (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF utilizes both strategic IO (Leopard trophy display) and domestic IO (criminal cases against festival producers) to reinforce narratives of RF internal order and military prowess while exploiting Western vulnerabilities.

Intentions:

1. Sustain Pressure on Pokrovsk: Maintain the high-cost attrition effort against Rodynske and adjacent sectors to prevent UAF reserves (identified in previous reporting) from stabilizing the line.
2. Continue Deep Strike Counter-Measures: Attempt to degrade UAF deep strike capability by increasing counter-UAV measures at the FLOC and in the near-rear, while attempting to manage domestic fallout from successful UAF strikes (Tuapse confirmation).
3. Exploit DPRK POW Narrative: Launch the predicted preemptive disinformation campaign to discredit UAF handling of captured DPRK personnel (MDCOA from previous reporting).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has rapidly integrated the successful interception of a UAF 'Army of Drones' UAV into its military blogs (Colonelcassad), demonstrating an effective and rapid cycle for Information Exploitation (IE) regarding tactical successes to boost domestic morale and deny UAF intelligence value.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UAF confirmation of the Tuapse oil terminal strike, alongside previous strikes (Sochi, Lipetsk), significantly increases the friction on RF logistics by targeting critical energy infrastructure. While not crippling, this campaign forces RF to allocate significant resources to damage repair and rear-area defense.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in coordinating high-intensity ground assaults (Rodynske) and stand-off fire (Kharkiv KABs). The claimed downing of a UAF reconnaissance UAV suggests effective localized counter-UAS C2, though deep-area AD C2 remains fragmented (Tuapse strike confirmed).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture on the Pokrovsk axis is defined by resilient defense and effective use of decentralized assets (FPV drones) to inflict disproportionate casualties on RF assault units. The commitment of the 155th Brigade is vital in slowing the RF advance toward Rodynske/Pokrovsk.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes (Tactical Attrition): Confirmed "colossal losses" of RF assault groups at Rodynske due to UAF fire (155th Brigade FPV strikes). This directly supports the operational objective of bleeding RF offensive potential.
• Successes (Strategic Strike): UAF General Staff confirmed a successful deep strike against the Tuapse oil terminal, sustaining the strategic pressure campaign.
• Setbacks (Reconnaissance Loss): Confirmed loss of a UAF 'Army of Drones' reconnaissance UAV, which provides the RF with technical intelligence on UAF platforms and potentially compromises operational patterns.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The high volume of FPV drone operations (155th Brigade) highlights the effectiveness of these systems, requiring sustained resupply of components and munitions. Continued AD/EW resources are required in the Kharkiv sector to mitigate the ongoing KAB threat.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF External IO (Leopard Trophy): Sustained strategic focus on demoralizing NATO partners via the institutionalized display of captured Leopard tank parts (CRITICAL, as per previous analysis).
• RF Internal IO: RF internal messaging focuses on securing the homeland (criminal cases against domestic producers) and celebrating tactical successes ("sbil ukrrazvedchik").
• Pro-UAF OSINT: UAF-aligned channels are effectively using tactical footage (155th Brigade FPV strikes, RF casualties at Rodynske) to counter the RF narrative and maintain high morale among frontline troops and domestic supporters.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is reinforced by confirmed tactical successes (Rodynske casualties) and strategic success (Tuapse strike). RF domestic sentiment remains highly managed, though disruptions from deep strikes (Tuapse) could increase anxiety about the war's proximity.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The previously noted positive shifts (German defense spending, Turkish oil changes) are strong indicators that UAF strategic actions are offsetting the negative impacts of RF IO (Leopard trophy, Berlin refugee narrative).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) - Next 24-72 Hours

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will continue to sustain high-attrition frontal assaults in the Rodynske/Pokrovsk axis, using these attacks as bait to draw UAF reserves into contact where they can be targeted by KABs or precision fire. Simultaneously, RF IO will fully mobilize the disinformation campaign regarding the captured DPRK POWs, utilizing state media to propagate claims of UAF misconduct to preempt intelligence exploitation.

• Indicators: Sustained high casualty rates reported by both sides near Rodynske; coordinated RF diplomatic and media statements concerning DPRK soldiers.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) - Next 24-72 Hours

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF conducts a massed, synchronized KAB strike package specifically targeting UAF command posts, logistics nodes, and identified reserve assembly areas supporting the Pokrovsk defense. This would attempt to decapitate the UAF counter-attack effort and exploit the success of the high-attrition ground assault.

• Indicators: Increased RF fighter-bomber sorties from major airbases (e.g., Voronezh, Rostov); sudden suppression of UAF EW activity along the Pokrovsk logistical routes.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. J2/GUR (Exploitation and Targeting): NEUTRALIZE COUNTER-UAS THREAT. Rapidly integrate the technical data from the downed 'Army of Drones' UAV into the UAF EW doctrine. Immediately adjust FPV/UAV flight profiles and operational areas on the FLOC to mitigate the newly identified RF counter-UAS capability (CRITICAL GAP).
2. J7 (Information Warfare): LEVERAGE DPRK CAPTURE (URGENT). In parallel with the strategic counter-IO (Recommendation 2 from previous SITREP), issue a detailed, controlled briefing on the captured DPRK personnel to select international media partners. Frame the capture as evidence of RF reliance on foreign mercenaries and a violation of international norms, preempting the anticipated RF disinformation.
3. J3 (Maneuver & Fires): MAINTAIN FPV ATTRITION AT POKROVSK. Ensure sustained resupply of FPV components to the 155th Brigade and similar units engaged on the Pokrovsk axis. The current high attrition rate inflicted on RF assault groups is tactically successful and must be maintained to buy time for the deployment of UAF reserves.

//END SITREP//